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OUTSIDE THE CONTEST



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# OUTSIDE THE CONTEST



A STUDY OF NONALIGNMENT  
AND THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF SOME  
NONALIGNED COUNTRIES

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## *Preface*

THE POSTWAR WORLD HAS SUPPLIED MANY NEW TERMS TO the vocabulary of international affairs. The most well-known among them is the 'cold war', sometimes referred to as the 'Great Contest' of the world. Along with it has emerged another term — nonalignment. This book is an attempt to explain the term and the foreign policies of some of those countries who are nonaligned in relation to the cold war.

The papers included in this book were first presented to a seminar in New Delhi in which many students of international relations participated. Some of these were published in some scholarly journals. For instance, the papers on Ceylon and Pakistan appeared in the *International Studies* (New Delhi) and the paper on India appeared in the *Indian Journal of Political Science* (Delhi). We are grateful to the editors of the respective journals for permission to include them in this volume.

Many international events, which have a bearing on the subject dealt here, took place since the manuscript had gone to the press. But as the central theme of the book still holds good, we have not made any changes to the original papers.

If this limited contribution to the sparse literature on the subject will lead to further discussion on it the contributors will feel more than satisfied.

New Delhi

15 January 1963

K. P. KARUNAKARAN



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## *Introductory*

# The Basic Factors

K. P. Karunakaran

EVEN THE MOST CASUAL OBSERVER OF THE ASIAN POLITICAL scene is impressed by the importance attached to foreign policy matters in the countries of the continent. Many have complained that the Asian political leaders' preoccupation, or even obsession, with world affairs is not always accompanied by an effort to develop their countries economically and socially, and that this is a very unhealthy feature. These critics are ignoring the importance of foreign policy to an Asian country and forgetting the fact that in the present international context a government in an Asian country cannot separate domestic politics and foreign policy into watertight compartments. Perhaps this is not a feature peculiar to an Asian country. The developments in France, culminating in General de Gaulle's accession to power and, later on, the army revolt in Algeria, bear testimony to the fact that even the government of a comparatively advanced and industrialised country like France cannot long ignore the repercussions in the internal political field of the pursuit of a certain kind of foreign policy. As far as the inter-relation between foreign policy and domestic politics is concerned, what is true of a European country is much more true of the newly independent and underdeveloped countries of Asia.

A comparison between the situations in the countries of the two continents will make this clear. In spite of the dominant influence the United States exercises in the formulation of British foreign policy, American impact on the United King-



dom's political and social life is limited. Apart from the political maturity of the British leaders and diplomats, many factors make it possible for Britain to insulate herself from what she considers to be an undesirable American penetration. The British nation has a cohesion of its own and its political life a remarkable stability. Yugoslavia's case is different, but shows the same degree of capacity to resist foreign influence. It will be idle to deny, as some Yugoslav leaders and their friends have been trying to do, that Yugoslavia's earlier disentanglement from the rest of the communist world and its cooperation with the western powers in some limited fields have in many ways affected its internal policies. At the same time it cannot be maintained that Yugoslavia's internal and foreign policies were at any time dictated by the western powers. The secret of the present Yugoslav government's capacity to resist foreign penetration into the country lies in the perfection of the control of the state apparatus in the hands of one party and one leadership. Yugoslavia has another advantage: it has a government with clear-cut economic objectives and plans to fulfil them.

The situation in most of the underdeveloped and the infant states of Asia is vastly different. In their body politic there are many cracks. In the first place, the foundations of a modern state and society are still to be laid in many of them. There may be a few exceptions, like Ceylon and India. But even in these countries the difference is one of degree rather than of kind. The late Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mr. Solomon Bandaranaike, quite unlike the head of the government of a secular and modern state, had to take into account the emotions and tensions set in motion by the Buddhist monks and had to, despite his views, declare that only a Buddhist would be appointed as the Inspector-General of Police. India has her own problems arising from the existence of religious and cultural minorities. If we turn from India and Ceylon to other countries, we see in a much more sharper form the deep cleavages that exist in their social and political life. The development in Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan and Iran are too well known to be repeated

here. The political battles inside these countries are not fought in the manner which is traditional in the more advanced countries of the west. Nor are they conducted without one side or the other seeking, and very often receiving, support from powerful foreign governments.

### *Categories of Asian States*

One has only to make a general survey of the political map of Asia to see the importance of the inter-relation between the foreign policies and the social and economic objectives of the independent states of Asia. Such a survey reveals that, broadly speaking, the Asian states can be divided into the following groups:

(1) *States under communist leadership like North Korea, China and Vietnam.* The countries follow the general pattern of the foreign policies of the communist states which seek to apply Marxism consciously, but with such modification as warranted by the concrete situations in their countries.

(2) *States which are under the dictatorship of national political movements like Egypt and Iraq.* To begin with, these two states followed similar policies with some minor differences. The dictatorship was primarily directed towards weakening and destroying the hold of the western powers and the political power of those of their own countrymen who drew their support from the former. The dictatorial nature of their governments was at first justified on the ground that it was essential to fulfil their national aspirations like freedom from imperial domination and exploitation. Later, as a result of the conflict between different political forces in the international field in general, and in West Asia in particular, and also in the domestic political life of their own countries, the foreign and domestic policies of the two countries have moved in different directions. In the initial stages of this second phase, the Egyptian government cooperated with the communist states abroad, but suppressed the communist movement within the country. The Iraqi government at first cooperated with both



the Communists inside the country and the communist governments outside. Later they also came into conflict with the Communists inside the country.

(3) The third group of states are Ceylon and India, which have a parliamentary system of democracy in the domestic sphere and which follow a policy of non-involvement in the cold war and military alliances in the international field. The characteristic feature of the political life of these countries is that, in this era of the cold war between western capitalism and international communism, although their governments are not in any sense dominated by the Communists, they have refused to join in the crusade against communism at home or abroad. Broadly speaking, they function within a democratic framework and are capable of representing and championing the national aspirations of their people.

(4) Burma and Indonesia are two other nonaligned countries. One is frankly a dictatorship now and the other, Indonesia, is moving more and more towards authoritarianism within the framework of 'guided democracy.'

(5) To a group, vastly different from the previous three, belong the states of Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea and South Vietnam. Some of these countries have an appearance of democracy like the Philippines and Pakistan of a few months ago. Others are frankly dictatorial like Thailand and the present Pakistan. But in spirit, all the governments in the group are cliques supported and retained in power by the United States. None of them is capable of resisting its political opponents within its own country without foreign support. Naturally both in the domestic and the international sphere these governments are obsessed with anti-communism. They are linked with the American-sponsored chain of military alliances.

This broad survey focuses attention on the connection between the domestic policies and foreign policies of the countries of this continent. The nature of the foreign policy followed by an infant Asian state is, on the one hand, the product of the

internal political forces of that state; and, on the other, it has a tremendous capacity to determine the character of its future internal political developments. Herein lies the importance of foreign policy in Asia. The charge that some of the governments of Asia are at present preoccupied with foreign policy issues, almost at the expense of their domestic problems, recalls to one's mind the earlier charge hurled against the leaders of the Indian national movement that they were preoccupied with political issues and that they ignored the social and economic problems of their country. To this frequent charge made by the British administrators, the Indian leaders replied that while political independence did not automatically lead to economic development and social reforms, without the former it was impossible to take the necessary steps in the latter fields. Perhaps, a future historian of the present times would record that in an Asian country a sound foreign policy did not automatically lead to economic and political progress, but without a sound foreign policy it was almost impossible to formulate and implement popular and useful measures at home.

### *Significance of Nonalignment*

At this stage we should try to understand the meaning and significance of the foreign policy of nonalignment followed by many of the governments in Asia.

It is often characterised as 'neutral policy', although it has very few features in common with the policy of neutrality followed by a country like Switzerland. The traditional policy of the Swiss government is not to get involved in the developments in the neighbouring countries. The Swiss go almost to the extent of not even taking much interest in the politics of their own region. This is not the policy of the Asian countries. Most of the governments of Asia and Africa take a keen interest in the development in the two continents, and, far from being neutral in the conflicts in the region, they take a firm stand on international issues connected with it. Quite unlike the Swiss government, the Asian-African governments also



work in cooperation among themselves. When the Dutch took armed action against the Indonesians in 1949, it was the Asian governments who took an unequivocal stand and it was the government of the USA which, in the initial stages, hesitated to take action. And this was not an isolated event. On Suez, the Congo and Cuba, all these so-called neutral governments had taken bold and unequivocal stand, while some other governments who were participants in the cold war, were taking a neutral attitude.

There is another distinguishing feature of the policy of neutralism pursued by the Swiss government which the Asian governments do not share. Switzerland's policy of neutralism has nothing in common with the attitude of the particular party in power. Irrespective of the party complexion of the government in power neutralism has been the policy of Switzerland for decades. This policy is derived largely from the geographical situation of the country, the nature of the conflicts in Europe and the weakness of Switzerland in relation to other European powers. This stands in glaring contrast to the situation in Asia. It is some of the weakest governments like those of the Philippines and Thailand which are committed to one power-bloc. Ceylon and Iraq disentangled themselves from the west when there was a change of government in the two countries, in the first as a result of elections and in the second as a result of a violent revolution. It was a coup, by which the elected Prime Minister was thrown out of power, that took away Iran from the policy of non-involvement to that of alliance with the west. Similar shifts can again take place in Asia, but are very unlikely to occur in Switzerland.

Another important fact is that Switzerland has remained neutral whatever the character of the conflicts in Europe, whether fascism or communism was involved. In other words, Switzerland's policy has nothing to do with the character of the issues raised by a particular conflict. The attitude of Asian leaders is different. The same statesman who advocates the recognition of communist China is capable of expressing his strong disapproval of fascist Spain. He can also be an uncom-

promising opponent of western imperialist exploitation of Africa and Asia. There is no inconsistency between these attitudes. The reason for the advocacy of negotiation and conciliation with communist China in Korea and elsewhere has its roots, not in a neutral's desire to avoid any kind of conflict, but in the comprehension of the fact that communism in China and in other parts of the world is not a force to be fought to the finish.

Another of the misleading explanations for the policy of nonalignment pursued by a government like that of India traces it to the philosophy of non-violence enunciated by Indian leaders and teachers like Gandhi and Buddha. A concept so patently absurd may not need a contradiction but for the fact that it is often repeated by many important people in India and abroad. There is nothing in the political behaviour of the Indian people and the administrative and other measures of the Indian government which substantiate this concept. In both Kashmir and Hyderabad the Indian government used its armed forces and acted more or less in the same way as other governments have acted in similar situations. The frequent firings resorted to by the various State governments in India do not in any way confirm the view that Indian administrators are believers in non-violence. India today, like other nonaligned countries, stands for effective armed action under UN auspices in the Congo. Moreover, one has to bear in mind that the policy of nonalignment in the cold war is not that of India alone, but is also the policy of many governments like those of UAR, Iraq, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia and Ghana and, therefore, there must be something common to these countries which is at the source.

Another explanation of this policy of nonalignment is that it is influenced by the Marxist thinking of Indian leaders and diplomats like Nehru, Krishna Menon and Panikkar. An obvious weakness of this argument is that Indian foreign policy is not formulated by two or three individuals, but by the action and interaction of many forces within the country. As Nehru has said, even if he went mad and advocated another policy,



the country would follow more or less the same policy. Another difficulty in accepting this view is that it is absolutely wrong to say that the influence of Marxism on these Indian leaders is greater than that of European liberalism. Moreover, even the American commentators, who are the chief proponents of this view, cannot maintain that other champions of the nonalignment policy like Nasser and Soekarno are under the influence of Marxism. Non-Americans will find it difficult to accept this argument for also another reason: it is based on the false assumption that this policy, though claimed to be one of non-alignment, is actually one of alignment with the communist states.

The real reasons for the pursuit of a foreign policy of non-alignment by many Asian countries lie partly in the traditions of their national movements and partly in their understanding of the problems they are faced within the national and international fields.

### *Political Philosophy of National Movements*

Many factors have led to the unique feature of the Asian political scene. Some of these are the characteristic features of Asian nationalism and the political philosophy of the nationalist movements of the continent. This is particularly important in the present international context when the division of a large number of states into two distinct power blocs is to some extent based on the different political philosophies which the two blocs uphold.

While nationalism arose simultaneously with capitalism in Europe as a protest against feudalism, in Asia it arose primarily as a protest against foreign political domination. Indigenous feudalism also was its enemy, but only a secondary one. Another equally important feature of Asian nationalism is the economic and social content of its political philosophy. The Asian national movements were also a revolt by a people with a keen sense of their poverty against the existing economic and

social order which permitted gross inequalities of wealth and opportunities.

Asian nationalism is thus a product of the three forces which sometimes fused, sometimes followed parallel lines and which occasionally came into conflict with one another: the fight against the foreigner, the fight against feudalism, and a demand for social and economic reconstruction.

A few authors have expressed the view that in Asian nationalism there is also an element of racial revolt against the white Europeans. This view can, however, be highly exaggerated. No doubt many Africans and Asians feel that they are discriminated against racially by westerners in some parts of the world; but there is no demand in these continents to organise resistance to such discrimination on the basis of racial homogeneity on the part of those who are discriminated against. Moreover, the increasing tendency to make alliances on the basis of ideological unity is making its influence felt on the people of Asia. For instance, North Korea, China and Vietnam will have a feeling of oneness with the Soviet Union rather than with other Asian countries. We cannot also ignore the fact that there were, and there still are, inter-Asian conflicts resulting from the real and fictitious domination of some Asian countries by others.

How have these prominent features of Asian nationalism influenced the political philosophy of the nationalist movements of the continent? The first to be taken into account is the evolution of the concept of the nation. In Europe the breakdown of feudalism and the emergence of the nation as a political entity were a gradual process. The king or some other single person was at first the symbol of this revolt against the feudal and regional loyalties and of the gradual rise of the sense of national unity within the country. Then the power and prestige were gradually transferred from one individual to a class, the middle class. This was possible because, almost simultaneously, capitalism had developed in the continent and had thrown new classes into prominence both in the economic and social fields. In most of the European countries the capitalist and middle classes are still in power; but as other classes have

increasingly begun to share in many of the social and political privileges, the concept of one nation as including all classes of people has gathered strength. In Asia this process is being pushed through all these stages in a few decades or years. And liberalism, which was the creed of the rising European capitalism, was mechanically accepted by the leaders of nationalism in some countries even though the historical conditions which gave rise to liberalism in Europe were absent in Asia. Industrial Revolution and the rise of the capitalist and middle classes preceded and resulted in the strengthening of liberal political and social ideas in Europe. The widespread acceptance of adult franchise was a late result. In Asia most of these developments came simultaneously and such an important development as industrial revolution has not taken place at all in most countries. So liberalism has no solid foundation in Asia.

The reason is obvious. In these countries, feudalism to the extent it was destroyed, was destroyed not by an indigenous bourgeoisie but by foreign capitalists. In some countries like India, before the European economic penetration took place, some kind of an incipient bourgeoisie was gradually making its appearance in the economic field. Under the British rule its growth was stifled, although much later an Indian entrepreneur class did arise and became a factor to reckon with. In countries like Burma this development never took place. It is well known that there are rich men in Burma, but no rich Burmese. The situation is more or less the same in Indochina and Malaya. In such countries the demands for political independence and for social change are fused in a single movement and the fight against the foreigner became simultaneously a fight against capitalism. In other Asian countries the fight for independence was initially led by the upper or middle classes, who wanted political independence but not social revolution. But when the national struggle assumed a prolonged character as in India, these classes tried to gather mass support by broadening the base of their movements and by accepting social and economic aims which were of a socialist pattern if not socialist. In a country like China the upper classes realised that a mass move-

ment was a threat to their leadership and interests and at several stages of the national struggle treated it as a greater enemy than the foreigner. The result was that the leadership of the national struggle for freedom passed into the hands of the lower classes and their spokesman, the Communist Party of China.

As a result, liberalism is only partially accepted in Asia. As noted earlier, in so far as its edge was directed against feudalism, it was welcome; but in so far as its edge is directed against socialism, liberalism is a weak concept because there is no class, mature and strong enough, to uphold it. This general statement is more or less true of the whole of Asia.

This is a very important aspect of the political situation in Asia. Neither the nature, class composition or the character of the national movements and their traditions nor the political ideas to which their leadership owe their allegiance make the present national governments of Asia automatically committed to one bloc or the other in the cold war. The fact that some of them have apparently accepted the parliamentary institutions does not make a basic difference in this respect. What is of greater importance is the spirit in which these institutions are worked and the strength of the classes who enthusiastically support them. Moreover, the fact that these national movements are also strongly committed to some kind of socialism as an economic programme is also important.

### *Pre-requisites for National Reconstruction*

From the traditions of the national movements, let us now proceed to the problems of national reconstruction facing the governments of the free countries of Asia.

These problems are: (1) the establishment of a modern state structure with a strong central government; (2) political unity and stability which can arise only from national solidarity; (3) the liquidation of the vestiges of foreign domination and complete assertion of national sovereignty and (4) a programme to promote social equality and economic development.



These problems can be successfully solved only by a government which is fundamentally socialist or at least nationalist in character. A government under a semi-colonial regime will only accentuate most of these problems. The validity of the principles of western liberalism to Asian conditions will be determined not by their soundness as principles or by the absence of it but by determining how their application to the situation in Asian countries will help the forces of socialism and those of nationalism. There is no doubt that the principles of liberalism and the institutions of parliamentary democracy will undergo great stresses and strains where new and powerful social forces are producing quick and important changes in the distribution of economic power and social prestige. When such changes take place, neither the groups that are losing power, nor those who are acquiring, will feel the sense of unity which is necessary for the successful working of parliamentary institutions and liberal democratic principles. Very often this situation leads to armed conflicts and civil wars. In some countries like China and North Vietnam the Communists have come out victorious in the civil war and joined the socialist camp in the international field. In others like the Philippines and Iran the Rightists have an uneasy existence in the seats of government with the help of western governments. The attempt of the governments like those of India, Ceylon and Indonesia is to create conditions under which the necessary social and economic changes can take place without civil wars and other violent conflicts. Those who head these governments are not always consciously setting in motion the new social forces: in other words, they themselves are not leading the movement for social change. But they are not in any sense trying to arrest the working of these social forces; nor are they allowing the foreign governments to interfere in the internal affairs of their countries and thus arrest the social revolutions. That is one of the reasons for their policy of nonalignment in cold war and their refusal to be a party to military alliances under western auspices.

*Defence and Extension of Freedom*

Let us now take the question connected with the liquidation of the vestiges of foreign domination and complete assertion of national sovereignty as one of the problems facing the Asian countries. Egypt in the postwar era was concerned with the nationalisation of the Suez Canal while Iran was interested in nationalising the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. While the former, though with great difficulties, achieved its objective, the latter, in the process of trying to achieve it, went under a subtle, but effective, foreign domination. Other countries face the problem differently. For a long time the Burmese government was worried with the presence of Chinese Kuomintang army within its borders. Apart from the question of the Dutch occupation of New Guinea, which the Indonesians consider to be a part of their territory, the Indonesian government is also unhappy by many of the difficulties created for them by foreigners. Foreigners still occupy many key positions in Indonesia's economic life while individual Americans find no scruples in helping with arms and other means those Indonesians who rebel against the established government. At one stage during the political crisis in Lebanon in 1958 the US army entered the country and the American Ambassador played an important part in the political discussions between various groups there.

Even when such frank interference is not there, a participation in the US government's world policy by an Asian government involves a compromise with its independence. There are many cases where the internal policies of a country are tremendously influenced by the foreign policy which its government pursues. In this context phrases like independent foreign policy have a meaning far beyond the foreign policies of these countries concerned because they affect their internal politics as well. The term, 'independent foreign policy' means a country, say India, following a foreign policy which is in her interests and which is in tune with the national aspirations of the people of this country. In the present context

such a policy involves non-participation in the military alliances led by the United States and other western powers. The implications of these developments in the domestic policies of these countries are as much important as their international repercussions. The ultimate effect of the policies of the western powers is to maintain the *status quo* in the international field as well as in the domestic fields of the Asian-African countries they once dominated, and certainly to prevent its revision in the direction favourable to the Communists. The primary aim of the nationalist movements and governments in Asia is to make immediate revision of the international order and the internal set-ups in their countries. Some countries would prefer the communist way and others the non-communist way; but all are agreed that revision should be made, and made in favour of progress. This is the fundamental conflict between the western powers and the Asian-African countries, and its magnitude is no less than that of the conflict between the western powers and the communist states. An Asian government's refusal to be a party to a scheme of things which is militarily dominated by the big powers is also an assertion of its national sovereignty which alone helps it to defend and extend its freedom.

### *Political and Administrative Unity*

This question of the defence and extension of freedom of Asian countries is linked up with one of major problems they have to face—the problem of the establishment of a modern state structure with a strong central government and the promotion of political unity. India and Ceylon were fortunate in this respect in that the two countries did possess strong central governments and other features of a modern state structure like the army, the civil service and legislature, all of which owe impersonal allegiance to the state. To begin with, even India had the problem of native princes. But they provided no insurmountable difficulties. The situation was different in Chiang Kai-shek's China where there were



innumerable warlords with their private armies. In such a situation the national government led by the Communists had to liquidate a large number of these people who wanted to preserve their vested interests—a task which was only partly accomplished by the previous regime. In Burma the problem was different, but as intense; at first the government of independent Burma could maintain law and order only in Rangoon and the surrounding areas. The developments in Burma of a few years ago leading to a military man becoming the head of the government arise partly from the fact that there was constant political and administrative instability in large parts of the country. In Indonesia the army does not always give unqualified allegiance to the state and there were frequent rebellions led by different political groups against the established order. The Indonesian government and the people are still on the way to the fulfilment of the primary function of establishing a modern state structure. Another well known unstable state is Pakistan where the army, the civil servants and the politicians do not have the concept of an impersonal and integrated loyalty to the state. In Thailand, in Iran and in some Middle Eastern countries the situation is not different. In all these countries liberal democracy has no meaning and it is possible that some section or other will always feel that it is not a part of the national stream. In such a situation what Mao Tse-tung has described as the people's dictatorship against a group of careerists and opportunists is of some significance; because it is possible that in some circumstances the alternative will be the dictatorship of the few against the majority. There was the tragic case of Mossadeq, the most popular leader of Iran, being thrown into jail by a combination of the Shah, the army leaders and the foreigners. Entirely different was the situation in Egypt and in Iraq, where those who were put in prison or hanged immediately after the revolution, were not the representatives of the people but the agents of foreigners. In Africa the newly independent country of Ghana moving away from liberal democracy towards some kind of a curtailment of the liberties of the

anti-national elements was another instance. The confusion prevailing in these countries focus attention on the difficulties involved in providing the necessary atmosphere for healthy political life. It shows that in some Asian countries liberalism cannot always fulfil the primary function of supplying a strong central government and modern state apparatus. That is why there is an 'almost nostalgic longing in the Middle East for a "strong" regime which will tolerate neither multiplicity of parties nor anarchy of ideas.' If Congo can be described as a case where such anarchy led to substantial loss of freedom, Cuba is the case where the freedom of the country was maintained by denying liberty to the agents of the foreign power in the country.

### *Foreign Policy, Democracy and National Unity*

It is not an accident that the gradual entanglement of an Asian country in the cold war and the military alliance under western auspices was accompanied by repudiation of democracy at home. Under the present circumstances in Asia all non-communist governments which want to retain their representative character and preserve democratic political systems are bound to follow foreign policies which are based on nonalignment in military alliances. As was noted earlier the majority of the politically conscious people in Asia are not obsessed with anti-communism, but with a desire to change the existing order in their countries and, consequently, in the international field. An Asian government's participation in the US government's world policy and its military pacts means that it is acting against this dominant trend in the country. If the national aspirations of the people are denied by a government in the international field, it is bound to deny them also in the domestic sphere. No country can have the exercise of democratic rights in the domestic field and its denial in the foreign policy field. When the Pakistan government moved in the direction of allying with the US, antagonizing the people and governments of the Middle East,

it saw to it that elections were indefinitely postponed. Of course, there were other reasons, which were of a domestic nature, for the curtailment of democratic rights in Pakistan. But very few will deny that the foreign policy of the Pakistan government was also not very popular with the people. The culmination of the series of undemocratic measures of various governments in that country was the naked military dictatorship which was established in 1958. It is also significant that one of the important steps of the military regime of Pakistan was to take over the *Pakistan Times* which had consistently opposed the country's involvement in the cold war.

All these developments point out to the obvious fact that the struggle for the defence of national freedom can become successful only by retaining and promoting the representative character of the country's political system. And this task can be undertaken only by following a foreign policy, the main features of which are acceptable to the vast majority of the people.

In the domestic sphere it also means allowing all parties, including the Communists, to function normally. This fact is to a very great extent highlighted in countries like India and Indonesia by the presence of well-organised communist parties. In India, the Communist Party was in power in one state, and is the second largest party in the country, though by no means it is a close second to the party in power. In Indonesia, the Communist Party is so strong as to determine the fate of the central government. Participation in the present cold war and military alliances under western auspices is based on a philosophy opposed to coexistence—coexistence both in the international and in the domestic fields. A government of a country, which has a large communist party, can successfully oppose coexistence only by destroying the Communist Party at home. And in a country where the Communist Party grows under bourgeois democratic systems, this task can be accomplished only by destroying bourgeois democracy; in other words, by turning fascist.

Fascism, however, does not have a fertile ground in the



majority of Asian countries. Very few of them have a continuous history as compact nations. In the multi-racial, multi-religious, and multi-lingual societies of Asia, which were once divided into different political entities, glorification of the past—an important feature of the fascist propaganda—cannot be stretched too far without creating many difficulties for those who do it. In India Hindu revivalists of the early twentieth century very soon found out that their 'national heroes' were the traditional enemies of the Moslems of the country and references to them did not arouse much enthusiasm among them. In India today a fascist type of agitation in the Hindi-speaking area can easily stir a greater degree of antagonism in non-Hindi-speaking areas than it would generate support in the former. In a multi-racial society like that of Malaya the prospects of fascism are much weaker. The position in countries like Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, Lebanon, Pakistan, UAR and other countries is not different.

Apart from the lack of homogeneity of the population there are other factors which will not easily permit the rise of fascism in Asian countries. There is no middle or capitalist class which is mature and strong enough to sustain a fascist movement. The fascist elements in the society are therefore inclined to gather support from foreigners to resist the advance of the indigenous progressive forces and as such they are bound to repudiate the most essential feature of fascism, which is nationalism. This has happened even when the conservative forces of a country were not fascist to begin with, but were interested only in opposing the revolutionary elements in the society with the aid of the foreigner. The most striking and tragic case of such a development, where erstwhile fighters of national freedom became tools of foreigners in their own country, was Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang.

It is the realisation of this fact that the defence of domestic reaction with the help of the foreigner can lead to the repudiation of democracy and nationalism that is preventing Asia's national leaders like Nehru, Soekarno and Mrs. Bandaranaike from joining the arch-reactionaries and the foreigners in their

political battles against the Communists and other leftist forces. And it is this realisation of theirs which have made them the symbols of freedom, national unity and democracy in their respective countries. Some Social Democrats of Asia, who are connected with Asian socialist and European socialist organisations, are blind to this fact; or, even after becoming aware of it, are too much obsessed with anti-communism that they are not prepared to act on the basis of it. The only exceptions are the Burmese and Ceylonese Socialists and, potentially, the Nepali ones. That is why, quite unlike their prototypes in other Asian countries, they are still in a position to become the symbols of the national aspirations of their countries.

### *Foreign Policy and Social Revolutions*

In our analysis we often referred to the immature nature of the capitalist class in Asia and their weakness. Related with this are a large number of social questions which have a tremendous bearing on the politics of Asian countries—both internal and international. One of them is the urgency of social revolutions in most of the countries of Asia.

At present the national output of these countries is very low and the economic and social consequences of which are aggravated by the marginal distribution of wealth and income. In the recent times the awareness has grown among large section of poor people of the injustices done to them by others and they also know that their poverty can be eradicated. Their leaders, some of whom belong to the upper strata of the society, have told them that comprehensive economic planning controlled by their own governments, in the interests of their own people, represented the best way to economic security. They also realise that they are too poor to afford the wastages and inequalities which economic individualism seems always to involve and that only socialism and socialism of a radical type offers the necessary discipline and the savings in

an underdeveloped country. This is the source of strength of Communism in these countries.

Perhaps a West European country like Norway, Sweden or even Britain could accomplish a social revolution by legislation; but in an underdeveloped Asian country where the conflict between the haves and the have-nots are sharp, no 'social democratic' programme can easily be implemented. If such a social democratic programme is accompanied by anti-communist obsession, the Social Democrats themselves will gradually move towards the camp of the fascists and reactionaries because in most countries in Asia the radical or social revolutionary movements are influenced, and in some parts controlled by the Communists.

### *Implications of Anti-Communism*

In such countries even the non-Communists who stand for social change and progress stand also for some kind of coexistence with the Communists. They are bound to resist any attempt to make Communists the main enemy; instead they consider the reactionaries their main enemy. It is this aspect of the Asian situation that is one of the sources of strength of the nonalignment policy in Asia and, as such, it is a powerful source.

One of the apparent contradictions in the Asian political scene is that, on the one hand, the Asian leaders realise 'that there is an obvious scarcity of capital for investment in their country and, on the other, they are not enthusiastic of getting large-scale assistance from the United States under some conditions. This contradiction is only apparent and not real, because the two attitudes emerge from the same motive—the motive to increase economic development in their countries. No doubt economic assistance both in terms of capital and in other matters can be a source of help for the quickening of the development of a country; but not if such help is accompanied by the suppression of radical politics which alone can set in motion the social revolution which is an essential condi-

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tion for the economic improvement. Social revolution is the first priority in Asia. Some of the western observers who concede this matter point out that the United States does not stand against social revolutions as such, but only against social revolutions led by the Communists who, in turn, are aligned with international communism. Even if this argument is true, it ignores the fact that for historical reasons many countries are not in a position to make a choice between social revolutions led by the Communists and those led by the non-Communists. Very often the choice is between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao on the one side and Bao Dai and Ho chi Minh on the other. In many of these countries the Communist Party has for a long time functioned as a left-wing absorber and it can be suppressed only if all the radical elements in the political field are suppressed.

Moreover, the argument that the US is not opposed to social revolutions and radical political movements led by the non-Communists is not completely true. This may be true as far as the world policy of the US government is concerned as is evidenced by the US policy towards Yugoslavia where for strategic and political reasons, it does support a government which has a socialist programme to support at home. The US for its own reasons has supported many governments led by Social Democrats and it would have helped any disentanglement of an Hungarian communist government from the Soviet camp even if they would not have repudiated their radical programmes inside their countries. One should not, however, forget that those policies emerge only when other factors of the US policy are superseded by considerations of the overall strategy in the rivalry against the Soviet Union in the international field. This does not happen in regard to the US policy in all the countries of the world. In regard to under-developed countries like Guatemala, Cuba, the Philippines and West Asian countries the US policy is very often determined not by any world policy but by the pressures and counterpressures which various groups of American businessmen and capitalists exercise on the State Department and the Congress.

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Let us examine the case of the Philippines. United States made the grant of independence to that country contingent on the future Philippines government agreeing to give the United States a number of military, air and naval bases in the islands. The Philippines was also compelled to give American investments parity with the Filipino investments. This kind of dependence on the United States on the part of the Philippines has affected the tone and quality of her political life and has hindered the development of responsible government based on the real will and interests of the people.

The exporters of goods from the Philippines also get preferential treatment in the United States. The rich Filipinos who are in that business also benefit from this arrangement. Production in the Philippines today is not organised on the basis of the demands of internal consumption or of world economic trends, but on the basis of economic relations between the Philippines and the United States. Although there is a strong case for the re-shaping of the very vulnerable and dependent Philippine economy, it is not likely to be pressed by any government that relies on the support of big business, whether Filipino or American. Both Filipino and American business circles have a vested interest in the present arrangements. The American interests in the Philippines may not be in a position to influence the US government's world policy, but certainly it is in a position to influence the US policy in the Philippines, as the United Fruit Company could in relation to US policy in Guatemala.

### *Why no Alignment with the Soviet Bloc*

In the preceding pages we examined the repercussions of an Asian government's alliance with a western government and its participation in the US government's global policies. The concentration on this aspect of the foreign policy was conditioned by the economic, political, military and cultural ties they had with their erstwhile colonial rulers and their allies who were the western powers. Owing to the then existing ties, in

the years immediately following their independence the aim of the national government was to disentangle themselves as much as possible from their former rulers and, in some cases, from their ally, the US. In this context nonalignment often meant disentanglement from the western powers.

A question may be asked: What were the chances and implications of an alliance between these countries and the Soviet bloc? In the Stalinist era the question was not relevant, because the Soviet Union's attitude itself excluded any such alignment. This was a period when the Soviet government was following a doctrinaire foreign policy. To be an ally to the Soviet Union, a country was not only expected to have a Communist Party in power, but that Communist Party had to fall in line with the policies followed by the international communist movement headed by the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia's was the only communist government which refused to function in that manner and the Soviet denunciations of that government are too well known to be repeated here.

Later, after the death of Stalin and the assumption of power by Khrushchov and his colleagues, this situation did change materially and many Asian-African states had responded to the hand of cooperation extended by the Soviet Union. But again the leading power of the communist world was not interested in drawing the non-communist states of Asia and Africa into its camp, but was content with taking them away from the western camp.

Moreover, there were occasional verbal quarrels between the heads of some Asian States and Khrushchov regarding the latter's comments about the alleged reactionary policies of the former.

There was at the same time an area of agreement between them. Whether it was Nasser's attempt to modernize his army and thus enable it to resist western armed attacks or India's attempt to modernize her economy by organising heavy industries with the object of making her economically independent of the western powers, Soviet help was forthcoming in large measures. In some cases it was this Soviet help that enabled



these Asian-African States to stick firmly to the foreign policy of nonalignment when the western powers tried to exert pressure on them to change it.

### *Impact of China on Asia and Africa*

An examination of the international character of the Chinese revolution will not be out of place here. To the US government, the establishment of the People's Republic of China may be nothing but another case of the extension of communism and the Soviet Union's influence; to the British people it is an accomplished fact which has to be recognised. But to the majority of Indians, Indonesians, Burmese, Ceylonese, Iraqis, Lebanese, Syrians and Egyptians, communist victory in China at first symbolised a desirable change from the previous regime in China. They did not just tolerate it as a necessary evil, but welcomed it. Some of these people did not like to have the same kind of political system in their countries; but, if the alternative were Chiang's regime, they would have preferred it in their countries too.

It was this attitude towards China that led to India's refusal to support the branding of China as an aggressor by the United Nations. When the US army advanced towards the Yalu river many Asians felt that what was at stake was China's freedom and that if China's freedom was imperilled, their own freedom would not be safe. When China successfully resisted the US action there was a feeling of pride in Asia that an Asian army was in a position to stop the advance of western armed forces towards its borders.

In the past two years a new image of China has made its appearance in non-communist Asia and Africa. This is in sharp contrast with the earlier one, when the communist government was struggling to get international recognition and respectability and was primarily interested in defending itself. This New China was far from being defensive; in the field of theory it began to function as the doctrinaire champion of 'pure' Marxism denouncing all non-communist political systems and

in the realm of international practice it showed unmistakable signs of trying to revise and expand its existing borders. This created a new situation and led to a new attitude towards China on the part of India and some other nonaligned countries. But it did not materially change their foreign policy vis-a-vis the cold war.

### Conclusion

The reason was obvious: the foreign policy of nonalignment pursued by these Asian countries had very deep roots which were not shaken by the shifts in China's internal politics and foreign policy. These roots lay in the traditions of the national movements of these countries and in the inter-relation between their foreign policies and the domestic politics with reference to their social and economic aims.

The objective of the foreign policy of a nonaligned Asian country is not to find a scapegoat for her backwardness, but to take the first step to define her national goal and clear the way towards reaching it. The question of the preservation of democratic structure and the formulation and implementation of correct social and economic objectives of the free countries of Asia cannot be divorced from the foreign policies followed by their governments. The days when a country's internal political life can be insulated against the outside forces are over. Not only that. We have now reached a stage, where in a pre-industrial society, like that of most Asian countries, a clique, which owes its origin and existence to the support of a highly industrialised country is in a position to perpetuate its rule over the vast majority of the unwilling people with the help of improved weapons and military strength at its disposal. Only a nonaligned country can avoid such a situation and in non-communist Asia and Africa only a nonaligned country can create the healthy political life essential for its rapid social and economic development.

# History, Ideology, Prospects

N. Parameshwaran Nair

THE TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE POSTWAR years have been broadly shaped by three main forces: western, communist and nonaligned. It is true that the major actors in the world drama during these years have been the first two, but a not too inconsiderable role has been played by the non-aligned nations also. This is particularly evident in the more recent years of the postwar period. In other words, the past years have witnessed the growing importance of nonalignment as a force, or at least as a trend, to be reckoned with in international politics. This growth in importance of non-alignment has been, therefore, one of the most significant aspects of the politics of the postwar world.

## I

### FACTORS OF NONALIGNMENT

In order to understand the factors that have given rise to the policy of 'nonalignment' and its increasing popularity among the new nations of Asia and Africa, it is necessary to take a look back at the international scene and the internal conditions obtaining in these countries during these years. For, it was the inter-relationship between these two that made the emergence of the policy a 'natural' thing, so to speak.

It was in the background of a rapidly deteriorating international situation, engendered by cold war rivalries, which



often brought the world on the verge of a third world war, that a number of nations of Asia, and later of Africa, achieved national independence. The motive force that facilitated this process towards independence was the upsurge of nationalism. The colonial and underdeveloped countries of these continents like India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Siam, etc., witnessed the emergence of strong anti-colonial movements for national independence. Soon after, West Asia, too, was undergoing a revolutionary upheaval, the discontent expressing itself against the Palestine policies and the economic and political domination of the countries of the region by western powers, notably Britain and France. The collapse of the Kuomintang government and the rise of the Communist Party to power in mainland China was also, in a way, on the crest of this nationalist upsurge. In the meanwhile the nations of the world had become divided into two blocs under the leadership of USA and USSR. Certain forces inherent in the traditions and experiences of the social and political movements of these countries made it difficult for them to identify themselves with either of the blocs. Greater contacts with the west in the past had led to a natural inclination in their thinking towards western political and economic systems. Thus in India, Indonesia and Burma parliamentary democracy was sought to be realised. Moreover, the leadership of their respective nationalist movements was usually vested in the educated middle classes who were trained to think and speak in terms of western political theory and ideals. Differences in local conditions had no doubt given particular orientations to these political ideas, but, on the whole, the general predilections of politics in these countries were in favour of the west.

Along with this, however, there was also a basic distrust of the western powers, arising largely from the imperialist character of most western powers. There was an obvious snag in the argument that the western nations were trying to preserve democracy against totalitarian communism, as long as they themselves sought to retain colonies. The evils of western imperialism were much more real and obvious to

these nations than those of some distant 'bugbear' of communist totalitarianism. It seemed for a time that the United States was more or less secure from charges of direct colonialism unlike other western powers like Britain and France, but American policy in the Philippines and in Latin America had given rise to misgivings and doubts. Moreover, postwar American policy was largely concerned with the fight against communism which, in practice, led to the virtual appeasement of western imperialism and condemnation, not infrequently, of genuine nationalist movements as communist or communist-inspired. Similarly, racial discrimination, which had been one expression of colonialism, had always been a sensitive issue with the colonial peoples, most of whom are coloured. The racial discrimination practiced against the Negroes or even the less coloured Mexicans and Indians in the United States was an unhappy reminder that the great liberal ideals of the American Revolution and Civil War were still far from realisation. The anti-colonial traditions of the nationalist movements, therefore, precluded any alignment with western powers.

Nor was a total alignment with the Soviet block easy in the circumstances. The nationalist movements of these countries were largely led by middle class intellectuals who were in no sense Communists or Socialists, except possibly in a vague romantic way. The socialist or communist elements present in the nationalist ranks were far too weak and small to influence the general social character of these movements. But the very impressive economic achievements of the Soviet Union and a vague awareness that some similar efforts might be required in their own countries, the consistent anti-imperialist attitude of the Soviet Union, the general egalitarian implications of their social order, the heroism and courage shown by the Soviet people in the Second World War, the absence of any obvious racial discrimination within communist states, etc., helped to develop certain favourable images about the Soviet Union, even though the rigidity of their social and political system had created a certain amount of uneasiness.

Thus, while the general social character of the nationalist movements was against any identification with the Soviet camp, a number of other influences operated to promote a less antagonistic feeling towards it than was present in the western countries.

These factors of nonalignment with either of the blocs were fortified by a general fear of all big powers, particularly of the west. The fear that the western powers might seek to re-establish their rule through the backdoor was shared by most of the newly-independent countries. This tended to keep them suspicious of and aloof from big-power politics. Proud and jealous of their freedom, and conscious of their material and military weakness, they regarded every move to bring them into bloc alignments with deep suspicion. They did not want to recognise the leadership or guidance of any bloc in their national or international policies. At the same time, the impact of world events was mercilessly drawing them out of any policy of isolationism into which they could have otherwise taken refuge.

The policy of nonalignment with power blocs was an offshoot of the strong sentiments of nationalism in these countries. The pursuit of an 'independent' foreign policy satisfied national pride and sense of independence. Nonalignment with either of the blocs, they discovered, not only helped them to preserve their newly-won independence, but it also gave them a sense of importance and recognition in world affairs. This relation between nationalism and foreign policy goes a long way to explain why such a policy enjoys such tremendous mass appeal in all these countries. It is significant that the countries that have pursued a policy of nonalignment in world affairs are almost invariably those where the nationalist revolutions have been in full swing. This is evidenced, in the case of India, Indonesia, the UAR, or Ghana. Where nationalist revolutions have failed to mature or have been thwarted, such tendencies are weaker. Ceylon passed through her nationalist revolution as late as 1961 — interestingly, some ten years after the advent of independence — and since then



there has been a definite swing in the country from a pro-west to a nonaligned policy. To some extent, it was an upsurge of nationalist sentiment that drove Yugoslavia to rebel against the communist bloc and pursue a policy of nonalignment. Other countries that are yet passing through various stages of the nationalist revolution — like Morocco, Tunisia, Cambodia or Malaya — have exhibited fluctuating tendencies between alignment and nonalignment in their foreign policies.

A major factor, determining the foreign policy outlook of these new nations is economics. Long years of stagnation under colonial rule have led to the existence of very backward economy in all these countries. The urge for modernisation and rapid economic and social development had been one of the prime motivations of nationalism in these countries, though this had remained subsidiary to the immediate question of political independence. With the advent of political independence, this urge has become a watchword of nationalism. But the success of a policy of social and economic development within these countries is dependent on peaceful conditions, internally and internationally. The fear of a third world war which might destroy their national independence if not their very existence, and all their hopes of national development has, therefore, acted on these states to seek peace. They have consequently argued for total disarmament and peaceful settlement of disputes. Their support to the United Nations is largely based on the hope that the world body is the only workable mechanism for peaceful settlement of international disputes in the present context, apart from finding in it a forum in which they are able to realise equality with other nations and a means of maximising their influence in world affairs.

A further factor of importance in this context is that of leadership. The nationalist movements in these countries had been mostly 'middle class' in character, particularly in their leadership. Consequently when freedom came, it was to these very same classes that power was transferred. The policy of nonalignment has, in many ways, been a reflection

of the general thinking and characteristics of this class.

The craving for security has also been an important factor in persuading many of these states into following a policy of nonalignment. The greatest threat to the freedom of small nations in modern times has been the cold war — the rivalry between the two blocs of powers. Countries which are adjacent to the communist nations have been specially subjected to this sort of pressure from both the blocs due to their strategic importance. Nonalignment with both the blocs was thus found to be the best possible guarantee by these states to preserve, however uneasily and precariously, their national integrity and independence. This factor is of importance in understanding the policies of nations like Cambodia, Burma, Nepal or even a bigger nation like India.

It is of course possible that in a number of countries where these factors are present — like Malaya for instance — the policy of nonalignment has not come to be followed, but this has been due to the existence of certain other factors in their national life counteracting the impact of these factors. In the same way, in a large number of countries like Saudi Arabia, Nepal, Ethiopia, etc., many of these factors are apparently absent though they claim to be nonaligned. In actual fact, however, their adherence to nonalignment is largely an expression of the pressure exercised by many of the factors of nonalignment, existing in a latent form, on their political leadership. Moreover, as far as the policy of nonalignment is concerned they are only of peripheral importance. These exceptions do not, therefore, invalidate the general factors of nonalignment noted above.

The existence of these common factors in the national situation of these countries do not, however, mean that they follow identical policies on all issues of international relations. For, there are also important differences which invest their foreign policies with significant variations both in emphasis and practice. Internal factors like existence of strong right-wing and left-wing political parties, the nature of the leadership in power, the nature of social organisation, the level of economic

development, geographic location, needs of security, etc., are some of the sources of these differences. Further, the impact of a particular international event on one nation is naturally different from that of another. Lastly, the nature and degree of strength of these common factors of foreign policy are different in different countries. For example, the nature of nationalism in these countries differ widely from one another in spite of certain common features. Such differences account for differences in policies at different times among these nations. These differences in policies have often come out in the open, the latest instances being the (Belgian) Congo and Algeria. They were expressed openly at the Cairo Preparatory Conference in June 1961 and at the Neutral Nations Summit Conference at Belgrade in the following September.

It is not, therefore, to be expected that nonalignment means a uniform policy for all its adherents on all occasions. It merely represents a broad similarity in approach to the contemporary international situation, expressing itself in similar policies on certain questions among these nations.

## II

### EVOLUTION OF THE POLICY

The first official declaration of a policy of nonalignment came with the assumption of power by the nationalist leaders in India in 1946. Immediately after his assumption of duties as Member for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations in the Government of India in September 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru declared that India would 'keep away from power politics of groups aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale.<sup>1</sup>' All the basic premises of the policy, like anti-colonialism, nonalignment with power blocs, faith in the United Nations, etc., were elaborated by

1. *Independence and After: A Collection of the More Important Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru from September 1946 to May 1949* (Delhi: Publications Division, 1949), p. 340.



him a few days later.<sup>2</sup> Internal troubles of a very serious nature prevented Burma from devoting full attention to foreign affairs during the first years of independence but there were firm pronouncements even during these turbulent years that gave definite indications of an independent foreign policy. The Prime Minister of Burma stated in 1948 that 'of the three great western powers, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR... the AFPFL wish that Burma should be in friendly relations with all the three.'<sup>3</sup> Two years later, in 1950, he categorically stated that Burma did not desire 'alignment with a particular power bloc antagonistic to other opposing blocs.'<sup>4</sup> Indonesia was admitted to the United Nations only in 1950. The protracted fight with the Dutch had prevented the young Republic from devoting full attention to foreign affairs earlier, but yet the trends of her policy were not much in doubt even then. The British and American policy of assisting the Dutch and the Soviet policy of supporting the local Communists during the early years of the Republic's fight for freedom were powerful factors that drove her away from alignment with either bloc. At the same time; on India's initiative, a conference of Asian nations met in New Delhi (January, 1949) to express support to the cause of Indonesian independence.<sup>5</sup> Within the United Nations also similar moves were initiated by these nations.

2. *Indian Annual Register*, ed. N. N. Mitra (Calcutta, 1946), Vol. II (July-September 1946), pp. 251-8.

3. Speech by Prime Minister Thakin Nu dated 13 June 1948. *Towards Peace and Democracy* (Burma: Government Printing and Stationery), p. 117. The AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League) has been the major nationalist organisation in Burma and was the ruling party at the time.

4. Speech by Prime Minister Thakin Nu, 19 July 1950. *From Peace to Stability* (Burma: Government Printing and Stationery), p. 86.

5. The Conference was held in New Delhi in January 1950. It was attended by official representatives of fifteen Asian States (Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen) and observers from four other States (China, Nepal, New Zealand and Siam). The Conference made recommendations to the Security Council to take action to stop the second Dutch 'Police Action' in violation of the 'Renville Agreement' of January 1948 and called for the transference of complete sovereignty to Indonesia by 1 January 1950.

Pakistan's foreign policy, during these early years, was more independent of bloc alignments than it was later, but before these early tendencies could crystallise, the internal political conditions within Pakistan and her disputes with India tended to drive her more and more into the western camp.

A very important addition to the nonaligned group during these early years was Yugoslavia. The factors that slowly drove Yugoslavia into following a policy of nonalignment were to a large extent different from those of the Asian countries. Until her rift with the Soviet Union in 1948, she had formed part of the communist bloc. The early violence of this rift seemed to drive her into the western bloc at first, but she was, soon after, able to find her moorings in a more 'independent' policy. There is little doubt that what decided her break with the Soviet Union and her later adherence to the policy of nonalignment, was a strong sense of nationalism.

The years 1950-54 could be described as the formative period in the evolution of nonalignment. During the earlier years it had not found favour with either of the blocs, but its growing popularity among a large number of countries in Asia and its increasing influence in world affairs had become quite evident. The end of the period saw the beginnings of a change in attitude of the two blocs and a clearer enunciation of the principles of nonalignment.

This period also witnessed the intensification of cold war tendencies into an actual outbreak of a 'hot war' in Korea (June 1950). The Korean War led in turn to a further intensification of the cold war on all fronts. The western strategy of containing communism by organising military pacts went ahead rapidly. The Rio Pact of 1947, the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 had only been the beginnings of this policy.<sup>6</sup> The Anzus

6. The Rio Pact was signed on 2 January 1947 at Rio de Janeiro between USA and twentyone Central and South American States. For text see, *Documents on International Affairs, 1947-48* (London: R.I.I.A., 1952), pp. 773-8.

The Brussels Treaty was signed on 17 March 1938 at Brussels between

Pact was signed at San Francisco in 1951.<sup>7</sup> The South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty was signed at Manila in 1954.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, in 1955, the Soviet Union and seven other communist countries in Eastern Europe signed at Warsaw a 20-year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid, setting up a communist counterpart of the Nato with a unified army command.<sup>9</sup> Both American and Russian policies grew increasingly inflexible during this period. The rigidity was reflected within the countries also. It was the period of McCarthyism in the United States and of the Doctors' Plot and 'purges' within the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries.

The outbreak of the Korean War put the nonalignment policy to a severe test, but it also afforded an opportunity for a demonstration of its utility. The policy pursued by the nonaligned countries, particularly that of India and to some extent of Yugoslavia, both of whom members of the Security Council, contributed in some measure to a lessening of the tension and to creating the necessary atmosphere for peaceful negotiations between the two blocs. The events in Korea and the common striving for peace helped to bring about a greater sense of unity among the Arab-Asian countries in the United Nations. Both the blocs came to recognise the value of the peace efforts initiated by the nonaligned nations.

United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. For text see *Ibid.*, pp. 225-9.

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 at Washington by USA, Canada and ten other West European powers. Greece and Turkey joined later, on 20 February 1952. For text see *Documents on International Affairs* (London: R.I.I.A., 1935), pp. 257-60.

7. The signatories of this Treaty were Australia, New Zealand and USA. It was signed at San Francisco in September 1961. For text see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1951 (London: R.I.I.A., 1954), pp. 677-80.

8. The following eight countries signed the Treaty in September 1954: UK, USA, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand. For text see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1954 (London: R.I.I.A., 1957), pp. 153-7.

9. Popularly known as the Warsaw Pact the Treaty was signed on 14 May 1955 by USSR, Hungary, Poland Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and East Germany. For text see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1955 (London: R.I.I.A., 1958), pp. 193-8.



The three anxious and unhappy years of the Korean crisis thus marked the beginnings of a more positive and creative orientation of nonalignment.

The emergence of successful nationalist movements in Asia and Africa during these years strengthened the number of adherents to the policy. These movements were sometimes thwarted, as in Iran, but met with success in other countries like Egypt. The successful completion of such nationalist revolutions led to the establishment of nationalist governments which declared adherence to a nonaligned policy.

The emergence of an Afro-Asian group in the United Nations in these years was an important development in the growth of nonalignment. This was in no sense a deliberate and well-organised group, but on matters of common interest they came to develop methods of consultation and cooperation. The twelve states that joined together in this manner were known as the Arab-Asian group. These were Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. Philippines and Thailand, also voted with this group at times. Later, Ethiopia and Liberia joined the group. It was thus growing into an Afro-Asian group. On a large number of issues like the Korean War, liberation of Tunisia and Morocco, the future status of South-West Africa and the non-self-governing territories, racial discrimination, etc., they came to work in common and thereby develop greater affinities and sympathies with each other. Few of the members of this group were nonaligned at this time, but on a large number of occasions the Asian-African nations found increasing opportunities to develop closer understanding and to work in collaboration with each other. They were also able to arrive at better understanding with the communist bloc, with certain countries of Latin America like Guatemala, Haiti, El Salvador, etc., and the Scandinavian countries.

The years since 1954 saw the consolidation of the policy on all fronts—in popularity, ideology and recognition by the two blocs. Adherents to the policy were on the increase

in Asia and Africa. A closer understanding with the communist bloc was developed. There were also indications of a change in attitude of the western bloc powers. The full conceptual implications of the nonaligned policy emerged by the end of the period, such as opposition to military pacts, the idea of an expanding peace area, the Panchsheel or the five principles of peaceful coexistence, etc.

The Indo-China crisis in 1954 gave the nonaligned nations another opportunity to demonstrate the significance of their 'independent' policy to the preservation of world peace. The issues here were not as complicated as in Korea, though intervention by the big powers had led to a tense situation. The course of events became no less ominous than in Korea when the basic question of liquidation of colonialism came to be tangled up with cold war politics. It fell to the nonaligned nations to try to separate the two aspects of the situation from each other. It cannot be said that the nature of the settlement has been one of full satisfaction to anybody, but the efforts of the nonaligned nations contributed substantially to the initiation of negotiations at Geneva between the two power blocs and to bringing about the cease-fire and the formula for immediate agreement. It was as recognition of these efforts that India was made Chairman of the International Commission on Indo-China as a 'neutral' power, acceptable to both blocs.

The Summit Meeting at Geneva and the Indo-China settlement, the process of liberalisation within the Soviet Union, particularly evident after the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, the signing of the Austrian Peace Treaty, the change of administration in the United States and the early pronouncements of President Eisenhower, etc., contributed to a relaxation of tension in the world for the next few years. But on a number of problems — like the organisation of military pacts, Formosa and the off-shore Islands, disarmament, racialism, admission of China to the United Nations, freedom for the colonies, etc., differences and consequent tension persisted.

The Bandung Conference of the twenty-nine Asian-African nations in 1955 was an important landmark in the growth towards maturity of the Asian-African world. This was in no sense an exclusive conference of the nonaligned nations as the 1961 Belgrade Conference was. A number of nations openly aligned to either of the blocs had also been invited to the conference. The final communique, embodying the decisions of the conference was not certainly an essay on the principles of nonalignment. But the leadership of the conference and the general tone of its communique was certainly of the nonaligned world.<sup>10</sup> It gave them an occasion to meet together and develop some common understanding on world affairs.

The Suez crisis (1956) gave the nonaligned nations a further occasion to demonstrate their solidarity. The indignant and united voice of the nonaligned nations was very largely responsible in protecting the freedom of Egypt. The Hungarian crisis (1956), however, proved to be a much more complicated issue for the nonaligned world. The Soviet action in Hungary generated spontaneous criticism in all these countries. And yet many of the leading nonaligned countries found it difficult to condemn with equal felicity the Soviet action in Hungary as the Anglo-French action in Suez. Most of these countries had received — and they continue to require — active support from the Soviet Union on certain vital questions of national interests to them. For example, India had received open support on the Kashmir and Goa questions from USSR, Indonesia on the West Irian issue and Egypt at the time of the Suez invasion. Relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were also showing signs of a rapprochement. While the above factors made it difficult for these countries to adopt the same stern attitude that they had taken a few days earlier on the Suez question, they were also extremely distressed and dismayed at Soviet policy in Hungary. These conflicting feelings were evidenced in the debates and votings in the

10. For text see *Foreign Policy of India: Text of Documents 1947-59*, (Lok Sabha Secretariat: New Delhi, 1959), pp. 173-181.



UN.<sup>11</sup> Liberal circles in many western countries who had begun to show some appreciation of the policy expressed disappointment and accused the nonaligned nations of adopting 'double standards'.

In the years that followed, the nonaligned nations sought consistently to realise their broad assumptions about international relations into actual policies. In urging the liquidation of colonialism, notably in Algeria and Angola, in attempting to realise through the United Nations and associate bodies peaceful solutions to international problems and aid to underdeveloped nations for their development programmes, in opposing the racial policies pursued by certain nations within their territories, in urging disarmament and the banning of nuclear weapons, etc., the nonaligned nations were trying to realise these principles into practice.

Particularly noteworthy in this respect have been the policies of the nonaligned nations towards the tragic events in the (Belgian) Congo in recent months. These events have shown that the nonaligned nations have been seeking to express all these years the dangers and perils which an underdeveloped or undeveloped nation faces when it is caught in the web of imperialist intrigues and intervention. It is true that conditions of political and social backwardness within the new Republic were also responsible, in a large measure, for these unhappy developments, but what made it truly tragic was the attempt by interested outside powers to exploit the situation. The foreign policies of the nonaligned nations themselves have not shown a uniform approach towards these events at all times, but there has been a basic similarity of objectives in their policies.

11. The most controversial thing in this context was the voting on the Resolution as submitted by Italy, Cuba, Ireland, Pakistan and Peru (Resolution 1005-ES-II) and as amended by sponsors (A/3316). The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 9 November 1951, meeting 571, by roll-call vote of 48 to 11 with 16 abstentions. India and Yugoslavia were the only countries to vote against the resolution with the nine communist countries. Most of the other nonaligned states like Egypt, Indonesia, Burma, etc., abstained. For a summary of the debates and text of resolutions see *Year Book of the United Nations*, 1956 (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1957), pp. 71-72, 85.

viz., that imperialism should quit the Republic, that big-power politics should be eliminated from the area, that the integrity of the whole state should be preserved and that democratic forces within the country should be encouraged to develop. This was why different nonaligned nations decided to send their armed forces to the Congo in support of UN action, whenever they felt that the latter's policies in the Congo were contributing to the realisation of these objectives.<sup>12</sup>

An event of major importance in the evolution of non-alignment was the summit conference of nonaligned powers at Belgrade in September 1961. This conference had been preceded by the Cairo Preparatory Meeting when foreign ministers or senior diplomats from twenty countries met in (June 1961) to draw up the list of invitees to the Belgrade Conference and to prepare its agenda. The importance of these conferences consisted in the fact that they were the first occasions when nonaligned nations had met in conferences of their own. The Cairo meeting attempted to define the concept of nonalignment.<sup>13</sup> Among other things, the Belgrade Conference also attempted to reduce international tensions following the Laos and Berlin crises and the resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union. These conferences were significant in yet another respect: they helped to bring out more openly the weaker links in the foreign policies of the various nonaligned nations.

### III

#### ENLARGEMENT OF AREA OF NONALIGNMENT

One of the most notable features about the growth of non-alignment in world affairs has been the growing acceptance

12. Ghana, UAR, Guinea, Morocco and Ethiopia agreed to send their armed forces to the Congo under the UN flag. At this stage India was reluctant to do so. Following the assassination of Lumumba, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and UAR announced the withdrawal of their forces in dissatisfaction with UN policies. At this stage India agreed to send her forces. Today Indian forces form the biggest contingent of the UN forces in the Congo.

13. This definition is discussed below. See p. 50.

of the policy by a large number of nations of the world. For some years after 1946 when free India proclaimed nonalignment as the basis of approach to contemporary international relations, she was practically the only country in the world to pursue such a policy. In contrast to this is the present strength of the nonaligned world, as reflected at the recent conference of nonaligned nations at Belgrade in September 1961. Governments of twentyfive countries participated in this conference with three more governments represented by observers.<sup>14</sup> Since then Tanganyika and Syria have also declared themselves as nonaligned. During the course of these last sixteen years the growth in popularity of nonalignment has been phenomenal.

This remarkable growth has come from one main source — the new states of Asia and Africa. A study of the list of participants at the Belgrade Conference shows that, with the possible exception of Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, all others are new states, having come into independent statehood only after the end of the Second World War. A geographical analysis of the participants shows that of the twentyfour participating countries (Algeria excluded) twelve represented countries of Asia,<sup>15</sup> ten from Africa,<sup>16</sup> one from Europe and one from Latin America. The three observers were all from South America. It is thus obvious that the growth in strength of the nonaligned world has been primarily due to the liberation of a number of countries of Asia and Africa from colonial or similar forms of subjugation.

14. These nations are:

From Asia: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cyprus, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Yemen.

From Africa: Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic. The Provisional Government of Algeria was also admitted to the Conference.

Others: Cuba, Yugoslavia.

Observers: Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador.

15. The total number of Asian states in the UN at this time was twenty (excluding UAR). Since then, Syria has come out of the Union with Egypt and has been admitted to the UN as a member.

16. The total number of African States in the UN at this time was twentyfive. Since then Mauritania and Tanganyika have been admitted.



This liberation had come mostly as a result of the rising wave of nationalism in these countries. Historically, these winds of change had blown first over the continent of Asia. By 1956, the peak of the nationalist upsurge in Asia may be said to have been over. It was now the turn of Africa to experience similar changes. For Africa the decisive year was 1960 when sixteen African states became independent.<sup>17</sup> Latin America is currently in the grip of a similar turmoil. In other words, the upsurge of nationalism can be regarded as the major social phenomenon for the emergence of non-alignment. This is true, as was noted above, not only of the new states of Asia and Africa, but also of the nonaligned nations in Europe and South America.

The real strength of the nonaligned world is to be seen not actually in the number of governments that claim to pursue the policy. As was noted earlier, many of these governments pursue the policy in a half-hearted manner and not quite fully understanding the social implications of such a policy. The real basis of strength of nonalignment can be seen in the tremendous popular basis which the policy enjoys, not only in those countries where nonalignment is pursued officially, but also in a number of other countries in the underdeveloped world and in liberal circles in some of the more advanced countries of Europe like Britain, Norway, Sweden, etc. In the underdeveloped world, it is not by casual design that governments which actively pursue nonalignment are also governments with large popular basis as in India, Indonesia, United Arab Republic or Ghana. The popular character of these governments may or may not be expressed through western forms of democratic institutions, but their mass basis cannot be held in doubt. The Preparatory Meeting of the Belgrade Conference (Cairo, June 1961) clearly stated that 'the zone of non-commitment could be further extended, both from the viewpoint of activity and of

17. This figure is on the basis of UN membership. Mauritania has not, therefore, been included which was admitted to the UN only in October 1961.

influence....'<sup>18</sup> Moreover, in large parts of the 'committed' world, in Asia, Africa and South America, the rumblings of political changes which might lead to the extension of area of nonalignment are being heard.

#### IV

#### CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT

A further aspect of the growth of nonalignment has been the gradual evolution of its conceptual implications. With the passage of years and as a result of practical experience of international politics, the nonaligned nations have been able to give a more coherent character to their foreign policies.

Prime Minister Nehru said in 1947 that his foreign policy was only an 'attempt to follow a certain rather vague policy in regard to foreign affairs.' But he added, 'I wish it were a more definite policy. I think it is growing more definite....'<sup>19</sup> This has been happening during the last few years. Certain general propositions of the policy were derived at the very beginning itself. These were largely inherent in the political experiences of these nations in the immediate past. Opposition to colonialism and racialism, securing of international assistance for economic development of the underdeveloped and undeveloped areas, the urge for peace and disarmament, support to UN, etc., constituted some of these.

Thus while there were a number of issues on which the nonaligned nations found little difficulty in deciding their attitude clearly from the very beginning, there were others for which they required time and experience before such clarity could emerge.

The foreign policies of these countries in this early period showed a general predisposition towards the west with which they had closer ties. This was evident from Nehru's own

18. *The Hindu* (Madras), 14 June 1961.

19. Speech delivered at the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 4 December 1947, *Independence and After*, op. cit., p. 208.

admission in 1949 when he said:

When I say that we should not align ourselves with power blocs, obviously it does not mean that we should not be closer in our relations with some countries than with others. At the present moment you will see that, as a matter of fact we have far closer relations with some countries of the western world than others.

Facts of recent history no less than association, education, language, etc., were responsible for this. But he hastened to explain that this position did not mean placing his country 'in a position where, politically speaking, we are lined up with a particular group or bound up to it in our future foreign activities.'<sup>20</sup>

A clearer distinction between nonalignment and neutrality, evident in later years, became possible as a result of experience and certain maturity of ideas over years. The international image of India had lain suppressed and distorted under imperialism in the pre-independence period. The advent of independence considerably helped these nations to rediscover their personality and to project them into the world. Non-alignment, they made clear, had 'nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else.'<sup>21</sup> India was nonaligned but not neutral; Indonesian policy was 'independent and active'; Egypt sought to pursue 'positive neutrality'. There have been repeated expressions of this distinction between nonalignment and neutrality by the leaders of these nations. In June 1961 the Cairo meeting affirmed again that the policy of non-commitment was 'a method of approaching positively the problems which confront the world at this hour.'<sup>22</sup> 'We are neither blind to reality nor do we to acquiesce in any challenge

20. Speech delivered at the Indian Council of World Affairs, 22 March 1949, *ibid.*, pp. 256-7.

21. Speech by Prime Minister Nehru delivered at the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 4 December 1947, *ibid.*, p. 200.

22. Italics added. Official communique at the end of the Preparatory Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the Uncommitted Countries (*Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), Belgrade Conference No. 1, p. 6).



to man's freedom from whatever quarter it may come,' declared Prime Minister Nehru in 1949. 'Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral.'<sup>23</sup> On questions of colonialism, racialism, world peace, etc., there has not been any tendency towards a neutral position among these nations. The nonaligned nations attitude, in the event of a world war, was clearly stated by Nehru:

If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless, it is a little difficult now-a-days in world wars to be neutral.... We are not going to join a war if we can help it; and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice.<sup>24</sup>

At the same time there were also certain negative elements in their basic approach to world affairs. They would prefer, it seemed, to keep aloof from a number of problems if they could help it, such as bloc formations, big-power politics, the question of communism vs. capitalism, etc. There was, consequently, a hesitation to take the full plunge in world politics if it could be avoided. Nehru said in 1948:

Our general policy has been to avoid entering into anybody's quarrels. If I may say so I have come more and more to the conclusion that the less we interfere in international conflicts the better, unless, of course, our interest is involved for the simple reason that it is not in consonance with our dignity just to interfere without producing any effect. We shall either be strong enough to produce effect or we should not interfere at all.<sup>25</sup>

This does not, however, mean that he was not conscious

23. Address to the East-West Association, the Foreign Policy Association, the India League of America and the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 19 October 1949. *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, 1949-53 (Delhi: Publications Division, 1954), p. 125.

24. Speech delivered at the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 4 December 1947. *Independence and After*, op. cit., p. 200.

25. Speech delivered at the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 8 March 1948. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

of the merciless logic and pressure of world events that left these countries with little choice in world affairs. The Belgrade Conference expressed this when it stated:

The participating countries consider it essential that the nonaligned countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and security in the world as none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues.<sup>26</sup>

The positive participation of nonaligned nations in world affairs, particularly after the Korean War (1950) proves the growing maturity of the nonaligned nations in this respect.

The changing attitude to regional military pacts demonstrates further the conceptual development of nonalignment. The earlier reactions of nonaligned states to the formation of military alliances was generally one of unconcern. The Rio Pact (1947) the Brussels Pact (1948) or the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 did not provoke among nonaligned nations the same uneasiness as similar pacts did later. In fact, India shared with her fellow-members of the Commonwealth 'the general agreement that this association of the United Kingdom with her European neighbours [the reference here is to the Brussels Pact and the Western Union—N.P.N.] was in accordance with the interests of other members of the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the promotion of world peace.'<sup>27</sup> At the same time India had not become 'entangled in any alliances, military or other, that might drag them into possible conflict.'<sup>28</sup> Even as late as August 1954, Yugoslavia joined the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey, both members of Nato, providing for mutual military assistance in case of

26. Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries, 6 September 1961 (*Review of International Affairs*, Belgrade Conference, No. 5, p. 21).

27. Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting 1948: Final Communiqué, 22 October 1948. *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-1952*, ed. Nicholas Mansergh (London: R.I.I.A., 1935), Vol. II, p. 1138.

28. Speech by Prime Minister Nehru at the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 8 March 1949. *Independence and After*, op. cit., 239.

aggression on any.<sup>29</sup> This attitude to regional pacts, however, changed soon after. For example, India felt in 1952 that though the Atlantic Pact was meant to be a defensive arrangement, it had widened its scope and had taken upon itself the defence of the colonial possessions of the member-nations of the Pact.<sup>30</sup> All round opposition to the formation of these pacts, particularly in Asia and Africa, has been expressed by nonaligned nations during these years. India, Indonesia, UAR, etc., saw in the multilateral and bilateral military pacts and alliances and defence agreements a threat to their own security and freedom. The Belgrade Conference took note of the fact that

... the existing military blocs, which are growing into more and more powerful military, economic and political groupings, which by the logic and nature of their mutual relations, necessarily provoke periodical aggravations of international relations.<sup>31</sup>

From this changed attitude to regional pacts emerged a new enlargement to the concept of nonalignment—the idea of a peace area. It was argued that whatever justification there might have been for the formation of regional military pacts in Europe, their extension into Asia and Africa could only bring cold war politics into an area of comparative peace. The western powers were accused of taking sides in disputes

29. For text see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1954, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-201.

30. Speech by Prime Minister Nehru in the Indian Parliament, 12 June 1952 (*Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-53*, *op. cit.*, p. 223). However, at a press conference held an year later on 10 June 1953, in answer to a question regarding India's views on EDC and Nato, the Indian Prime Minister said, 'we do not wish to get entangled in European problems or in problems apart from those directly affecting us' (*Jawaharlal Nehru's Press Conference*, 1953 (New Delhi: Information Services of India, 1953), p. 7.

31. India took the Kashmir question to the Security Council in January 1948. Both the USA and the UK have been accused of adopting an obvious pro-Pakistan attitude while the USSR has openly supported, particularly after 1955, India's stand on Kashmir. Interestingly, India chose Czechoslovakia as her nominee for the UN Commission for India and Pakistan set up by the Security Council in January 1948.



between Asian nations with definite cold war motives. For example, India suspected that the obvious western partiality for Pakistan against India in the Indo-Pakistan disputes was due to the former's readiness to enter into bloc alignment and military agreements with western powers as in the Medo, Seato and the US-Pakistan Pact. It was demanded that Asia should be kept out of cold war politics and maintained as an area of peace, which could then be gradually expanded to cover other parts of the world like Africa.

One of the most important contributions to the concept of nonalignment since 1953 has been that of the Panchsheel or the five principles of peaceful coexistence. These principles were in fact a further elucidation of the policy rather than any addition to it. They were first enunciated in the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet and then in the joint statement by the Prime Ministers of India and China in 1954.<sup>32</sup> These were later incorporated in the ten principles enunciated in the final communique at the Bandung Conference.<sup>33</sup> Joint statements signifying agreements on the five principles have since been issued by these countries with each other and with

32. These principles are:

- (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- (2) Mutual non-aggression;
- (3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- (4) Equality and mutual benefit;
- (5) Peaceful coexistence.

For texts of the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet dated 29 April 1954 and the Chou-Nehru Joint Statement dated 28 June 1954, see *Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents, 1947-59*, op. cit., pp. 103-109, 113-114. Extracts are available in *Documents on International Affairs, 1954*, op. cit., pp. 313-315.

33. These ten principles are:

- (1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
- (2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;
- (3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small;
- (4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country;
- (5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations;
- (6) (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence

others.<sup>34</sup> The Belgrade Conference declared that the principles of peaceful coexistence 'which include the right of peoples to self-determination, to independence and to the free determination of the forms and methods of economic, social and cultural development must be the only basis of all international relations' in its present phase. The participating countries considered that under the present conditions 'the principles of peaceful coexistence are the only alternative to the "cold war" and to a possible nuclear general catastrophe.'<sup>35</sup> It makes an interesting commentary on the methods of diplomacy of the two blocs that while the communist bloc has shown enthusiastic adherence to these principles in joint-statements with these countries, the western bloc has tended to look down upon them with disdain.

By 1954-55, one notices that all the major premises of the nonalignment policy as are understood today had emerged clearly. The latter years have seen attempt at giving practical application to these principles in response to the challenges of the changing international situation.

It was in the context of the gradual emergence of these ideas that the representatives of twenty governments claiming to pursue nonalignment met at Cairo in June 1961 in a preparatory meeting for the Belgrade Conference and attempted to

to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.

(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries;

(7) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country;

(8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations;

(9) Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation;

(10) Respect for justice and international obligations. (For text see *Foreign Policy of India*, op. cit., pp. 173-181. Extracts are given in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1955, op. cit., p. 436).

34. For similar statements signed by India see *The Foreign Policy of India*, op. cit.

35. Declaration of the Heads of State of Government of Nonaligned Countries (*Review of International Affairs*, No. 5, 20).

define a nonaligned country. After long debates, which brought out not only the areas of agreement but of differences as well among the nonaligned countries, the meeting adopted five broad criteria to distinguish a nonaligned country from the aligned on the basis of which invitations were to be issued for the Belgrade Conference. These criteria were that a nonaligned country should

- (1) follow an independent policy based on nonalignment and peaceful coexistence;
- (2) support liberation movements;
- (3) not be a member of a multilateral military pact in the context of the east-west struggle;
- (4) not be a member of a bilateral military pact with a big power in the east-west struggle;
- (5) not grant military bases to foreign powers.<sup>36</sup>

These criteria are, however, too broad and general to be taken as a clear guidance to the understanding of nonalignment on the foreign policies of the invitees to the Belgrade Conference. The failure of the Cairo Meeting to arrive at more precise criteria is, however, understandable in view of the political character of the definition, the diversity of the nations that attended the preparatory meeting and the nature of nonalignment itself which is more a method of approach than a final and definite policy.

The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries meeting in Belgrade in September 1961 made some effort to state clearly the principle of nonalignment as expressed in the foreign policies of these nations. The rather lengthy declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries, issued at the end of the Conference (6 September 1961) bears evidence to this fact, though one should not take it as a final declaration of nonalignment. The Conference communique read along with the speeches made at the Conference, makes it clear that nonalignment means

<sup>36</sup> *The Times of India* (Delhi), 12 June 1961 and *The Statesman* (Delhi), 12 June 1961.



not merely non-involvement in power blocs but also adherence to a number of positive concepts like the stabilisation of world peace, elimination of colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations, the principles of peaceful coexistence, cooperation and brotherhood between nations, opposition to military alliances, condemnation of the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination, faith in fundamental human rights and respect for the right of minorities, disarmament, removal of the economic imbalance inherited from colonialism and imperialism, revision of the UN Charter to expand the membership of the Security Council and ECOSOC, etc.<sup>37</sup>

## V

### CHANGING ATTITUDE OF BLOCS

The changing attitude of the two blocs to the policy of nonalignment during all these years is an excellent commentary on the growing importance of the policy as well as on the methods of diplomacy of the two power blocs.

The attitude of the two blocs to the policy of nonalignment during the early years was one of suspicion and distrust, probably because during this period of the cold war both the blocs could see others only in a black-and-white pattern. India's unsuccessful candidature in 1947 for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council was symbolic, in a way, of this position.<sup>38</sup> Nehru spoke of this early mistrust of the two blocs in the following manner:

We have sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other. The natural result has been that neither of these big blocs looks on us with favour. They think that we are undependable, because we cannot be made to vote this way or that way.... They could not quite

37. *Review of International Affairs*, No. 5, pp. 19-23.

38. India's candidature on this occasion was based on the contention that the Security Council should be fully representative of all important regions of the world.

The London gentleman's agreement of 1946 among the big powers pro-

make out what we were or what we were aiming at. There was a suspicion in the minds of the first group that we were really allied to the other group in secret, though we were trying to hide the fact, and the other group thought that we were allied to the first group in secret though we were trying to hide the fact.<sup>39</sup>

These words of the Indian Prime Minister seemed particularly bitter to the western bloc countries as these nations — India, Indonesia, Burma, etc. — had, till a few years ago, been aligned to the west as the latter's colonies. Refusal to join the western bloc, therefore, seemed to them to be a case of positive defection from own ranks.

It is interesting to compare this western attitude towards their ex-colonies with that of the Soviet Union in the case of Yugoslavia which defected from the Soviet camp.

The Soviet Union, too, was unhappy in a general way, with the policy of nonalignment, though on a number of occasions, particularly in the United Nations, she found herself working in close understanding with the nonaligned countries and against western powers. But there were also issues on which the Soviet Union and the nonaligned powers disagreed. The debates in the UN on Greece, Interim Committee and Korea, for instance, brought out these differences. At the core of the Soviet bloc mistrust of nonalignment was the belief that

vided for a distribution of the six non-permanent seats of the Security Council as follows: two to Latin America and one each to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Middle East and British Commonwealth. On 31 December 1947 the terms of office of Australia (Commonwealth), Brazil (Latin America) and Poland (Eastern Europe) were due to expire. The 92nd Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly therefore went ahead with the election of three new members to these seats.

Four countries — Argentina (Latin America), Canada (Commonwealth), Ukraine (Eastern Europe) and India — submitted nominations for the three seats. In the first ballot on 30 December 1947 Argentina and Canada received the required two-thirds majority and were declared elected. The second and remaining ballots (up to eleven) resulted in a deadlock, neither India nor Ukraine getting the required majority. At the 106th plenary meeting of the General Assembly India withdrew its candidature (U.N. Year Book, 1947-48, pp. 30-31).

39. Speech delivered at the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 4 December 1947 (*Independence and After*, op. cit., pp. 201-2).

the governments of newly-independent Asian countries represented a deal between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism against peoples of these countries. One Soviet analysis of the time about India read:

Congress leaders have made a deal with Anglo-American imperialism and Indian reactionaries to fight their own people. Now the struggle for the real independence of India for the interests of the labouring masses is continuing outside the Congress against it.<sup>40</sup>

Moscow believed that Prime Minister Nehru was 'directing his country's affairs with the support of the warmongers and trying to cut off the Indian people from their natural allies and liberty-loving people.'<sup>41</sup> The attitude of the communist parties in the nonaligned countries during this period also reflected this understanding.

Thus, in the early days, nonalignment was regarded as a heretical doctrine, ridiculed and condemned by both the blocs and practiced by few. India was very nearly waging a lone crusade, for unsettled conditions prevented Indonesia and Burma from following an active foreign policy.

During the next few years, relations with the western bloc showed signs of further deterioration. The early pro-western tendencies in many nonaligned nations suffered a severe setback. The general approach of western policy towards non-alignment and many problems of these countries alienated considerably the earlier friendly feelings towards them. The west lacked, as Nehru pointed out, 'the subtlety of thought in understanding the east or in dealing with it.'<sup>42</sup> On almost all important problems — colonialism, racialism, trusteeship system, disarmament, military pacts, etc. — there seemed to be a positive clash of opinion and interests between the western bloc and the nonaligned nations. These differences of

40. *New Times* (Moscow), 12 January 1947.

41. *Ibid.*, 4 August 1948.

42. Speech at the Eleventh Session of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Lucknow, 3 October 1950 (*Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-53*, op. cit., p. 163).

opinion found specific expression in their policy pronouncements on the major international events of the time — the Korean War, attitude to communist China, Japanese Peace Treaty, Eisenhower Doctrine, Lebanon crisis, etc. Western criticism of nonalignment also grew bitter. The *New York Times* editorially described Nehru as 'The Lost Leader' who was 'fast becoming one of the great disappointments of the postwar era.'<sup>43</sup> Following the loss of China, there were some attempts to make a reassessment of US policy towards Asian countries, particularly India, but this did not meet with any success. US policy under Dulles showed an extreme rigidity of approach and lack of imagination which accentuated these differences and, in fact, made them seem wider than what they were in reality.

A basic change in the Soviet attitude was, however, visible by 1953. The change in Soviet attitude can be attributed partly to the clearer emergence of the policy as a really 'independent' and 'nonaligned' one and partly also due to the increasing divergence between the western bloc countries and the nonaligned nations. It was also due, to a large extent, to the tremendous changes set in motion within the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin in 1952.

The most significant evidence of this change was seen in Khrushchov's Report to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Nineteenth Congress held in 1952 did not even recognise that India, Burma and other countries had become independent. The movement for national liberation was still continuing, according to the view then held. Yugoslavia was regarded, along with Greece and Turkey, as American colonies.<sup>44</sup> The Twentieth Congress, on the other hand, recognised the fact of political independence of India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, etc. It spoke of the 'identity of views' existing between the Soviet

43. *New York Times*, 28 August 1951.

44. G. Malenkov, *Report to the Nineteenth Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B)*, 5 October 1952 (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1952), p. 32.



Union and the nonaligned nations on basic world problems, viz. the preservation and consolidation of world peace and national independence.<sup>45</sup> The Congress also decided to strengthen the friendship and cooperation with the fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia and to consolidate the bonds of friendship and cooperation with the nonaligned and other countries which stood for peace.<sup>46</sup> The period also marked the beginnings of massive economic aid by Soviet Union to these countries 'to help them to build up an independent national economy and to raise the living standard of their peoples without assuming any political or military commitments.'<sup>47</sup> This basic change in Soviet attitude enabled them to wrest the initiative from the western powers in their relations with the nonaligned nations. In the nonaligned countries themselves, the fund of goodwill and admiration for the Soviet Union shot up to an all time high.

This happy trend of friendly relations with the communist world received, however, a rude shock in 1959 when communist China seemed to strike a new attitude towards nonaligned nations. The policy of the Chinese Communists towards the nonaligned world, it was believed, was on the same lines as that of Moscow. The nonaligned nations regarded the Chinese Revolution as the completion of the Chinese nationalist revolution, though the communist character of its leadership had put it in a class by itself. Chinese performance at Bandung was a big success. With assiduous care China had built up the foundation of a firm friendship with most of the Asian nations. But, by 1959-60, there was an apparent change in policy. As though by deliberate decision, China's relations with Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, Yugoslavia and India — the most important members of the nonaligned world — showed evidences of sudden strain and deterioration. It is not impossi-

45. N. S. Khrushchev, *Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress*, 14 February 1956, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), pp. 29-30.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 46-47.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

ble that there has been a reassessment in Peking that the period of giving tactical support to the nonaligned countries was over and that the time has come to expose 'the real class character' of the governments in these countries.

Even if this were true, Russia, clearly, does not seem to share the view. The Soviet Union and other communist countries have remained significantly silent and uncommitted during these months of Peking's acrimonious disputes with Burma, Indonesia and India. This was a very unusual development in the communist world. While it is true that Soviet relations with Yugoslavia and the UAR are not firm or stable as yet, the differences between the Soviet and Chinese policies towards the nonaligned countries in general are too obvious to be ignored.

Western policy towards the nonaligned countries, particularly towards the so-called moderate nations among them, like India, Burma, etc., has also shown signs of change. This tendency could be traced to 1956, in President Eisenhower's statement of 7 June 1956 when he declared that the 'neutrals' were not necessarily neutral between 'right and wrong or decency and indecency'. Some two days later, however, Secretary of State Dulles attacked 'the principle of neutrality, which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others.' According to Dulles, 'this has increasingly become an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and short-sighted conception.' This statement was further elaborated by Dulles at a press conference some three days later when he refused directly to add India and Indonesia to the category of moral neutrals and would exclude only Switzerland from the category of immoral neutrals. Similar statements condemning nonalignment were made by Vice-President Nixon during the course of his tour of certain South-East Asian countries, particularly in a speech at Manila on 3 July 1956. Nehru reacted sharply to these statements and said that the views of Nixon and Dulles 'are not wise and they do little good.' He said that the world cannot be divided

into good and evil and thought it impossible and undemocratic if any one wanted all people to think alike.<sup>48</sup> On 11 July 1956, Dulles, on second thoughts, conceded, indirectly though, that nonaligned nations are not 'immoral', as long as they expressed their concern for others. This, in his opinion, could be done through membership of the United Nations.<sup>49</sup> This tendency of conciliating the 'neutrals' went on in the United States and found better expression during the closing years of the Eisenhower administration. These were highlighted by the visits of the leaders of many nonaligned nations like India and Indonesia to USA and of President Eisenhower to some of these countries. The defeat of the Five-Power Resolution in the 15th Session of UN General Assembly was a setback to this process, but hopes were again revived when the Kennedy administration took over in 1961. The present US administration has made more conscious efforts to conciliate the non-aligned opinion than any previous administration. The policies of major western nations in the Congo during the earlier months of the crisis led to another setback to these trends, but in recent months the USA has sought to dissociate itself from British and French policies in the Congo. The reluctance of nonaligned nations at Belgrade to censure Soviet resumption of nuclear tests disappointed the west, as the Declaration of the Conference directly condemning the policies of western powers in Cuba, Tunisia, Angola, Algiers, etc., annoyed them. Yet, on the whole, the relations between the western bloc and the nonaligned world have shown some improvement in recent years.

It is possible to argue that this change in attitude of the two blocs was the result of the considerable pressure of contemporary facts of history and, perhaps to a lesser degree, to a genuine reassessment of the policy pursued by them vis-a-vis the nonaligned nations. It might have also come out of the realisation that while immediate possibilities for a communist

48. For more details see D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origin, 1917-1960* (London), Vol. II, pp. 780-84.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 783.

revolution in the West European countries and of counter-revolutions in the East European countries are remote, the underdeveloped and undeveloped areas of Asia, Africa and other parts of the world presented a different prospect. The extremely fluid social and political conditions in the latter make them seem areas of potential revolutionary changes. Both the blocs are therefore interested in maintaining the closest possible contacts with the dominant social forces in them. These have not yet clearly emerged as communist or anti-communist. For the time being at least nationalism represents the most dominant social force in these countries. It is, therefore, natural for both the blocs to try to remain friendly with these nationalist forces and seek to influence them as far as possible.

## VI

### GENERAL ESTIMATE

A general estimate of nonalignment as it has operated during the last few years would indicate that in spite of occasional setbacks and compromises, its total impact has been towards contributing to the stability and maintenance of peace in the world, of preserving the national independence, political stability and of advancing the national interests of these countries.

During the early years of the cold war a third world war seemed imminent on more than one occasion. And yet during the last fifteen years or more the world has managed to survive crisis after crisis, without precipitating a major holocaust. The role which the nonaligned nations played during these crises — Korea, Indo-China, Suez, Hungary, Belgian, Congo, Laos, etc. — has substantially contributed to the stabilisation of peace and in preventing the outbreak of a major war. This was why the Belgrade Conference considered that 'the further extension of the non-committed area of the world constitutes the only possible and indispensable alternative to



the policy of total division of world into blocs and intensification of cold war policies.<sup>50</sup>

It would of course be unrealistic to claim that the efforts of the nonaligned nations alone have preserved world peace. Questions of war and peace do not basically depend on them, but on the big powers who are the chief actors in the complex drama of world politics today. The role which the nonaligned nations have played is therefore only secondary, but by no means a negligible one. They only desired to become 'a basic factor for the preservation of peace and international security.'<sup>51</sup> Occasionally, however, their efforts have contributed to the relaxation of tension and in evolving compromise formulae to tide over immediate crises.

This was made possible mainly due to the emergence and existence of a balance of power between the two blocs. This is exemplified by the fact that the policy of nonalignment found its first opportunity to play a creative role at the time of the Korean War. By this time, Soviet Union had been able to achieve a comparable balance of strength vis-a-vis the western bloc. This had been made possible by the expansion in area of the communist world, particularly by the addition of China, and the development of nuclear weapons by Soviet Union. The new balance of power made it possible for the nonaligned nations to operate within it. Explaining the foreign policy of his country, Nehru said that 'While remaining quite apart from power blocs, we are in a far better position to cast our weight at the right moment in favour of peace.'<sup>52</sup>

The growing importance of the policy of nonalignment was also due to certain other important developments in the nature of international affairs after World War II. This is related to the increasing importance of the United Nations in the diplomacy of nations. A major factor of the growth in

50. Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries (*Review of International Affairs*, No. 5, p. 20).

51. *Ibid.*, No. 1, p. 6.

52. Speech delivered at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 22 March 1949 (*Independence and After*, op. cit., p. 257).

importance of the United Nations is the emergence of an independent world public opinion, as distinct from the sum-total of the opinions of the different governments. The open discussion in the United Nations afforded at least a limited opportunity to different opinions to make a direct appeal and impact on public opinion in different countries and thus indirectly bring pressure on their governments. Modern diplomacy has, in this sense, become highly revolutionised. Governments of fairly advanced countries can no longer conceal any big divergence between profession and practice in their diplomatic relations. They cannot any more ignore the trends of opinion in the United Nations. Within the United Nations itself, especially in its plenary bodies, the nonaligned nations present a growing body of opinion. The growth of the nonaligned world has, in this indirect manner, come to influence the policies of the big powers.

The activities of the nonaligned nations have also contributed to maximising their influence in world affairs. Individually and collectively, they have helped to safeguard the national independence and rights of the smaller nations, strengthen the forces of nationalism in the colonies, discredit the policies of racial discrimination and apartheid. The importance of economic and social problems that confronts the undeveloped and underdeveloped nations found greater emphasis in the policies and pronouncements of the nonaligned statesmen. The general trends of the world situation were favourable to such developments and the efforts of the nonaligned nations have contributed to strengthening of these natural forces of historical development.

The pursuit of a foreign policy of nonalignment has also helped to maintain internal stability within these countries. This policy has provided a broad national front in which extremely divergent sections of the population are able to come together. This is particularly evident in those countries where the communist parties are very strong. The nonaligned foreign policy of the government has been one of the most persuasive factors in Indonesia, Burma or even India

in preserving some measure of internal peace among parties that often display conflicting views on almost every other question. Prime Minister Thakin Nu of Burma sought to make peace with the Communists in 1948 by promising to adopt a more nonaligned policy.<sup>53</sup> The fall of the Sukiman Cabinet in Indonesia in 1952 demonstrates how a departure from the policy creates strong divisions and feelings within the country.<sup>54</sup>

Similarly, the nonalignment policy has also helped these nations not merely to preserve but to advance their national independence. Alignments of a close military or political character would have naturally divested these nations of certain elements of their freedom and independence. There is surely little scope for equal partnership between unequal allies. This would explain the great anxiety that the nonaligned nations have shown against alignment with blocs, and alliances of a military character.

But possibly, the most important aspect of nonalignment which requires consideration in this respect is the fact that there exist a dynamic relationship between the foreign and domestic affairs of these countries. It is not by accident that governments that pursue a policy of nonalignment are also those which pursue active and conscious policies of national development in social and economic spheres. The instances of countries like India, UAR, Ghana, Indonesia, etc., prove this.

53. The Leftist Unity Programme announced by Prime Minister Thakin Nu on 26 May 1948. The programme was set forth by Thakin Nu in an effort to conciliate the Communists and for the achievement of leftist unity. It contained the following points on foreign affairs: immediate establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviet Union and the new democracies of Eastern Europe; the non-acceptance of any kind of foreign aid which will compromise the economic or military independence of the state (*Keesings Contemporary Archives*, 1948-50, 9428A).

54. In January 1952, the Sukiman Government committed Indonesia to the Mutual Security Aid from the United States under the United States Mutual Security Act of 1961. (Public Law 165, 82nd Congress, 1st session). As this became known in Indonesia there was a storm of public indignation. Even the right-wing Masjumi Party withdrew its support to the Government. The Government had to resign and the agreement was not ratified. For more details see Herbert Feith, *The Wilpo Cabinet, 1952-53* (Monograph series, Ithaca, New York, 1958), pp. 57-67.

At the same time, governments in power in the aligned countries do not seem to possess the same consciousness of these requirements of their countries. There is thus a vital correlation between progressive social policies at home and a policy of nonalignment in world affairs. This relationship may not be equally evident in the case of certain countries like Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, etc., which also claim to be nonaligned, but as noted earlier, in so far as the policy of nonalignment is concerned their adherence to the nonaligned world has only incidental and peripheral importance. It is this vital relationship between the necessary social revolution in these countries and their foreign policies that gives nonalignment its tremendous popularity and mass basis.

## VII

### PROSPECTS

The policy of nonalignment was seen to have emerged as a product of certain historical circumstances pertaining to the internal conditions of these countries and the international situation in the recent period.

It follows logically that as changes occur in these internal and external conditions the policy in its present form would also undergo modifications. There could, for example, be a real agreement on peaceful coexistence, so that each country practises the principle of live and let live in its international relations. A sudden acquisition of greater military power by any particular bloc would upset the balance of power in the world today and make any policy of nonalignment impossible and meaningless. Important political and other changes within these countries themselves would signify important changes in their foreign policy. Total hostility to the policy by any one of the two blocs is also bound to weaken its influence considerably in world affairs.

There is also danger of the weakening of the policy from another source. Among the nonaligned nations themselves there have not always been a complete and harmonious under-



standing on all issues. Relations between Ghana and Egypt, for example, appear friendly on the surface, but it is generally known that there is an undercurrent of coldness and rivalry in their mutual relations, particularly in the matter of leadership of Africa and the policy towards Israel. Differences of opinion among different nonaligned nations are known to exist regarding Algeria, the Congo, revision of the UN Charter and certain other matters. Some states like Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, etc., have appeared in recent times to be more militant than others like India or Burma. The differences on various questions among nonaligned nations came out into the open at the Cairo and Belgrade conferences.

Such differences of opinion show the divergence in approach among the different countries. It is natural if India, which is economically more advanced and politically more stable than most other countries of this group, should place a different emphasis in its approach to world problems from that of other nations who are economically less developed or politically less stable and emotionally less mature. It is of course impossible to expect that the nonaligned nations would show the same degree of unity and coherence in their foreign policies as the communist bloc or even the western bloc does. None of them has the material and military leadership which the USA or USSR possess. Nor do they have any clear-cut ideological basis. They do not constitute a bloc and the very idea of a uniform foreign policy for all goes against the very basis and logic of nonalignment. And yet, the present differences can be taken as indicative of possible future trends.

These differences do not, however, cloud the basic factor of unity in nonalignment. The primary problem of all underdeveloped or undeveloped nations in the present context is that of modernising their traditional or medieval societies as rapidly as possible. There are, however, different levels of consciousness about this problem in different countries depending on various historical and other factors, such as the existing levels of social development, past experience, qualities of leadership, etc. It was noted earlier that there is a necessary

relationship between the momentum of this social revolution within a country and its foreign policy and that governments that actively pursue nonalignment in their external relations are mostly those that are more conscious of these and are more responsive to the demands of their communities. The fact of underdevelopment, along with the fact of this more conscious urge for social revolution, may continue to act as a bond generating mutual sympathy, understanding and even unity among these nations in the coming years. In other words, even when occasional differences on specific questions of policy arise among these nations, the content of social revolution in their national policies which is expressed today in their foreign policies through nonalignment will continue to be expressed in other forms in future.

*India*

## National Interest

Devdutt

NONALIGNMENT DOES NOT DEFINE THE ENTIRE FOREIGN POLICY of India. It is only one of the three aspects of the policy,<sup>1</sup> and is one of the three terms (the other two being, 'independent policy' and 'peace area approach') which have been used to describe the Government of India's attitudes to the cold war.

The term 'independent policy' was more frequently employed during the period 1946-50; the term 'peace area approach' was preferred during the period 1950-58 and the term 'non-alignment' came more into vogue after 1958. Far from representing three different policies or three different stages of the growth of India's policy, in the sense that the 'peace area approach' evolved out of the 'independent policy', and 'non-alignment' stemmed from the 'peace area approach', these terms simply denote the Government of India's response to the changing character of the cold war.

### *Independent Policy*

During the period 1946-50 the cold war was to a great extent confined to Europe.<sup>2</sup> Asia, by and large, was free from

1. The other two aspects of India's foreign policy are: anti-racialism and anti-colonialism on one hand and bilateral relations between India and other states on the other.

2. The three historic principles, viz., the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the Policy of Containment were all stated in the European context only. During the period from the Yalta Conference through the blockade of Berlin to Korea the situation of Europe had hardened along definite lines and division. Long before the Korean War ended, it had

its benumbing effects, although a few whiffs of the chill winds blowing across Europe did reach Indo-China and Iraq.

This policy expressed the Government of India's desire to be impartial about such issues of the cold war as did not affect Asia in general and India in particular. Hamstrung by her military weaknesses and domestic strains, it wanted to keep aloof from big blocs of nations — rival blocs — and did not consider it wise to get entangled in the problems of Europe which, according to Nehru, were 'problems of power politics.'<sup>3</sup> Nehru believed that India had no cause to be unfriendly to any country or groups of countries. It had no obvious reasons for being interested in problems of power. Therefore, regardless of the implications to the balance of forces between super-powers, efforts were made to judge each issue on its merits and not to take a partisan view of the various problems in which the two super-powers were interested.

### *Peace Area Approach*

The 'peace area approach' was adopted in the context of a tense international situation created by rapid application of nuclear technology to warfare. 'A single phrase', said Nehru, 'can sum up what is today the foremost issue in international affairs: peace or war.' He asserted that 'foreign policy is also governed by the threat of war, a war on an unimaginable scale which has been made possible by tremendous technological development.' He therefore believed it to be the duty of every nation to try out its utmost to avert a third world war. Thus during the period 1949-58 when the nuclear gap between powers diminished,<sup>4</sup> and when movements and counter-movements to encircle each other became a style in

become evident that Europe, and particularly Germany, was again the main area of Russian-American conflict.' J. Lukacs, *The History of the Cold War* (New York, 1961), p. 101.

3. Jawahar Lal Nehru, *Independence and After* (New Delhi, 1949), p. 232.

4. Russians were known to have succeeded in exploding an A-Bomb in 1949 and the H-Bomb was exploded by Russia in 1953. The successful experiments with rocketry after 1957 further diminished the gap.



the diplomacy of super-powers, the Government of India embarked on a crusade for peace and offered the world what seemed to her to be the most realistic alternative to war — Panchsheel or the Five Principles.

If viewed objectively, this policy is plain common sense. However, in an atmosphere rendered tense with the talk of war, it acquired a special significance. Nehru, who understood war and its political consequences rather well, proposed the 'peace area approach'. On 23 December 1953 he declared, 'It is desirable to have an area where peace might perhaps subsist even if war was declared.... It would be good because that area would exercise some influence when a crisis came....'

It was no doubt realised that this was not a complete cure. However, he believed that in a critical situation, even marginal action turned out to be useful. When 'the world is in a ferment of passion and prejudice — a crowd of excited people... your job is to try and make people less excited....'<sup>5</sup>

### Nonalignment

After 1953, the tension travelled from Europe to Asia and Africa. The super-powers embarked upon a competitive programme of giving economic and military aid to the newly-freed states of Africa and Asia. There began a worldwide bid for diplomatic favours — a scramble, as it were, to win over the young nations.<sup>6</sup>

The Government of India, however, was opposed to aggressive military alliances, political pacts and economic aid with strings. It stood for coexistence, and preferred the diplomacy of accommodation to the diplomacy of threats and balance of power.

5. Publications Division, Government of India: Jawahar Lal Nehru, *Speeches*, 1949-53, (New Delhi, 1954), p. 192.

6. The USA was no longer interested in containment of communism but it began to think in terms of military alliances to serve as a deterrent to war as well as to liberate the countries from communism.

This approach of the Government of India to international problems, which was more activist and participating than the 'independent policy' and the 'peace area approach', was denoted by the term 'nonalignment'.

It must be borne in mind that whatever the term used to denote it, the Government of India's policy towards the cold war has throughout remained unchanged in respect of substance and the bases. Therefore, in the foregoing analysis, the term nonalignment, which no doubt came more into vogue rather late in fifties, has been adopted to define<sup>7</sup> the entire attitude of the Government of India towards the cold war since 1946. It broadly includes the attitudes represented by the term 'independent policy' and 'peace area approach'.

## I

### NONALIGNMENT AS A CONCEPT

The attitude of a nation to international problems is conditioned by the image of the world it carries in its collective consciousness. This image is a product of interaction of several factors, such as rational, emotional and historical.

Two groups of factors — (a) rational considerations regarding the nature of communism, capitalism, war, and war-like preparations and (b) emotive factors, such as, nationalism, anti-racialism, and feelings of Asian fraternalism — have been responsible for creating in the mind of the people of India an image of a world which is different from that which is in the mind of Americans and Russians.

#### *Rational Components*

Prime Minister Nehru, as well as a section of the articulate and effective public opinion in India, do not take a doctrinaire view of capitalism and communism. Nehru is convinced

7. The 29-Nation Preparatory Committee for the summit conference of nonaligned countries which met at Cairo in June 1961 adopted the following criteria which should serve as a basis for sending invitations:

that 'in spite of differences between rival ideologies today, the points of similarities are growing and circumstances are bringing them nearer to each other. If fear was not present and threats and compulsions are not used, the process will be hastened.'<sup>8</sup> Since capitalism has changed for good and so also has communism in some respects at least—he is not inclined to be extraordinarily critical of either of them. On the contrary, he finds in each of them such features as would commend themselves to India in the present circumstances.<sup>9</sup> In fact, the Congress concept of socialist pattern of society, of which the mixed economy is an important feature, contains some of the ingredients of both the systems.

These considerations determine the limits of Government of India's opposition to and support for international communist and non-communist ideologies. The Government of India can neither accept the view that communism is an unmitigated evil, nor can it endorse the claim that contemporary capitalism is out of date. Consequently, it is unable to take sides in the ideological conflict in which the super-powers are engaged.

Two more factors are responsible for Nehru's refusal to take a partisan view of the ideological conflict. First, he does not believe that the super-powers are really earnest about ideologies. The cold war as an instrument of foreign policy would become merely shadow-sparring, if the element of 'real politics' is absent. In reality, ideology serves as a

The country should have adopted an independent policy based on coexistence of states with different political and social systems and on nonalignment. It should have been consistently supporting the movements of independence. It should not have been a member of even bilateral military alliance.

8. J. Nehru, *India Today and Tomorrow* (New Delhi, 1958), p. 27.

9. J. Nehru, 'Basic Approach', *AICC Economic Review* (New Delhi), 15 September 1958.

It may be recalled that while sponsoring the resolution on objectives in the Constituent Assembly, Nehru paid a tribute to all the three major revolutions of modern history—French, American, and Russian. A large section of Indian people admire the rapid industrial progress made by the USSR, though they are aware that there is suppression of individual liberty.

veneer. 'Although there is a great deal of talk about ideology,' says Nehru, 'I doubt if they came into picture at all except as weapons.'<sup>10</sup> He therefore refrains from such actions and decisions as will drag India into this conflict.

Secondly, even if the powers were serious about ideology, India has her own traditional attitude towards conflict. She is not used to thinking in terms of absolute categories — such as good and evil, black and white — as far as ideals and concepts are concerned. Therefore, she cannot support a stand which smacks of self-righteousness and sectarian absolutism. And since the cold war is a product of this kind of thinking, most Indians are not inclined to line up with either of the contestants. On the contrary, as of yore, they take a long-term view of conflicts, which, as the historical experience has taught them, generally tend to relax sooner or later. They know that tension cannot remain at a boiling point for long.

Nonalignment therefore rests on the belief that it is unwise to take sides in any quarrel which by its very nature is short-lived and in which the crusading contestants are bound to get mellowed with the passage of time. Further, it is believed that the cold war has its origin in a state of funkiness of mind. It is not a thrilling and an elevating contest of the courageous for more power, but a clumsy and enervating game whose participants, with all their brave gestures, are really scared of each other. 'Europe,' Nehru observed, 'has a legacy of conflict of power... which is the fear of losing it or the fear of some one else getting greater power.'<sup>11</sup> He traces the origins of conflicts between super-powers to a sense of fear and diagnosed it as a disease of mind which requires a psychological treatment: abandon fear, look at the world with a calm, unprejudiced, clear eye. He believes that out of fear (which is probably the greatest evil) arise conflict and violence.<sup>12</sup> He argues that alignment will

10. See note 5, p. 184.

11. See note 3, p. 232.

12. See note 3, p. 251.



aggravate the disease and, therefore, at least India should not be a party to the process. On the contrary, he would like India to remain nonaligned and thus throw her weight at right moments in favour of peace.<sup>13</sup>

If war is an obsolete weapon of national policy, so are war-like preparations. Military alliances (which are a form of diplomacy by threat or deterrence) promote a sense of insecurity and destroy conciliatory environment free of fear in which alone the temper of peace can develop. Time and again, Nehru has deplored the 'incursion of the military mentality in the chancellories of the world.'<sup>14</sup> His opposition to pacts stems partly from the basically peaceful approach to international issues. There are, says Nehru, two ways of approaching the problems of international relations, 'one is the conviction that...war is bound to come. Therefore, we should prepare for it...The other way starts with the feeling that war can be avoided...we do not believe that war is inevitable although it is a dangerous possibility.... Apart from the political and diplomatic fields, one can work for its avoidance even in psychological field.'<sup>15</sup>

### *Emotional Factors*

In addition to the above-mentioned rational considerations powerful emotive factors have determined the Government of India's attitude to the cold war. Anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, and fraternal feelings for Asian countries did not permit the Government of India to move too far towards the west. On the contrary, they have tended to render its attitudes rather critical of some of the actions and decisions of western powers. It could not openly and unconditionally align itself with the western powers singly or collectively because western imperialism throughout the late forties and early fifties remained powerful in Asia and Africa. In

13. See note 3, p. 257.

14. See note 5, p. 249.

15. *Ibid.* p. 250.

fact, on account of the reluctance of colonial powers to retreat gracefully, it had to oppose the western powers openly and since the attitude of the USSR on these questions turned out to be in line with that of India, it appeared that it was supporting Russia. Just as emotional attachment to the ideal of 'freedom with justice' (which often expresses itself negatively as a rabid form of anti-communist sentiment) tends to impinge on the mind of American people an image of a bipolar world, in the same way, opposition to colonialism and racialism has impinged on the minds of Indian people an image of a different kind of bipolar world—the 'haves' or imperialist powers on one side and colonial dependencies or the 'havenots' on the other.

The Government of India has shown extraordinary concern and an unusual sensitiveness towards some of the earlier issues relating to anti-colonialism and anti-racialism. The spontaneous action in Indonesia in 1949 and her initial response to Suez invasion in 1956 are comparable, for their vigour and enthusiasm, to the American response to the outbreak of war in Korea and events in Hungary. Even opposition to regional military alliances was also related to opposition to colonialism.<sup>16</sup> Obviously, a nascent, sensitive, and alert nationalism cannot take chances. It will oppose anything that has the faintest suggestion of colonial revivalism. Emphasising this point Nehru said: 'When I think of any military aid...freely given from a country of the west...to a country of the east...the past history of Asia comes up before me, the history of colonial dominations.'<sup>16a</sup>

No doubt, regional military alliances could be denounced as precursors of colonial expansion even on rational grounds. But the difference in the manner and the general tone of the opposition to the alliances in Asia and similar alliances else-

16. Explaining this point in Calcutta on 1 February 1958, V. K. Krishna Menon said, 'Participation of newly liberated countries in military alliances might result in the admission of colonialism by the back door...that is one of the reasons why India should follow an independent course...'

16a. See note 5.

where (e.g., Nato, Rio pact, Anzus) gives an impression that the Government of India was acting emotionally. After all, in practice, none of the signatories to the SEATO, particularly Pakistan, has been reduced to the status of a colony. On the contrary, some observers have not failed to note elements of independence in the foreign policy of Pakistan also.

Two interesting consequences flowed from this attitude. Firstly, the Government of India committed more or less the same error as the big powers. The cold war mentality, in a sense, implies the introduction of non-political, particularly the moral or ideological considerations, into the evolving of foreign policies. By accepting anti-colonialism it has also added a moral and emotional component to the foreign policy.<sup>17</sup> The only difference between the Government of India on one hand, and the USA and the USSR on the other is that, while in case of the latter the values are anti-communism and anti-capitalism respectively, in case of the Government of India they are nationalism and anti-colonialism.

Very often the Government of India has tested the consequences of some of the US policy pronouncements and decisions inside and outside the UN on the anvil of anti-colonialism and racialism.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, US spokesmen have tested some of the policies and decisions of the Government of India on the anvil of the anti-communist crusade.<sup>19</sup> The judgement of one country regarding the other got partly distorted. Each

17 (a) 'The kernel of our policy is ending colonialism all over Asia, Africa and elsewhere'. Nehru, *The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. II (Calcutta, 1947), p. 251.

(b) 'India will uphold the principle of freedom for dependent peoples and will oppose racial discrimination wherever it may occur,' *Ibid.*, p. 252.

18. E.g. (a) regional pacts, (b) the US stand on racial segregation issue in UN in 1947, (c) US aid to the Netherland and France was considered an indirect abetment to their colonial policy in Indonesia and Indo-China respectively, (d) India's criticism of Nato: when Nato was first envisaged it was for defence. But gradually we found it was supposed to cover colonial possessions of all these powers also. Government of India, Publications Division: *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949-53* (New Delhi, 1954), p. 269.

19. India's stand on Hungary and her stand on the later resolution on Korea were deeply resented in the USA.

judged the policy of the other by a criterion which had no direct relevance to the nature of issue in question. This was natural because to the Government of India, given her background and the stage of development, anti-imperialism appeared a greater evil than communism. It took a comparatively lenient view of world communism and a more serious view of western imperialism in all its manifestations. It considered communism as a local, and not an international phenomenon, related to certain social and economic problems.

Secondly, being conscious of her position in Asia as a free country, India projected into her foreign policy another emotional component, namely, the sentiment of Asian solidarity which in fact was more or less a negative sentiment.

Nehru had to act as the spokesman of resurgent Asia and Africa.<sup>20</sup> He was conscious of this responsibility. 'May I say,' asked Nehru, in course of his address to the UN General Assembly in Paris in 1948, 'as a representative from Asia, that we honour Europe... but may I also say that the world is something bigger than Europe... I venture to submit that Asia counts in world affairs. Tomorrow it will count much more than today.' As he explained later, 'India's championship of freedom and racial equality in Asia and Africa is a natural urge of the facts of geography and history.... We are compelled by circumstances to play this part.'<sup>21</sup>

Anti-colonialism, anti-racialism and the feeling of Asian solidarity are responsible for making Nehru think in terms of a different kind of bipolarity. Nehru does not 'see' the great ideological 'divide' which separates the two super-powers. The image of the world which he carries in his mind does not correspond to the image which the leaders of the USA and the USSR carry in their minds. Naturally, he could not develop a foreign policy which is based on the recognition of this division.

20. Nasser and Nkrumah and others had not come to power. Nu was involved in internal affairs; so was Sukarno. But later in 1959 the birth and growth of Afro-Asian group in the UN relieved India of this function.

21. See note 5, p. 128.



## II

## NATIONAL INTEREST

The above-mentioned rational considerations and emotive compulsions serve only one purpose, namely, to build an attitude which does not admit of a partisan policy. However, these cannot be considered as the sole determinants of foreign policy which, as we all know, is not a manifesto of the cherished ideals and emotional preferences of a leader, or, for that matter, even of a nation. Like the rest of political activity, foreign policy is the art of reconciling the attitudes with the national interest. Some governments see to it that the shine and majesty of the ideals do not get dimmed or diminished or compromised too much in course of their encounter with reality. In India, Nehru had not only to formulate and state the policy of nonalignment but also had to implement the policy in the best interest of the country.

It is true that sometimes the language and the tone of his foreign policy pronouncements and the manner in which he goes about dealing with them give an impression to the critical observers<sup>22</sup> that he is aspiring to be a moral preceptor or an impartial arbiter. But, this is not correct. As Moraes explains, 'If Nehru talks constantly of moral and ethical values it is not for the benefit of the world so much as for the understanding of his countrymen.'<sup>23</sup> Nehru as a practical idealist knows that moral values cannot be adopted as the ends of foreign policy. He does not ignore their importance at the stage of formulation, but he is quite clear that the pursuit of moral values as such is the task of a prophet.<sup>24</sup> Addressing the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on

22. India's emphasis on Panchsheel contributes to giving her policy that characteristic dual nature of seeming pursuit of national interest and moral goals.

Werner Levi, *Year Book of World Affairs 1958* (London, 1958), p. 115.

23. F. Moraes, *Nehru, A Biography* (New York, 1959), p. 441.

24. 'There is always a difference between the prophet and a politician in their approach... He [Nehru] has to steer through a middle course.' Moraes, *op. cit.*

4 December 1947 he said that whatever be the broad principles and policy of a government it ultimately functions for the good of the country.<sup>25</sup> 'The first thing,' he confirmed later, 'that was kept in view was to build our own country and not to get entangled in matters which did not directly affect us.'<sup>26</sup>

What constitutes India's national interest? India has no empire to hold on to, no trade monopoly to perpetuate, no ocean routes to safeguard, no international commitments of vested interests to preserve (except for Kashmir and people of Indian origin abroad) and no special ideology to sell. Further, so far the Government of India has not shown signs of thinking in terms of power or struggle for power which is normally the quest of state. India's quest is survival — survival as a free, united, and prosperous nation. Indian people are interested in stability and security — internal and external.

### *Political Stability*

In almost all developed countries, particularly those which have adopted democratic constitution, the international environment exercises a considerable influence on the balance of political forces within the country. In some instances the lack of harmony between domestic situation and foreign policy leads to disastrous results. Nehru understands the balance of forces as represented by the various groups within his party and also the relative strength of his party. Keeping in view these factors, Nehru said in Lok Sabha that the 'Government cannot go too far in one direction.'

25. See note 3, p. 205.

26. See note 3, p. 215. Speaking at a press conference in Nigeria in September 1962, Nehru is reported to have said that India's foreign policy is neither pro-east nor pro-west but it is pro-India.

India's action in Goa clearly brings out these remarks about the real character of India's policy. However, unfortunately, some of the idealistically inclined spokesmen of India's foreign policy, as well as the public, are not sufficiently clear about this patent fact about India's policy. Even some of the western observers have fallen into this error. Less related to the substance of the matter, the bitter criticism of India's action on Goa was on account of this misunderstanding.

Any policy in favour of one of the two groups of powers competing for world supremacy would have resulted in the polarisation of the effective public opinion within the Congress and upset the balance between the Congress and other parties. Further, alignment with one bloc might have provoked the other bloc to support and strengthen secretly or indirectly such forces within the country as were in its favour. If the balance of forces within the country is not as stable as it is in the UK or elsewhere, bipolarity in international politics on the basis of ideology tends to create bipolarity or division in internal politics.

During the period 1946-48, in Patel — conservative and rightist in his leanings — and in Nehru — progressive and ebullient (but by no means leftist) — two powerful forces were equiposed against each other at the highest echelons of national leadership. A partisan foreign policy would have upset this delicate balance.

Besides the factor of personalities who differed from each other in temperament and affiliations, the public opinion in India did not show any special enthusiasm for any one of the ideologies. In fact, there was something in both of them which brought a mingled reaction of revulsion<sup>27</sup> and admiration.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, unreserved support to the west<sup>29</sup> or wholesale approval of communism was not possible.

Nonalignment promoted internal stability. Negatively, it did not aggravate the 'political schizophrenia'<sup>30</sup> in the mind of

27. (a) The US policy of supporting colonial powers, the reticence on Indian freedom struggle.

(b) The USSR: the violence, materialism, and denial of individual freedom.

28. (a) The efficacy and the capacity for rapid growth of communist planning, humanitarian ideals, and anti-colonialism.

29. (a) From 1946-48, the US was considered to be on the side of colonial powers, e.g. (i) her reticence over India's freedom (ii) aid to the Netherlands when Indonesia was in trouble (iii) the Indo-China policy of the USA.

(b) On account of the past records of the CPI, specially during the war, there existed unsympathetic feelings against Communists.

30. See note 23, p. 402.

the people. Positively, it helped in creating such conditions as would promote political stability.

After 1951 also, the situation remained materially unchanged. Although Patel was now dead, public opinion at the base and at the higher level of leadership continued to be largely conservative and anti-communist. In fact, during the last fourteen years the effective base on which national leadership has rested has been predominantly committed to conservative ideals. Like the tower of Pisa, with his feet in the rightist base, Nehru has been leaning to the left in domestic policy. No doubt he is the undisputed leader now, unrivalled and alone—yet his authority over the Congress is by no means unquestioned. He has to reckon with opposition in regard to vital policy matters.

In the centre of the spectrum of public opinion, as expressed through votes, are the most dominant section of the Congress, PSP and the Socialists; the Jan Sangh and the Swatantra parties are on the right, the Communists are on the left.<sup>31</sup> Naturally, the foreign policy of India cannot ignore the views of the middle sectors which obviously have no special affection for any of the super-powers.

Thus it appears that nonalignment imparted to the foreign policy of India the character of a national policy. Since it reflected the consensus of opinion of all the major parties (which accept it from different points of view) it enabled India to face the world as one nation and speak to it in one voice. Any other policy would not have had this almost universal support and would have divided the country.

So far we have discussed the question of stability in relation to the balance of political forces within the country. The question of the relation of stability to foreign policy can be seen in other contexts, namely, (a) the gigantic social problem after partition during 1946-54 and (b) social tensions expressing themselves through linguism, provincialism, and

31. The Third General Elections reflect the same position, although the rightist forces in some states have gained more representation.



communalism during 1956-62.

During the first period India was engaged in a life and death struggle for survival. The integration of princely states, the rehabilitation of refugees, the drawing up of the constitution and the holding of elections were the four major steps in the country's progress towards unity and stability. 'Two other steps reinforced this process. The decision to remain within the Commonwealth and the firm resolve to counter and crush communist terrorism.'<sup>32</sup>

The second period (1956-62) which saw factional strife over language was a period of anxiety when fears about the possible<sup>33</sup> dismemberment of the country were being openly expressed.<sup>34</sup> These fissiparous trends filled Nehru's mind with anguish and he put aside other issues and took up the cause of unity.<sup>35</sup> This was made possible by the policy of non-alignment.

There is one more aspect of the relationship between the foreign policy and internal stability and balance of forces. Even military alliances upset the political equilibrium. Analysing the consequences of military aid to Pakistan, Selig Harrison in a series of articles<sup>36</sup> has concluded that aid from outside upset the balance of forces within Pakistan. By giving aid on a grant basis — which does not have to be won on the inter-government battle of budget — the donor government intervenes on the side of defence ministry... it underwrites the

32. See note 23, p. 413.

33. S. Selig Harrison, *India, The Most Dangerous Decades* (New Jersey, 1961).

34. (a) 'India stands the risk of being split up into a number of totalitarian small nationalities'. Suniti Kumar Chatterji, *Report of the Official Language Commission* (New Delhi, 1957). Quoted by Harrison, see note 33, p. 3.

(b) 'The future is in the hands of God... Centrifugal forces will ultimately prevail' C. Rajagopalachariar in *Our Democracy* (Madras, 1957). Quoted Harrison, see note 33, p. 3.

35. 'Nehru's nightmare is the separatist chain reaction in which one region's defiance of the central authority touches off another's.' See note 33, p. 9.

36. Harrison, *The New Republic*, Vol. 141, Nos. 6-7, 8-9, & 10 for 10 Aug. 1959, 24 Aug. 1959, 7 Sept. 1959 respectively.

rulers.<sup>37</sup> In other words, military aid interferes with the free play of political forces in the country and it is liable to place one of the groups representing one set of forces at a greater advantage in relation to others.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, it is sometimes difficult for democratic procedures and ideals to strike deeper and more genuine roots.

In the foregoing analysis foreign policy has been considered as one of the determinants of domestic stability. But the objective conditions prevailing within a country also determine foreign policy. In fact, the two are interrelated. In less developed countries, where the conditions are fluid and a high degree of political maturity has not been attained the international tensions and the nature of a country's response to them become more decisive. Therefore, in such cases it is necessary to 'quarantine,' as it were, the country against the cold war epidemic in order to ensure normal political evolution. Nonalignment can serve the functions of an 'isolation hospital.'

### *Economic Interest*

Modern diplomacy, like war, is 'totalitarian'. It tends to penetrate into every aspect of national life, particularly the economic. It has been observed that alignment interferes not only with the political balance of forces but also with the normal working of the national economy. On account of formal pre-commitment, political considerations are liable to outweigh economic considerations regarding rational allocation of national resources within the country.<sup>39</sup> In fact, the economy of the aligned countries, particularly those which are

37. Harrison, 'Undoing a Mistake,' *The New Republic*, 7 Sept. 1959 Vol. 141, No. 10, p. 12.

38. In 1954 when M. Ali went to the USA and G. Mohammed had dismissed the cabinet and dissolved the legislature, the quantum of aid to Pakistan was increased four times to strengthen M. Ali's position at home.

39. The economies of India and Pakistan are inter-dependent and complementary. To some extent the US aid to Pakistan hit the essential interdependence of these two countries serving the ties of complementarity... it has taken the form of an economic war e.g. Pakistan has been restricting

geographically contiguous with one of the super-powers (e.g., the economy of East European countries and of South America), tend to get integrated into the economy of the stronger partner. Further, as it happened in Pakistan and Thailand, economic aid to satellite states tends to acquire the nature of intervention in favour of certain special economic groups within the recipient states.<sup>40</sup>

According to certain critics<sup>41</sup> even free US aid to India has strengthened the private sector. 'The US aid does not on the whole promote industrial growth... and to the extent it does, it goes to private enterprise special groups.'<sup>42</sup> And since the control of private enterprise is in the hands of small tightly-knit groups (e.g., eight Marwari families in India control 565 directorships in industry, banking, insurance)<sup>43</sup> the US financial aid which has been confined to strengthening private sectors<sup>44</sup> becomes a kind of intervention on the side of such groups. But this did not have extremely adverse consequences because in India the public sector plays a predominant part in the economic life. Nehru is aware of this fact. Speaking at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National Development Council on 7 January 1956, he said: 'I am not against foreign capital coming in. But when foreign capital comes in, it produces certain effects... if foreign capital is associated with the private sector, it may play a greater part.'<sup>45</sup> The industrial policy of the Government of India is

her jute acreage and India enlarging it. Harrison S. Selig, 'Undoing of Mistake' *The New Republic*, 7 Sept. 1959, Vol. 14, No. 10.

40. See note 37, p. 12.

41. D. R. Gadgil, in 'Arth Vijnan,' September 1959. Quoted by Harrison, see note 33.

42. In fact as is clear from the pattern of aid, it is a deliberate policy. Long-term objective of US aid is to create a class of 'rich farmers' in rural areas of underdeveloped countries. This will serve as an antidote to the revolutionary proletariat who are bound to come into existence in course of industrialisation.

43. Harrison, ed., *India and US* (New York, 1961).

44. Early in 1962 it was agreed that the US will participate in the Bokaro Steel Project with, of course, an exception. But the very fact that it has taken such a long time for the US to decide proves this point.

45. Publications Division, Government of India, *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches* (New Delhi, 1958), Vol. III, p. 32.

based on the assumption that interests of private enterprise are not injured by the policy of public ownership and management of certain sectors of economy. Within the larger framework of socialist policies both sectors are important and the private and the public sector can coexist in healthy competition.

Alignment with either the USA or the USSR would have strengthened one sector against the other. It has been noted that if the USA has hesitated to enter whole-heartedly the area of heavy industry which falls under public sector, the USSR has been equally reluctant to give such aid as would strengthen private sector. It, therefore, appears that on account of the very nature of the pattern of Indian economy alignment was not advisable.

Nonalignment spared India of several complications. Although it is true that India is receiving large quantities of free aid from the USA, yet the manner and the form in which it is received and the policy of nonalignment make it possible for Indian public opinion to endorse government policy of seeking and receiving such aid. As a satellite power such support would surely not have been given, for memories of the times when political subjugation masqueraded in the guise of economic aid are still fresh in the minds of our people.

Further, nonalignment enabled India to keep the avenues of intimate economic contacts with all countries open. On account of the tradition of friendliness which India had established with each of them, it was less difficult for the super-powers to extend a helping hand to India in her economic difficulties. For example, up to 1953 Russia viewed India with some suspicion. But 'Korea made them realise that any attempt to move towards areas of strength in East Europe and Far East serves to add to the military strength of Nato, etc. . . . Therefore, they should look to uncommitted areas.'<sup>46</sup> There was a change in the character of Soviet policy. Economic aid replaced military and diplomatic pres-

<sup>46</sup> F. Parkinson, 'Soviet Aid to Underdeveloped Countries' *Year Book of World Affairs*, 1957 (London, 1958), p. 188.



sure. And in 1955 or a little earlier<sup>47</sup> 'Soviet Russia decided to provide direct technical assistance to an underdeveloped country not within the orbit of Soviet political influence.'<sup>48</sup> The nonaligned position of India facilitated the implementation of this policy and made it easier for Russia to give aid.

It is sometimes argued that India would have received more aid than she gets now if she had aligned herself with one of the super-powers. However, as Nehru argued, this would have meant India's virtual dependence on one power. And he did not wish to put all eggs in one basket.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, a smaller nation cannot think of receiving aid from a bigger power as an equal even if it is not pre-committed by a formal agreement. The dog, says V. K. Krishna Menon, may think that it is taking his master for walk. But the fact is quite the contrary; aid as reward for alignment is not worth the price.

India did not choose nonalignment because it wanted aid from both sides. In fact, on account of the policy of non-alignment India had to suffer considerable indifference and hostility at the hands of the super-powers in the initial stages of her free existence. Even if it was an act of expediency to entice them, no amount of begging or pretensions or even diplomatic pressure could have possibly coerced the unwilling powers. In a sense, it appears that since 1953 the big powers have veered round India.

There is one more aspect to this question. The policy of nonalignment, in so far as it could promote peace by lessening tension helped economic development indirectly. Conditions of belligerency disrupt the free flow of capital and technical know-how. India may have faltered when justice has been threatened. It may have hesitated when freedom was violated. But she did not waver when peace was threatened. With startling speed, whether invited or uninvited she has gone about the job of strengthening the forces of peace which promote her national interest. Even her opposition to imperial-

47. See note 46, p. 190.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

49. See note 3, p. 217.

ism, besides it being based on sentiments, is related to peace, which also according to Nehru is incompatible with colonialism and imperialism.<sup>50</sup>

In short, India's policy is a product of interaction of India's attitudes which are conditioned by certain rational and emotive factors, and her interests which are determined by the prevailing balance of political and economical forces in the country. Rational considerations did not justify a partisan stand in regard to east-west struggle for world supremacy. Emotive factors did not permit that it should take a definite stand in favour of western bloc, which at that time was collectively associated with imperialism and colonialism. National interest demanded that the India Government shows no special partiality to any one of two big powers. Thus by a felicitous coincidence the attitudes and interests reinforced each other during the period 1946-62 and there evolved the policy of nonalignment. To crown this, India had in Nehru a very competent spokesman who could articulate this policy clearly and who could capture the various nuances of this policy which in the hands of a lesser man and lesser mind might not have acquired its present sweep, stature, and dignity. But for his pragmatic approach, open mind and westernised as well as Gandhian orientation, a complete exposition of this policy could not have been possible. Nehru has imparted to this policy a peculiar halo and an almost 'un-nameable and undefinable quality' because of which it has been aptly called Nehru's policy.

### III

#### NONALIGNMENT IN ACTION

✓ Ideals suffer in expression. It would therefore be essential to examine how far the Government of India has succeeded in living up to the policy of nonalignment in the conduct of its relation with the super-powers and their conflict, and its

relation with other countries. It would also be interesting to examine this policy in the light of the Government of India's role in the Congo, its efforts in promoting Asian solidarity, and in the context of the changes that have occurred in the international situation since 1946.

India's relation with almost all nations are cordial. Even with China, Pakistan, Portugal and South Africa with which India has serious differences, it has refrained from taking an attitude of positive hostility and unfriendliness, though protracted negotiations to resolve the respective points of contention show no signs of hopeful conclusion. With regard to the USA and the USSR, both of them today are undoubtedly more friendly than they were in 1946. It is true that the stand taken by the Government of India on individual issues has given an impression of bias (to such observer as are habituated to no other rationale except that of classifying decisions and actions of nations in terms of the cold war). However, taking the period as a whole, it has so far succeeded in remaining unaligned.

The acceptance of the policy of nonalignment means that a country will not allow ideological considerations to effect the foreign policy. In other words, the economic or social or political values according to which a particular state wishes to organise its domestic affairs will be respected and no direct or indirect actions will be taken against it, even if these values happened to be antagonistic to or different from those of non-aligned states.

It cannot be said with certainty whether the Government of India have always been able to immunise the foreign policy from the virus of ideology — be it democratic or socialistic or secular. The spokesmen of India's foreign policy have often mentioned that the common belief in democratic values is one of the bases of Indo-US and Indo-British relations. Speaking in Lok Sabha on 6 December 1950, Nehru said 'in the nature of things' we stood not only for progressive democracy in neighbouring countries but also in other countries. We have said this not only to Nepal but it has consistently been a part

of our policy in distant quarters of the world. We are certainly not going to forget this when one of our neighbouring countries (Nepal) is concerned.'<sup>50a</sup>

As stated by Nehru himself, this is particularly true of India's relations with Nepal and Pakistan. Whenever occasions have arisen, the Government of India have not remained silent and unbiased regarding the political developments in these countries.

### Nepal

Nehru has shown an 'acute personal interest in Nepal's internal developments.' Consequently, 'sympathetic and friendly pressure' was exerted in respect of democratisation of Nepal<sup>51</sup> during 1950s, and even later. In 1950, it appears, Nehru pointed out in a friendly way to a Minister from Nepal to go in for progressive principles.<sup>52</sup> India is indirectly committed in Nepal to an ideology.

In the words of Nehru, 'India wished to treat Nepal as an independent country, but at the same time she was well aware that unless steps were taken to democratise the regime, difficulties and embarrassments would arise.'<sup>53</sup> Explaining his policy on Nepal more explicitly he said:

Our interest in the internal condition of Nepal has become still more acute and personal because of the developments across our borders, specially those in China and Tibet. Besides our sympathetic interest in Nepal, we were also interested in the security of our own country. Therefore, much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened... it would be a risk to our own security... The recent developments should make

50a. See note 3, p. 175.

51. See note 5, p. 177.

52. See note 5, p. 178.

53. See note 23, p. 462.



us ponder more deeply over the Nepal situation than we had done previously.<sup>54</sup>

These mildly phrased and cautious statements in essence mean that India's recognition of Nepal's independence is conditional upon Nepal's remaining democratic. One wonders, how far India's attitude is different in this respect from the US attitude to Latin American countries and the USSR policy regarding the bordering states. How is Indo-Nepalese defence pact different from other similar pacts between strong and weak countries? What is the value of such a pact between two unequal powers? Negatively, this means that in its relation or in its attitude towards Nepal, the Government of India's policy is not entirely in conformity with Panchsheel or nonalignment. We should like to point out that India has no imperialist or any sinister design on Nepal. Far from it. However, it is also clear that Nepal cannot enjoy its independence and internal autonomy in respect of choice of the form of polity to the extent that it becomes a threat to India's security. In other words a section of public opinion in India has placed a limit within which it will respect the sovereignty of Nepal. This is resented in Nepal.

### *Pakistan*

India's relations with Pakistan do not really reflect the best in Indian diplomacy. India has been engaged in another kind of 'cold war' with Pakistan during all these years. In spite of his sober counsels and broad-minded tolerance Nehru could not fully resist the general pressure of Indian public opinion about Pakistan. Considered objectively, his reaction to the proposal of the US aid to Pakistan may be objected to by some as somewhat high-strung.

54. See note 5, p. 177. The latest example is the limited assurance given by the Government of India to the King of Nepal (during his visit to India in April 1962) about checking the political activities of Nepalese nationals in India against the King's régime. Obviously, this is an example of a concern for some sort of ideological considerations.

This section seem to believe firmly that relations with Pakistan could have been better than what they are today. Pakistan, of course, must share a considerable portion of the blame for this mess. However, India's attitude becomes less justifiable because nonalignment implies a capacity of localise differences and develop friendly relations in other less controversial spheres. India could have afforded to adopt a more sympathetic policy with regard to her economic relations with Pakistan. Beside her own powerful complexes, one of the reasons why Pakistan began to look to the west rather than to the east for friends was the Government of India's incapacity to improve its diplomatic initiatives in the early years of independence.

These instances show the divergence in the Government of India's precepts and practice nearer home where her national interest is involved. Ideology or rational factors were rightly compromised in favour of national interest or national public opinion. 'Equality of treatment is a fundamental prerequisite for a successful policy of independence,' and the Government of India has not been able to satisfy this criteria.

But is it really necessary? Foreign policy is not a pursuit of moral ends. It is a means to promote national interest. The Government of India has never forgotten this. Self-interest rather than ideological or logical consistency has been her main objective. Moral ends entered the foreign policy only as means or as attitude-building factors. Seen from this point of view the Government of India's concern for the UN, its opposition to regional pacts in Asia, its acceptance of aid from both blocs of power, its crusade against imperialism and racialism, its zeal for 'peace area approach', its active involvement in world affairs — all these can be considered as exercises in promoting self-interest.

Take for example, her attachment to the sentiment of Asian solidarity. The popularity of the sentiment of Asian solidarity in India dates back to the victory of Japan over Russia in 1905. Subsequently, several national leaders, e.g., Chittaranjan Das and Dr Ansari, expressed themselves in favour of the idea. Nehru has dwelt on the same idea in one of the essays in

*Unity of India.* After independence, the Government of India has actively associated itself with the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, the Afro-Asian Conference on Indonesia in 1949, the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the formation of an Afro-Asian group in the UN.

But all these are by no means manifestations of the Government of India's platonic attachment to this idea. The Government of India's support to the idea of Asian solidarity is rooted in self-interest. If the attempts of the super-powers to enter Asian scene are opposed, it is because India wants to maintain in Asia the natural post-colonial balance of power. Any intrusion which will disturb this balance in favour of the other Asian country receiving the patronage of a super-power is resented. She wants to maintain a neutral, peaceful, free Asia, in which, if foreign patronage is eliminated, India automatically acquires an important position by virtue of her geographical position and economic potential. Asianism is a kind of Monroe Doctrine to keep Asia free from the evils of power conflict. It will enable Asia to develop herself freely. And since India's destiny is tied with Asia, peace in Asia is bound to promote peace in India. The Government of India had stronger objection to regional pacts in Asia than elsewhere because these pacts tend to upset the natural balance of power in Asia against India.

Nehru seems to be conscious of India's place in Asia. Commenting on this point in 1949 he said, 'whether we want it or not, we realise that we simply cannot exist in isolation. Certainly we cannot—India in southern, western and south-east Asia has to play a distinctive and important role... or else she will fade away.'<sup>55</sup> As he himself made it explicit on some other occasion, India was 'compelled' by circumstances to give expression to this natural urge of history and geography. Obviously, it is not an ideal but a compulsion.

It would be wrong therefore to attribute idealism to India's support for Asian solidarity. In fact a closer examination of

55. See note 3, p. 248.

the Government of India's actions relating to the four major expressions of Asianism are revealing.

Firstly, India has not followed up with zeal any concrete attempt to strengthen and promote Asian solidarity. For example, the Government of India is said to have allowed to languish the Asian Relations Organisation which was set up by the Asia Relations Conference in March 1947. It made no efforts to convene a second Bandung.

Secondly, as is the general impression in India and even elsewhere, India cannot be considered as the leader or initiator of the idea of Asian autonomy. The idea of sponsoring a conference on Indonesia in 1949 which though convened in New Delhi, was actually mooted by Burma. The Bandung conference was the result of the joint efforts of Colombo Powers and it appears that India did not play an extraordinary role in it. The Colombo Powers Conference on Indo-China in 1954 was held at the initiative of Ceylon.

Thirdly, India's effort to promote freedom movements in Asia has been more moral than material. Take, for example, Indo-China. The Government of India's attitude to the Indo-Chinese problem was one of 'aloofness'. When on the occasion of the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 some of the delegates representing national movements of south-east Asia demanded that armed assistance be given to their struggle of freedom and that some of their governments be given *de jure* recognition, Nehru made his influence felt on the side of moderation. He made it clear that though India had moral sympathy with the national movement of south-east Asia, it was altogether unrealistic to expect active intervention on her part. In fact, the tone of speeches of Nehru as compared to the other delegates to that conference was moderate.

If we compare the role of the Government of India in Korea and her role in the Congo, it will be seen that it is making unawares a qualitative change in some aspects of its basic policy. On the Korean issue it opposed all efforts to make the UN an enforcement agency. But in the Congo it has actively associated itself in enforcing the decisions of the UN



even by force. It participated<sup>56</sup> quite actively in what Ritchie Cadler calls the UN's great experiment of 'international state-making and state-management'<sup>57</sup> in the Congo. Further, it has always held that the UN forces should enter a country with the consent of the country concerned. But at a certain stage, powerful factions in the Congo were opposed to the presence of the UN forces, particularly Indians in their country. Once Kasavubu refused to recognise that India was nonaligned.

Now, these taken together can also be justified as expressions of nonalignment. However, the fact remains that since India is more inextricably involved in world affairs today than it was before, one therefore wonders whether it is possible for any country to be involved and yet remain nonaligned and independent in the process. It appears that the very success of nonalignment will perhaps lead to its modification. Non-alignment and deep involvement may not go together for long. Responsibilities, both national and international, cannot be discharged so impartially. There is bound to be a bias in favour of national interest or groups of nation.

#### IV

#### PROSPECTS

The Government of India's attitude and interests towards the cold war were formulated and implemented during the formative years of Indian nationhood in the context of an international environment of which the most important features, from the point of view of the Government of India, were racial inequality, colonialism and imperialism in Asia and Africa, and a relentless super-power rivalry conducted in the name of ideology.

No doubt the problems of the world including those of India remain basically the same. However, the landscape is in a state of constant flux and like the ever dissolving patterns

56. Government of India sent troops and loaned the services of Rameshwar Dayal to implement UN resolutions on the Congo.

57. Ritchie Cadler, *Agony of the Congo* (London, 1961), p. 159.

in a kaleidoscope, the tones of the shades which compose this landscape, and their juxtapositions and relationships with each other, it has undergone considerable change. This may perhaps necessitate a reconsideration of the Government of India's policy of nonalignment.

Considering the external conditions, international outlook today is quite different from that of late forties and fifties. Colonialism, racialism, and imperialism have retreated almost everywhere. No doubt, some pockets of colonies and dependencies still exist, but as time passes these questions will not receive the same priority attention as they got in the fifties. The leadership and the tone of the political life in the USA and USSR, though they still function within the old framework, has changed for the better. Kennedy and Khrushchov have set into motion new trends in international diplomacy which on account of its comparatively less dogmatic emphasis (if this trend continues) makes for a better international climate in which nonalignment may lose its functional significance. The Commonwealth as an association has courageously accepted the implications of multi-racial membership. The composition and scope of the UN have so changed that the big powers cannot easily manipulate it as a tool of national policy. The non-European races are making their presence felt in all the councils of the world. This is an environment of strength with which the policy of the Government of India, originally mooted in an international environment of weakness, will have to be reconciled.

There is another new factor—the Chinese aggressiveness. In the long run, the need to hold in check the expansionistic tendencies of China may force India to think in terms of power more seriously and openly and it may have to pursue a more effective policy of balance of forces in Asia because in a system of powerful states (which is bound to come into existence) in Asia and Africa 'politics of powerlessness' may not work.

As regards the internal situation, at the bottom, the national interest of India can even today be defined in terms of economic

backwardness and political stability. But as compared to the past, today the level and pattern of the problem have changed so significantly within the original framework that it is going to make a significant difference in redefining national interest.

The modern Indian state has moved out of infancy into some kind of 'majority' or adulthood. In this process of 'drive towards comparative maturity' the emphasis has shifted from simple elemental needs of survival to complex factors of development. The forces released by the third five year plan are bound to have substantial implications for the policy of nonalignment. Take, for example, the economic aid from the western powers. The circumstances<sup>58</sup> in which it is being rendered, and its changed character<sup>59</sup> are not going to make any significant impact on India's attitude to western bloc.

In short, the internal maturity and the question of Chinese hostility, an environment of which the most significant feature is the fading away of colonialism, the rise to power of Kennedy and Khrushchov—all these taken together have created a new situation.

The basic urges of a growing polity are: development rather than emancipation and power and all that goes with the acquisition of power rather than preliminary need of a new state in terms of fraternal relations and survival. It appears that India's policy of nonalignment will also be determined by these new needs and urges. The politics of nonalignment is a politics of peace, a state of powerlessness and survival.' Will nonalignment fit in or accord with the politics of power and development?

<sup>58</sup>. The installation of Democratic administration in US and the decline of colonialism create conditions of better understanding.

<sup>59</sup>. It is not earmarked for private sector; it is intended to be on a long-term basis; it is a low rate of interest; it is from group of countries, though US's share is maximum.

## Domestic Compulsions

Urmila Phadnis

CEYLON ACHIEVED NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE IN 1948. THE Ceylonese movement for independence was relatively a brief one compared to similar movements in other colonial countries.<sup>1</sup> Another distinguishing feature of the movement in Ceylon was the absence of any serious mass struggle conducted in a sustained manner over a long period of time.<sup>2</sup> Under these circumstances it was only natural that the leadership of Ceylon which took over power from the British neither faced a sizeable parliamentary opposition to its policies nor had to contend with issues of deep emotional significance to the masses. This leader-

1. In response to the representations of some of the prominent Ceylonese citizens, the British Government introduced a Legislative Council with a limited franchise (4 per cent of the population) in 1921. But the overwhelming powers given to the official members reduced its significance. Subsequently, the Legislative Council was substituted by a State Council in June 1931. It was comprised of 61 members, of which 50 were elected (on the basis of universal adult franchise), 8 nominated and 3 officers of State. The Council shared executive authority and had a right to select its Board of Ministers from its own ranks. From these beginnings of responsible government, Ceylon moved to dominion status in 1946 on the recommendations of the Soulbury Commission and finally became independent in 1948. D. K. Rangnekar, 'The Nationalist Revolution in Ceylon,' *Pacific Affairs* (New York), 3 December 1960.

2. 'There had been nothing equivalent to the non-cooperation movement in India, on the contrary, Ceylonese Ministers had been continuously in power since 1931 and had, as members of the War Council, collaborated with the commanders of the armed forces of the United Kingdom during the war with Japan. Though Indian nationalist propaganda had produced an echo in Ceylon, the method of peaceful persuasion had been substituted for the method of Satyagraha....' Ivor Jennings, 'Crown and Commonwealth in Asia,' *International Affairs* (London), 32, April 1956, p. 137.



ship, consisting primarily of the upper strata of Ceylonese society with considerable landed interest, was emotionally as well as intellectually oriented towards the west.<sup>3</sup> The leaders were active in public life, participated in almost all the legislative bodies,<sup>4</sup> providing a loose opposition to the official majority in the twenties and playing a prominent role in the State Council later.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, on the eve of the transfer of power, when Ceylon went to polls in 1947 to elect its own representatives, this western oriented group, with its fairly wide political experience, was bound to assume the leadership of a national party which could inherit power from the British. The United National Party, as it was called, was not so much a party as it was a conglomeration of several groups.<sup>6</sup> As in some of the other Asian countries, it claimed the allegiance of the masses without necessarily being a mass party. The opposition to the UNP, consisting of small and weak parties, was in no position to challenge its supremacy.<sup>7</sup>

3. A. J. Wilson, 'Ceylonese Cabinet Ministers 1947-1959: Their Political, Economic and Social Background,' *Ceylon Economist* (Colombo), 5, March 1960, pp. 8-11.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-7.

5. To quote a few instances, D. S. Senanayake was the Minister of Agriculture and Lands from 1931-47 as well as the Leader of the State Council and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Ministers since 1942. Sir John Kotelawala was the Minister of Communication and Works from 1936-37. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike was the Minister of Local Administration from 1936-47. For details see *ibid.*, pp. 3-7, 14-15, 22, 25.

6. Apart from several members of the Ceylon National Congress (formed in 1919 on the model of the Indian National Congress) two groups joined the UNP. They were the Ceylon Muslim League and the Sinhala Maha Sabha. Like the Burmese AFPFL, the Sinhala Maha Sabha was not officially dissolved. Thus till 1951 it effectively functioned as a party within party. W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of New Nation* (Princeton, 1960), pp. 7-9.

7. In the first election held under the new constitution in 1947, the United National Party secured 42 out of 95 seats in the House. The six appointed members and a significant proportion of the 21 Independent members voted regularly with it. Out of 7 members of Tamil Congress, 5 eventually joined the government party. The Trotskyist parties — the Lanka Sama Samaj Party and the smaller Bolshevik Leninist Party — together gained 15 seats. The Communist Party won 3 seats and the Ceylon Indian Congress 6. In the 1952 elections, the UNP emerged even stronger

### From Senanayake to Bandaranaike

In view of its western-oriented leadership, it was not surprising that the first government of independent Ceylon tended to pursue a foreign policy which was largely pro-western in character. Even so, enunciating Ceylon's foreign policy, the first Prime Minister of Ceylon, D. S. Senanayake, declared that the UNP was concerned with maintaining peace in the world and not in lining up with one bloc or the other.<sup>8</sup> According to him, Ceylon would pursue the policy of the 'middle way'<sup>9</sup> in international relations.

Senanayake was convinced that peace could not be established 'by hatred or revenge or by suspicion or by keeping nations under subjection.'<sup>10</sup> He believed that international communism posed a real threat to the freedom of the newly emergent countries<sup>11</sup> and that Ceylon should help in resisting its expansionist tendencies.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, Senanayake was aware of the strategic location of Ceylon in the Indian Ocean area and its importance in the struggle for power in the region.<sup>13</sup> Fearing that a militarily weak Ceylon might not

with 54 seats and the opposition was again divided between Trotskyites, Communists, Sinhalese communal party, two Tamil parties and two insignificant 'splinter' parties. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

8. Speech of D. S. Senanayake during the debate on the Japanese Peace Treaty. *Ceylon, Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 10 (1951) 3847.

9. 'Speeches of D. S. Senanayake,' *Ceylon Historical Journal* (Colombo), 5 (July and October 1955 and January and April 1956), p. 114.

10. *Ceylon, Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 10 (1951), 3848.

11. Speaking in the House of Representatives on the Governor-General's address, Senanayake declared: '...If we try to get too close to Russia, we would be embracing danger, we would be embracing the bear.... I would appeal to my good friends...Let them not play the game of Russia and make us slave again. *Ibid.*, pp. 260-1

12. J. R. Jayawardene, 'D. S. Senanayake's Foreign Policy,' *Ceylon Historical Journal*, 5 (July and October 1955 and January and April 1956), p. 54.

13. Speaking in the House of Representatives as early as 1947, D. S. Senanayake maintained: 'We are in a specially dangerous position, because we are in one of the strategic highways of the world. The country which captures Ceylon could dominate the Indian Ocean....We cannot defend ourselves....Let us confess that our freedom depends on somebody or other undertaking to help us defend ourselves....As I look round the

be in a position to defend itself he agreed to let the United Kingdom establish military bases in Colombo and Trincomaly.<sup>14</sup>

Whether Senanayake's fears were justified or not, his actions were a response to the cold war which was growing in intensity, thanks to the policy of containing communism through military pacts pursued by the USA and the inflexibility and lack of realism that characterised Soviet policy under Stalin. Under the circumstances, Senanayake's policy was one of sympathy for the west and opposition to the communist bloc. Ceylon did not enter into any formal military alliance with the US, the Ceylon-UK defence pact having precluded the need for it. While, on the one hand, Ceylon supported practically all the moves of the nonaligned Asian countries directed towards the ending of colonialism, and supported the freedom movements in Asia and elsewhere,<sup>15</sup> on the other hand, she consistently supported western moves on issues where the Soviet Union as a party was involved. Thus, Ceylon refused facilities to Dutch war ships en route to Indonesia in December 1948 but permitted harbour facilities to an American flotilla on its way to Korea. When asked to explain the distinction between the two cases, Senanayake maintained that in one case the Dutch were opposing a movement for freedom and in the other the UN was opposing aggression by international communism.<sup>16</sup>

D. S. Senanayake was succeeded by his son Dudley Sena-

countries of the world, I see at the moment only one country with sufficient interest in us to defend us at their expense, and that country is Great Britain.' Ceylon, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 1 (1947), 444-5.

14. 'It was...in our own interest to have an agreement to provide for our defence....There is no question of giving bases to anyone....They were only to be given when it became necessary in our own interests and after entering into an agreement.' *Ibid.*, pp. 731-3.

15. In accordance with this, Ceylon recognised the communist regime in China. *The Hindu* (Madras), 7 January 1950. Also, though Ceylon was not satisfied with the terms of the Japanese Peace Treaty, still she signed it unconditionally on the plea that it was better that Japan had as much freedom as possible rather than be a subjugated nation. Ceylon, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 10 (1951), 3848-50.

16. Jayawardene, see note 12, pp. 55-6.

mayake who, after a brief tenure of office, handed over the Prime Ministership to Sir John Kotelawala.<sup>17</sup> Sir John continued Senanayake's policies even more vigorously. If D. S. Senanayake was content only to endorse the policy of 'containment,' Sir John vociferously championed it.<sup>18</sup> Thus, during his regime, American transport planes carrying troops to Indo-China were permitted airport facilities in Ceylon on the plea that they were going to check 'the danger of communist advance and expansionism.'<sup>19</sup> In his speech at the Asian and African Conference at Bandung, Kotelawala raised the issue of 'Soviet colonialism.' If the Asian and African countries were united in their opposition to colonialism, should it not be their duty to openly declare their opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to western imperialism, he asked.<sup>20</sup>

Although Sir John was against establishing diplomatic relations with the countries of the communist bloc he had no objection to concluding a trade agreement with China in the interest of Ceylon's economy which faced a serious crisis after the Korean boom.<sup>21</sup>

It is significant that during this period the Soviet Union opposed Ceylon's entry into the United Nations on the ground

17. For a detailed exposition of the social, economic, religious and political background of these leaders, see Wilson, note 3, pp. 1-13.

18. Explaining the reasons for not even allowing a good will mission from China, Sir John said that Ceylon's relationship with China was to be limited, 'only for business'.... 'I do not want them in this country for any reason. I took this stand because the country must be saved from communist influence.' *Ceylon Daily News* (Colombo), 14 December 1953.

19. *The Hindu*, 28 April 1954.

20. George Mac Turnnan Kahin, *The Asian African Conference* (New York, 1959), pp. 18-9.

21. It is significant to note in this context that nearly 40 per cent of Ceylon's gross national product is accounted for by producing, processing and handling export commodities. Imports—mainly rice—are roughly equivalent to 35 per cent of her gross national product. Where import-export sector has such importance in the overall economy, Ceylon's standard of living, like many of the other underdeveloped countries, is closely dependent upon international exchange. As such, to avoid downward fluctuation in terms of trade, constant efforts to achieve the highest price for its export commodities from any country, irrespective of the political relationship with it, has remained the objective of Ceylon's economic policy. For details see Wriggins, note 6, pp. 378-83.



that Ceylon was not completely free from foreign domination.<sup>22</sup> Many leaders of the opposition parties in Ceylon also took the stand that the UNP government was not following an independent foreign policy. It merely followed 'the policy of the British Commonwealth which in turn... follows the dictates of the Dollar Republic.'<sup>23</sup> It must, however, be noted that Ceylon's commitment to the west was never formalised by signing a military pact with the United States. Nor did the Government try to suppress by force any opposition to its foreign policy. In other words, Ceylon's commitment to the west was not the policy of a small clique which owed its political existence to foreign and military support; it was only the policy of a party which was in power when the country achieved her independence.

### *Emergence of New Forces in Ceylonese Politics*

However, the defeat of the UNP and the landslide victory of the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (People's United Front) in the 1956 elections marked the beginning of a new phase in Ceylonese politics, characterised by the rise to power of a segment of Ceylonese society which had hitherto acquiesced in the leadership of an élite. It reflected the political awakening and a conscious drive for power of a section of society which was frustrated because of the privileged position of the foreign-educated ruling group. Personifying this segment of society were the Sinhala school teachers who felt that they were treated as 'second class professionals' in relation to the English-educated teachers; the Ayurvedic physicians who believed that the introduction of the western medical system posed a threat to the indigenous system and the Bhikkus (Buddhist priests) who felt that the western orientation of the ruling élite had been instrumental in corrupting and

22. United Nations, *Security Council Official Records*, third year (18 August 1948), pp. 11-4.

23. Ceylon, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 8 (1950), 345.

deteriorating the traditional Sinhalese culture. Thus, in spite of the introduction of universal adult franchise as early as 1931 it was only in the 1956 elections that the rural middle class successfully challenged the monopoly of power which an urban-oriented and pro-west élite had enjoyed since independence.<sup>24</sup>

The rise of these forces brought in its wake religious and Buddhist revivalism and a resurgence of the traditional culture. This socio-cultural renaissance was closely linked with nationalist fervour and had its impact on politics to the extent that it condemned everything which was foreign. Though it was not strictly anti-west, it did manifest the desire of the Ceylonese people to oppose any policy which subordinated its own interests to western interests or which tied them to the west in such a way that limited their freedom of action. As such, it was more thoroughly Asian in its outlook than the policies of the UNP. It was the support of these forces which, coupled with several other forces and factors,<sup>25</sup> brought victory to the MEP led by Bandaranaike.

Bandaranaike ably represented the new forces that emerged from the elections. 'Symbolically he had made Sinhalese his culture, Buddhism his religion and Ceylon his home. Thus, at a time when indigenous language, culture and religion were on the political agenda, the image of himself which he was able to project before the public was far more likely to evoke a positive response than his opponent's.'<sup>26</sup>

24. For details see Wriggins, note 6, pp. 326-69.

25. The main reasons ascribed to the victory of the MEP could be summed up as follows: (a) Electorate's desire for a change in view of the fact that the UNP had been in office too long; (b) Economic discontent chiefly due to high prices following the reduction of rice subsidy in 1952, the growing spectre of unemployment and the acute housing problem; (c) The vigorous campaign waged in favour of the party by the young monks who wielded considerable influence in the rural areas and (d) the no-contest pact between the SLFP and the left parties which prevented the splitting of votes. Thus while in the previous elections the dispersal of opposition votes among a number of parties enabled the UNP to win with a minority vote, it lost this advantage in the 1956 elections. *Ibid.*, pp. 366-8.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 353.

In 1937 Bandaranaike formed a political party named Sinhala Maha Sabha which had voiced Buddhist and Sinhalese aspirations. Later, it joined hands with the UNP. Bandaranaike held many important posts in the State Council and later in the House of Representatives where he was elected its leader. He was also in the UNP Cabinet till he crossed floor in 1951 and formed a new party—the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. The reasons for his leaving the UNP have never been fully explained but he and those who supported him ostensibly took the step on the plea that 'they were not satisfied with the progress made by the Government towards what they regarded as a mere Nationalist State, e.g. in such matters as the substitution of local languages, particularly Sinhalese, for English as the official language of the country, and the possible formation of a Republic on the Indian pattern.'<sup>27</sup>

### *Principles of Nonalignment*

As soon as Bandaranaike assumed office, he began to give effect to his ideas on what were the cardinal principles of his foreign policy. He believed that the world was in a state of 'change and flux'<sup>28</sup> and was on the threshold of the historical development of a new civilization. 'We are living today,' said the Prime Minister, 'between two worlds, the one dying and the other struggling to be born.'<sup>29</sup> Under these circumstances, he explained, the foreign policy of Ceylon must take into account the welter of conflicts that were inevitable due to this 'change over' and to prevent these conflicts from developing into a war which, in the atomic era, was unthinkable. The crying need of mankind in this historical setting was mutual understanding, collaboration and cooperation among nations with conflicting interests and ideologies.

27. 'Ceylon Under Socialist Rule,' Round Table (London), 9 March 1959 p. 141.

28. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, *The Foreign Policy of Ceylon* (Colombo, 1957), p. 4.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

While Bandaranaike recognised the ideological schism that rent the world, he also believed in the need for coexistence. Though he refused to recognise ideology as a criterion to determine Ceylon's relations with other countries he believed in borrowing 'some ideas and some principles from this side, and some from the other,' until a coherent form of society was created which suited 'the genius of our country.'<sup>30</sup> The formation of such a society implied a refusal to have any type of commitments which would frustrate its purpose. The role which Ceylon would play in her relationship with other countries was to be that of conciliator and mediator 'to bridge over the gulf between the two opposing factions,'<sup>31</sup> and thus help reduce the cold-war tension.

In view of these aims, Ceylon advocated close contacts with countries of both blocs provided such relationship did not involve<sup>32</sup> her in the politics of cold war. Ceylon, accordingly, established diplomatic relations with several countries. She also desired to conclude joint communiques reiterating the Bandung principles;<sup>33</sup> this policy did not, however, preclude barter pacts, payments agreements, trade pacts,<sup>34</sup> and friendly exchange of personnel but expressly ruled out military alliance and pacts.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

31. *Ibid.*

32. During Prime Minister Bandarnaike's regime diplomatic relations were established with the USSR, China, Canada, Afghanistan, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Ceylon, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 28 (1957), 4 and 35 (1959), 6.

33. To name a few, joint statements were signed by Bandarnaike with Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister of Japan, N. Kishi, in May 1957. The same month a joint statement was signed after the visit of Prime Minister Chou En-lai. Ceylon signed a joint communique with Czechoslovakia in 1958 and a joint statement with Yugoslavia in 1959. *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), 3 (1957) 1457 and 1490; 4 (1958) 1877 and 5 (1959) 2484.

34. E. g., during 1956-59, trade pacts and economic aid agreements were concluded with the Governments of Austria, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Maldives Islands, Pakistan, Poland, Rumania, Spain, USA, USSR and Yugoslavia. Ceylon, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 28 (1957) 4 and 35 (1959) 6. Also refer to Ceylon, *Treaty Series*, 1956-60.



### *Ceylon and UK Military Bases*

In consonance with his policy, Bandaranaike took a definite stand on various issues which came up before the UN or elsewhere, like the Suez, Hungary, British military bases in Ceylon and disarmament. One of Ceylon's early commitments which militated conspicuously against this new trend of its foreign policy was the continuation of British bases in the country. Therefore, the Prime Minister's first step after the formulation of his policy was to initiate negotiations for the withdrawal of these concessions granted voluntarily by his predecessors to the British.<sup>35</sup> While Ceylon's negotiations with the United Kingdom were half-way, the Suez crisis intervened. Declaring that Ceylon had no intention of embroiling herself in hostilities, Bandaranaike informed the Parliament that Ceylon had already declared its independent position on the issue and had secured assurances from the United Kingdom that the Ceylonese bases 'would not be used by them for any purpose connected with any military action in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.'<sup>36</sup> Also, after the outbreak of hostilities Ceylon expressed its inability to permit the use of these bases to Britain because such use would have militated against the basic tenets of her foreign policy.<sup>37</sup>

### *Ceylon and the Suez Crisis*

Ceylon believed that Egypt had a sovereign right to nationalise the Suez Canal but that in view of the exceptional international importance of this waterway, the legitimate interests of the world community in obtaining adequate assurances regarding the freedom and security of navigation should also be taken into consideration.<sup>38</sup> At the London

35. For details refer to Prime Minister's speech dated 11 July 1956. Ceylon, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 25 (1956) 225-34.

36. Ceylon, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 27 (1956) 426.

37. *Ibid.*, 804.

38. Ceylon *Daily News*, 20 November 1956.

conference of August 1956, Bandaranaike wholeheartedly supported a compromise solution of the problem which proposed a consultative body to advise Egypt in accordance with the interests of the users of the Canal. This body would maintain contacts with the UN.<sup>39</sup>

In the second phase of the Suez crisis, whether it was in the debates of the Ceylon Parliament<sup>40</sup> or in the UN<sup>41</sup> or elsewhere,<sup>42</sup> the Ceylon Government firmly declared that the action of Israeli troops followed up by Anglo-French action was unjustified; that there should be a ceasefire as well as immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Anglo-French troops from the Egyptian territory. In the joint communique signed along with Burma, Indonesia and India in November 1956, Ceylon also approved the creation of an international UN force to help in resolving the crisis. Outside the UN, she tried to impress upon the powers concerned the necessity of adopting appropriate steps to avert the danger of widespread hostility.<sup>43</sup>

An analysis of the voting record of Ceylon on the issue indicates the pursuit of a policy designed to solve the crisis through persuasion, negotiation and mediation and through active support—material as well as moral—to the UN in its efforts. Ceylon co-sponsored practically all the important resolutions dealing with the demand for withdrawal of Israeli and Anglo-French forces and for the creation of the UNEF.<sup>44</sup> It was also amongst the 24 countries which offered troops for the UNEF.<sup>45</sup> She was also elected a member of the 7-man

39. *United Nations Year Book* (1956), p. 19.

40. Speech of Prime Minister Bandaranaike on 11 December 1956. *Ceylon, Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 27 (1956) 194-6.

41. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (London), (1955-56) 15213.

42. *United Nations, General Assembly Official Records* (GAOR), First Emergency Session, 563rd mtg., 645; 566th mtg., 94-5; GAOR (XI) Plen., 590th mtg., 22 November 1956, 232 and GAOR (XII) Plen., 698th mtg., 2 October 1957, 246.

43. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, n. 41, 15213.

44. *Yearbook of the United Nations* (1956), pp. 25-67.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

committee 'to examine the question of the apportionment of the expenses of the force in excess of \$10 million.'<sup>46</sup>

An interesting point to note in the resolution on the Suez issue was the absence of any resolution sponsored by the USSR in the General Assembly and the association of India in 8 out of 15 resolutions. The US co-sponsored 6 resolutions out of which 2 were procedural ones. In fact, it was the relatively smaller European countries and Afro-Asian countries which dominated the proceedings of the General Assembly. Consequently, the resolutions were strikingly moderate in tone and balanced in language. They were neither recriminatory nor condemnatory. The explanation obviously lay in the fact that despite the magnitude of the Suez crisis as an issue which threatened the peace and security of West Asia in particular, the divergence between the two major parties of either power bloc was at its minimum. The refusal of the USA to support its western allies acted as a deterrent to the worsening of the situation. Consequently, the discussions as well as the initiative were left to the Afro-Asian group the keynote of whose policy was moderation.

Though the Suez crisis was not exactly a cold war issue in the sense that both the USA and the USSR gave their support to Egypt against UK and France, it assumed some importance in Ceylon's foreign policy due to the fact that this was the first issue on which the new Government was required to take a positive stand in consonance with its policy of nonalignment. By its frank pronouncements on the use of the UK bases in Ceylon the Bandaranaike regime made it clear that it was determined to adopt a policy independent of, and disentangled with, the west.

### *Ceylon and Hungary*

Bandaranaike was no less forthright on the Soviet military action in Hungary. He declared that whether it was Soviet

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-9.

dictatorship in Hungary or Anglo-French aggression in Egypt, they were equally 'unwise and undesirable'. He believed that these events were 'a manifestation once again of a certain resurgence of the spirit of colonialism, the desire of a strong power to achieve its purpose and impose its will, even by force, on a weaker power.'<sup>47</sup>

Notwithstanding this condemnation of Soviet action in Hungary, Ceylon abstained on most of the resolutions on Hungary in the UN. Her abstention on these resolutions was explained by the fact that in Ceylon's opinion they were recriminatory in character as well as in tone and, instead of providing a solution to the Hungarian problem, were only likely to serve the interest of the cold war.<sup>48</sup> Ceylon, however, supported all the resolutions which made straightforward appeal for immediate large-scale aid for the refugees.<sup>49</sup>

However, on 12 December 1956, Ceylon, along with Burma, voted in favour of a resolution sponsored by the west. In his speech, Ceylon's delegate Gunewardene said that Ceylon was disappointed and grieved to note that there had been 'violation of the code of conduct by a nation which we expected believed in preserving peace, order and the well-being of the world.'<sup>50</sup> He emphatically believed that it was necessary — rather obligatory — on the part of the UN to take a positive action and send an investigating committee to Hungary. Thus, for the first time Ceylon voted positively on the Hungarian question. Interestingly enough, Ceylon along with India and Indonesia had put forward amendments to this resolution for the purpose of deleting its condemnatory clauses. However, in spite of it, Ceylon and Burma voted for the main resolution.

47. GAOR (XI) Plen., 590th mtg., 22 November 1956, 234.

48. According to the Ceylonese delegate in the UN, Mr. Gunewardene, UN should be used as an instrument for the solution of disputes and not in gaining 'political capital' for one group or the other. The resolutions which had a 'propaganda' value or which were motivated by the political considerations of one group or another, could not lead to the solution of an issue. GAOR, Second Special Emergency Session, 571st mtg., 9 November 1956, 70-1.

49. Yearbook of the United Nations (1956), pp. 94-6.

50. GAOR (XI) Plen., 616th mtg., 11 December 1956, 647.



The resolution moved by India, Indonesia, Ceylon and Burma had to be withdrawn.<sup>51</sup>

Subsequently, when the Secretary-General in his report of 5 January 1957 felt that it was the proper time for the appointment of a Special Investigation Committee on Hungary,<sup>52</sup> Ceylon was an obvious choice for its membership.<sup>53</sup> The report of the Committee which was submitted unanimously by its members to the UN in February 1957 was in the nature of an indictment of the USSR and the Hungarian regime.<sup>54</sup> It also became the terms of reference for a new western initiated resolution sponsored by 37 states on 14 September 1957.<sup>55</sup> Ceylon, however, abstained on this resolution on the plea that owing to lack of assistance from the USSR and Hungary, the report of the Special Committee might not be complete.<sup>56</sup> Recalling that Ceylon had voted for the earlier General Assembly resolution (1131/XI of 12 December 1956), the Ceylonese delegate stated that in his Government's view, a renewed condemnation might not improve the situation and might even hinder the emergence of a climate conducive to a speedy solution.<sup>57</sup> Since then, whether it was the second report of the Special Committee on the murder of Imre Nagy and others in July 1958<sup>58</sup> or the Munro report on Hungary in 1959,<sup>59</sup> it abstained along with India.

This brief shift in Ceylon's attitude remained unexplained. Perhaps Mr. Gunewardene, disappointed at Soviet attitude, felt that what was needed was not abstention but some active approach towards the question. How much credit for this approach could be ascribed to the Ceylonese representative in the UN will be an interesting point to explore. Gunewardene, however, failed to convince Bandaranaike of the propriety of

51. *Ibid.*, 674-5.

52. *Yearbook of the United Nations* (1956), pp. 80-1.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

54. *Ibid.*, (1957), pp. 60-2.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Ibid.*, (1958), p. 70.

59. *Ibid.*, (1959), p. 51.

his action which might have led to Ceylon's embroilment in the politics of the power blocs. How much influence the nonaligned countries exerted on her decision will be another point to explore. Suffice it to say that, after this brief state of ambivalence, Ceylon reverted to the abstainees' camp on Hungary and Gunewardene was called back to be replaced by Sir Claude Corea.

### *Ceylon and West Asian Crisis*

In its pursuit of peace, Ceylon deprecated any type of foreign interference in the internal affairs of another country. It felt that, firstly, such interference could be used by unpopular governments to maintain themselves in power against the wishes of a majority of their people and thus deny to the people the elementary right of self-determination.<sup>60</sup> Secondly, Ceylon felt that in the event of the opposition in a country seeking the assistance of the other power bloc, the country could easily become a cockpit of rivalry between the two power blocs and could become a serious threat not only to the stability and peace of the country but of the whole world.<sup>61</sup> It was in anticipation of these fears that it unequivocally demanded the withdrawal of the UK and US forces from Lebanon and Jordan<sup>62</sup> and urged the Arab states to solve their internal issues among themselves.<sup>63</sup>

### *Ceylon on Tibet*

On the Tibet issue, while expressing Ceylon's sympathies for the Tibetans, 'particularly as Buddhists,' Bandaranaike felt that the only thing Ceylon could do in the context was 'to

60. GAOR (XI) Third Emergency Special Session, Plen., 742nd mtg., 20 August 1958, 116.

61. *Ibid.*, 117.

62. Ceylon, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 31 (1958), 2625-6.

63. Speech of Sir Claude Corea on 21 August 1958. GAOR (XI) Third Emergency Special Session, Plen., 746th mtg., 21 August 1958, 170-1.

wish that some satisfactory settlement should arise permitting Tibetans to follow their own way of life, what they conceive to be their way of life, under the suzerainty of China.<sup>64</sup> Thus, while on the one hand, Bandaranaike believed that the Tibetan issue was an 'internal affair'<sup>65</sup> of China, on the other, he offered 'to lend whatever good offices we can in every way to bring about a satisfactory settlement of this trouble and thereby enhance... greater understanding among the people of the world, particularly in this region, in Asia.'<sup>66</sup> It is difficult to understand how, if it was a domestic issue, Ceylon could offer to mediate. When the issue came up for consideration in the UN, Ceylon along with India and others chose to abstain on the question of its inclusion in the agenda.<sup>67</sup>

### *Ceylon on Disarmament*

On issues like disarmament and suspension of nuclear tests, Ceylon believed that one of the ways in which 'this downward trend towards destruction' could be arrested was to abandon military blocs and to enter into treaties of non-aggression and non-interference in the affairs of each country. The principle of peaceful coexistence in the economic as well as political sphere<sup>68</sup> which could greatly facilitate in 'creating an atmosphere of confidence and trust'<sup>69</sup> could also help in dealing with the problem of disarmament. Another factor which could contribute to the lessening of the cold war tension was the efforts on the part of the UN as well as the other powers, to ameliorate the economic conditions of the underdeveloped countries. The political and economic stability of these countries not only would make them exert their influence on the

64. Ceylon, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 34 (1959), 2744.

65. *Ibid.*, 2741.

66. *Ibid.*, 2744-5.

67. GAOR (XIV), Plen., 834th mtg., 21 October 1959, 528.

68. GAOR (XIII), Spl. Pol. Com., 119th mtg., 4 December 1958, 150-1.

69. GAOR (XIII), Plen., 764th mtg., 30 September 1958, 234.

power blocs more effectively but also would be a deterrent in their becoming pawns in power politics.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, Ceylon not only emphasised the importance of complete disarmament and suspension of nuclear tests<sup>71</sup> but also urged on the convening of meetings of the Heads of States and other statesmen as well as on the exchange of exhibits and information<sup>72</sup> which could help to some extent in removing the fear and suspicion among the powers concerned.

This emphasis on solving every issue not through a cold war approach but through a peaceful one has ostensibly been the guiding feature of Ceylon's attitude. Also, not merely condemnation of a particular country as an aggressor but a solution of the problems of the aggrieved was what she thought she attempted to attain. In this task, Ceylon believed that on every issue, whether Korea, apartheid or elimination of colonialism,<sup>73</sup> the UN had an important role to play. To Ceylon, the UN symbolised the 'faith and determination of the nations and peoples of the world to work out a means of peaceful coexistence and cooperation that is so essential if civilisation is to survive.'<sup>74</sup> To be effective it should be as broad-based as possible.

### *Ceylon's Policy of Nonalignment Since 1959*

The leadership of Bandaranaike was brought to a sudden end by his assassination in September 1959 and Ceylon witnessed the fall of two governments within eight months. Dahanayake, who was elected leader, could not carry the Sri Lanka Freedom Party along with him due to serious internal crisis in the

70. GAOR (XIV), Plen., 821st mtg., 5 October 1958, 39.

71. GAOR (XIII), 1st Com., 950th mtg., 16 October 1958, 39.

72. GAOR (XIV), 1st Com., 1041st mtg., 2 November 1959, 79-80.

73. According to the Ceylonese delegate to the UN, Mr. A. B. Perera, 'colonialism means economic exploitation, political domination and racial arrogance.' GA. P. V. 926, 28 November 1960, 62. This covered not only issues like Algeria, Cyprus and West Irian but also the apartheid policy of the Union of South Africa. •

74. GAOR (XII), Plen., 698th mtg., 2 October<sup>c</sup> 1957, 248.



ruling party and was forced to resign by December 1959. The elections of March 1960 reflected the political crisis in the country in the sense that every party and group fought independently. However, on the foreign policy programme, they all promised to pursue the late Prime Minister's non-alignment policy. In the elections no single party could gain a safe majority; the UNP won 50 seats and the SLFP followed it by gaining 46 seats.<sup>75</sup> No coalition seemed possible between the two and the SLFP along with other leftist parties was able to oust the UNP ministry on the Governor-General's address itself, thus ending its two-and-a-half months rule.<sup>76</sup> The country went into another election in which the leftist parties—Trotskyites and Communists—agreed to join hands with the SLFP by concluding no-contest pacts as they had done in 1956. Led by Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the SLFP promised the electorate implementation of the policies of the late Bandaranaike and won the elections by a safe majority in July 1960.<sup>77</sup>

Armed with this mandate, the present Government has been following the nonalignment policy with great initiative and vigour. On the Congo question, Ceylon was a co-sponsor of almost all the important resolutions in the Security Council as well as the General Assembly and has asserted its independent approach on various issues. While it has consistently opposed the USSR's stand for the withdrawal of the UN forces from Congo, it has not supported the USA's stand on the recognition of the Kasavubu Government. After the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, it joined the lead of the smaller states in the Security Council in sponsoring a joint resolution which authorised the UN contingents in the Congo with sanctions necessary to make the UN action a success. On issues like Cuba, colonialism, etc., its utterances as well as its stand in the UN have been in consonance with its past policies.

75. Rangnekar, note 1, p. 372.

76. Ceylon, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Representatives), 38 (1960), 899-900.

77. Rangnekar, note 1, pp. 370-1.

## Conclusion

The review of Ceylon's foreign policy reveals that though its main feature is the exercise of independent judgement, the course of its evolution first saw a tendency towards identification with one bloc before it became completely nonaligned. That the basic principles of this policy received the mandate of the people from the beginning and that the non-implementation of its cardinal principles—among other reasons—led to the defeat of the UNP, makes it clear that not only its adoption but also its implementation is what is taken to be the right course of action for Ceylon by its people.

A significant point to note in this context is that while the impulse for the change has been authoritarian in countries like the UAR and Iraq, it has been democratic in Ceylon. Thus while it has been brought about by a *coup d'état* in some countries, this change of policy has resulted through the democratic process of elections in Ceylon.

Another feature of the situation in Ceylon is the nature of the political alignment of various forces within the country and its possible repercussions on her foreign policy. Unlike India where the Congress does not rely either on extreme rightist or leftist parties for its political strength, in Ceylon, the centrist party of Bandaranaike—which itself is more to the left of India's Congress Party—leans to a great extent on the support of the leftist parties. Another unique feature of the situation in Ceylon is the presence of a Trotskyite party—the LSSP—as a stronger element than the Communist Party among the Left parties and its vigorous support of the nonalignment policy.

Can a possibility of a change in the foreign policy of Ceylon be envisaged if the UNP comes to power? It is difficult to foresee the future but in the light of the historical developments in Ceylon some conclusions may be suggested.

Ceylon has already pursued the nonalignment policy for five years and has evolved a definite line to follow on various issues. This has given a certain amount of political maturity and experience to Ceylon in its conduct in international relations.

Also, in view of the fact that even the UNP leaders accepted it as the basic creed of Ceylon's foreign policy during its formative stage and also in view of the unanimous support given by all the political parties to this policy, it appears that the nonalignment policy has come to stay in Ceylon.

Nonalignment is sometimes described as a policy of opportunism. This is, however, a charge directed by those who are committed. That the nonaligned countries—and Ceylon in particular—have followed a policy of judging each issue on its merits and bringing to bear upon them a stand designed to encourage coexistence is evident from Ceylon's policies in respect of the Congo. Ceylon, like other nonaligned countries, is guided by the firm conviction that there cannot be any military solution to the problems that divide the world. Its emphasis has, therefore, been on strengthening the UN as a forum for the solution of world's problems. It is this perspective that guides her attitude towards the two power blocs. ✓

*Indonesia*

## Militant Anti-Imperialism

S. Krishnamurthy

INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY DESCRIBED as 'independent and active'. This policy has been interpreted differently by the political parties in that country. For some parties it has meant that the country would remain 'neutral' in the event of war. For some others it has meant that Indonesia would not join any 'power bloc' and would judge various issues in the light of their content and nature. But all were agreed that Indonesia should lead an 'independent and active policy'. Indonesia's policies did not clearly emerge till 1954. In 1954 it enthusiastically welcomed the convening of an Asian-African Conference and played host to the participating countries. Since 1955 Indonesia has emerged as one of the most important advocates of 'nonalignment' policy. It has laid special emphasis on anti-colonialism and has suggested closer cooperation among the nonaligned countries.

### I

A number of factors have influenced Indonesia's foreign policy since independence. Indonesia achieved national independence when the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was developing. The declaration of independence on 17 August 1945 was not recognised by the Dutch, who proceeded to take strong military action against the new republic. The struggle between the Dutch and the new republic lasted for four years during which period the republic



was fighting for its survival. The reaction of other nations to this conflict often influenced the Republic's foreign policy. Many European powers were unable to decide quickly whether to support the Republic or the Dutch. The British military authorities in the beginning recognised the Republic and proceeded to negotiate with it for the maintenance of law and order and accept the surrender of arms from the Japanese. However, they did not maintain this stand for long and in 1946 they came out in support of the Dutch. The attitude of United States seemed indecisive. The Netherlands was an important ally of the United States in Europe. The Republic of Indonesia had hoped that the United States with its tradition of opposition to colonialism would actively support them against the Netherlands. But this hope was belied when the United States failed to exercise its influence on the Netherlands for a long time.

Many leaders of the Republic of Indonesia felt that the European powers tended to view the Dutch-Indonesian conflict from the cold war angle and were more interested in speculating whether an independent Indonesia would be a communist ally or an ally of the Anglo-American camp. In September 1948, when the Indonesian Government succeeded in suppressing the ill-timed Madiun revolt by the Communists, many western observers welcomed it and urged the Dutch to come to terms with the Republic. The *Economist* wrote:

It is to the interest of the Dutch to come to terms quickly with the government of Soekarno and Hatta because this government, whatever its origin in pro-Japanese collaboration, represents the hitherto effective leadership of the nationalist movement; and the only alternative to it now, if it is suppressed or driven to accept humiliating terms, will be communist leadership.<sup>1</sup>

In other words the western nations welcomed the emergence of a strong anti-communist government. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, regarded the crushing of the revolt as a

1. *The Economist*, 18 June 1949.

victory for the reactionaries. The Republic resented such comments and was determined to follow a policy of non-alignment.<sup>2</sup>

The Indonesian political parties have been active in the parliament and have never allowed the cabinets to deviate from an 'active and independent' foreign policy. The Masjumi, the leading Moslem party in the country, interpreted this to mean closer alliance with the western nations. The Socialists (PSI) were in favour of a strong anti-communist foreign policy and favoured, like the Masjumi, closer alliance with the west rather than with the Communists. The Communists demanded that an 'active and independent' foreign policy should mean closer alliance with Soviet Union and the East European countries and the nonaligned countries. The Nationalists (PNI) were greatly influenced by other nonaligned nations like India, and thus were in favour of 'strict' nonalignment. Besides these three major parties there were numerous political parties which supported one or the other of these three views on foreign policy. An interesting sidelight to the situation in Indonesia in the last decade was that almost all the cabinets formed were coalitions of different political parties. In the period before the first general elections (1955) the Masjumi was a major party and the policies of the Government were considerably influenced by it. Strong criticisms of Government policies, however, prevented any major deviation from the policy of nonalignment. In the period after the elections the emergence of Communists as one of the major parties in the country was undoubtedly a factor influencing the policies of the government.

It has often been pointed out that, '*Pantjasila*' or the Five Principles forms the theoretical basis of Indonesia's domestic and foreign policies. The five principles are: Belief in God, Democracy, Social Justice, National Consciousness and Human-

2. In 1950 Hadji Agus Salim, Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that Indonesia 'will find a third way.... We will take our own way and thank God that New Delhi and Baguio are guiding the way.' *Aneta* (Djakarata), 10 May 1950.

tarianism. The incorporation of the ideals of democracy, social justice, humanitarianism into the Constitution is usually pointed out as indicating Indonesia's determination to fight colonialism and imperialism and their evil effects.

But by far the most important factor that influenced the evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy was the influence exercised by President Soekarno over his country and its people. This became particularly evident after 1957. Thus Indonesia's strong anti-colonial stand and its active support for any policy aimed at greater cooperation among the nonaligned Asian-African nations can directly be traced to Soekarno's political ideas.

Finally, the reaction of other countries to the internal developments influenced Indonesia's foreign policy considerably. During the struggle against the Dutch it received the sympathy of most nations in the world. But in the period following the transfer of sovereignty there occurred a gradual change in this attitude. Failure to tackle the basic and most urgent problems of the country and the increasing inefficiency and corruption in the administration came in for severe criticism. After the 1955 general elections many western nations felt that communist influence over the country was increasing. At the same time Indonesia's determination to recover West Irian from the Dutch did not always find favour with most of the western nations. Indonesia reacted sharply to this situation and her foreign policy accordingly underwent suitable modifications.

## II

The evolution of Indonesia's foreign policy can be broadly divided into two stages: the first between 1950-56, and the second between 1956-60. During the first period a provisional parliament was in existence, but whose members were appointed by the President. No single party was strong enough to form a cabinet by itself. There were only coalition cabinets whose survival depended largely on the support of smaller parties.

In the course of five years (1950-55) no less than five cabinets were formed.<sup>3</sup> While every cabinet claimed that it was following an 'independent and active' foreign policy, differences could nevertheless be discerned. The Natsir Cabinet and the Sukiman Cabinet, which held office in the years immediately following the transfer of sovereignty, adopted a pro-western policy. In both the cabinets the Masjumi was the dominant party and it clearly favoured closer alliance with the Anglo-American countries. Natsir in his policy statement before the parliament stated that the Government would pursue an 'independent and active' policy. He explained:

It is not our intention to pursue a neutrality policy in the sense of pursuing a negative policy; it is not our intention to abstain from endeavouring to find a solution for international disputes, as if such conflicts will have no repercussion on our lives or on the world.<sup>4</sup>

But the members of the parliament were not satisfied with such statements. They demanded that the Prime Minister should assure the House that the country will not be drawn 'into the American orbit of defence.'<sup>5</sup> The Natsir Cabinet, besides, failed to take a definite stand on several important issues. Thus in spite of the fact that a number of members urged the Government to recognise the Viet Minh regime in North Vietnam<sup>6</sup> and improve the relations with East European

3. The five cabinets were: the Natsir Cabinet (6 September 1950 to 21 March 1951); the Sukiman Cabinet (27 April 1951 to 23 February 1952); the Wilopo Cabinet (3 April 1952 to 3 June 1953); Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet (1 August 1953 to 24 July 1955); and Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet (12 August 1955 to 3 March 1956).

4. Mohammad Natsir, 'A Review of Indonesia's Reconstruction,' *Indonesian Review* (Djakarta), 63, 1 January 1951.

5. *Ibid.*, 75.

6. Indonesia viewed the war in Indo-China as a 'scuffle between the ideals of national independence and the itch of colonialism.' See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The Historical and Philosophical Background of an Independent Policy,' in *Basic Information on Indonesia* (Ministry of Information, Djakarta), p. 1.

In 1951 many parliament members demanded that the Viet Minh regime should be recognised. But Prime Minister Natsir decided to have a 'cautious approach to the problem.'



countries and Soviet Union, Natsir decided to adopt a cautious stand and managed to shelve the question temporarily. Though the Natsir Cabinet did not fall on account of its foreign policy, it was clear that its policies were unpopular.

It was only during the term of the Sukiman Cabinet, which succeeded the Natsir Cabinet, that the dangers arising from any deviation from the 'independent and active' policy became apparent. The Sukiman Cabinet was also dominated by the Masjumi. Foreign Minister Subardjo reiterated Government's intention to follow an independent policy. But soon after assuming office Subardjo's policies came under criticism both in parliament and in the press. As Foreign Minister, Subardjo's first important assignment took him to San Francisco (1951) to participate in the Japanese Peace Conference. Though differences existed between Japan and Indonesia on questions of reparations and the regulation or limitation of fishing in the high seas surrounding the Indonesian islands, Subardjo signed the Peace Treaty on the basis of assurances given by the leader of the Japanese delegation. It was felt in Djakarta, however, that in taking this step Subardjo was unduly influenced by the President of the Conference, Dean Acheson. The Cabinet itself was badly divided on this issue and the press was extremely critical.

The signing of an agreement with the United States on the basis of the Mutual Security Act (1951) in 1952 led to even greater criticism and finally led to Subardjo's resignation. This Act stipulated that states receiving military aid should pledge to contribute to the 'defensive strength of the free world' (Section 511-A). Section 511-B, however, provided that states getting economic and technical aid were not required to make this commitment. Indonesia had at first been receiving aid under the latter clause. But negotiations for a new agreement was started in 1952. Details of the negotiations between Subardjo and US Ambassador Cochran revealed that Indonesia would receive aid under Section 511-A with the stipulation

that it would 'contribute to the strength of independent and sovereign nations.'<sup>7</sup> This Agreement was signed on 2 January 1952. When the crucial provisions of this Agreement were known there was a bitter furore in the press. The Masjumi members themselves were embarrassed<sup>8</sup> and the Nationalist Party (PNI) was very critical. The criticism led to the resignation of Subardjo and later the whole cabinet.

The two incidents cited above indicate the popular feeling in favour of a nonalignment policy. Opposition parties were always watchful of the activities of the cabinets and refused to support it if they felt that it had deviated from an independent policy. The Cabinet that succeeded the Sukiman Cabinet, the Wilopo Cabinet, carefully avoided controversial issues and followed a neutral policy. But this negative approach in foreign relations did not satisfy many.

During the period when Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo was Prime Minister clear indications of the general trend of Indonesia's foreign policy in the postwar period began to emerge. Sastroamidjojo had often expressed the view that the centre of international affairs had shifted to Asia from Europe. He believed that Indonesia should play an important role in Asian affairs and should take the initiative in championing the interests of Asia. It was this conviction that led him to develop the idea of convening a conference of Asian-African states. He was opposed to the idea of a regional 'bloc', consisting of only Southeast and South Asian states. What he desired was the bringing together of the 'nonaligned' countries of Asia and Africa. The Bandung Conference, held during 18-24 April 1955 was hailed as a success by many in Indonesia. The decision that Indonesia should play host to the Asian-

7. For a detailed discussion on this see Russel H. Fiffeld, *The Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: 1945-1958* (New York, 1958).

8. The leaders of the party hastened to explain that Subardjo had signed the agreement on his own responsibility and the party cannot endorse the same. The Executive Council stated: 'The Masjumi is unable to be responsible for the signing of the agreement concerning Mutual Security Agency which has taken place.' Cited in H. Feith, *The Wilopo Cabinet: A Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia* (Mimeographed), (New York, 1959), p. 63.

African Conference was interpreted by the Indonesians as a success to her nonalignment policy and as signifying her growing popularity among the Asian-African states. The Conference called for greater economic and cultural cooperation among the participating nations. But it laid special emphasis on the need to end colonialism in all its forms. The success of the Bandung Conference increased Indonesia's prestige enormously.

The Bandung Conference marked the end of the first stage in the history of Indonesia's foreign relations with other nations. The period demonstrated clearly the general support from almost all sections for an 'independent and active policy.' The failure of the Natsir and Sukiman cabinets to move the country closer to the western bloc clearly demonstrated that most of Indonesia's political parties would not tolerate even the slightest deviation from this policy. Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo's policies gave the first clear indication of the future trend in the country's foreign policy. By 1955 Indonesia had emerged as one of the most important advocates of nonalignment in foreign relations.

### III

In the second stage, the years 1955-60, certain important developments within the country and abroad exercised considerable influence on her foreign policy. The first general elections were held in 1955. Nearly 75 per cent of the votes were shared among four major political parties, namely, the Masjumi (20 per cent), the Nationalists (PNI—20 per cent), the Nahdatul Ulama (NU—18 per cent) and the Communists (PKI—16 per cent). The remaining votes were distributed among twentyfive smaller parties. The emergence of the Communists as a major party was one of the most important outcomes of the elections. The Masjumi and the Socialists did not fare well in the elections. The Communists emerged as the main opposition party in the parliament. Their success in the local elections a little later proved beyond doubt that

the party had recovered its strength in Java. The communist success made itself felt on the policies of the government in the post-election period.

But by far the most important factor which influenced Indonesia's foreign policy in this period was the increasing influence of President Soekarno in policy decisions. Soon after the elections Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo was called upon to form a cabinet. His cabinet included the PNI, Masjumi and the Nahdatul Ulama members. The Communists were excluded and led the opposition in the parliament. The Cabinet was not always united and charges of inefficiency and corruption were levelled against it. Further, it failed to prevent the frequent intervention of the army in civil affairs. Early in 1957 President Soekarno announced his 'konsepsi' (concept) as a solution for the national problems. He called for the 'burial' of political parties since they had not functioned well. He considered western parliamentary type of government unsuitable for Indonesia. He believed the exclusion of the Communists, who won over six million votes in the elections, improper. However, the immediate reaction to his proposal to bury the political parties led to a storm of protest and the President had to modify his stand. He called for the creation of a National Council in which not only the political parties but also the functional groups in the society would be represented. The functional groups were the students, women's organisations, farmers and other such groups which normally get no direct representation in an elected parliament. In April 1957, when Ali Sastroamidjojo's cabinet resigned, President Soekarno took the first steps towards the implementation of his concept which came to be known as 'Guided Democracy'. An extra-parliamentary cabinet responsible only to the President was formed. He announced his plans for the formation of a National Council. Since then President Soekarno's influence on the Government's policies had steadily increased.

Though the official foreign policy continues to be described as 'nonalignment', it is generally believed that Indonesia has



moved closer to Soviet Union and the East European countries. As pointed out earlier the Natsir cabinet and the Sukiman cabinet did not show any anxiety to improve Indonesia's relations with Soviet Union. Only in 1953 was the Rondonowu motion introduced in the parliament, which provided for the opening of an embassy in Moscow. In 1954, when Ali Sastroamidjojo was the Prime Minister, an embassy was opened in Moscow. He regularised Indonesia's relations with communist China. When Ali Sastroamidjojo assumed office after the elections for the second time, he negotiated a \$100 million loan from Soviet Union and another loan from China. Soekarno's visits to the communist countries and the exchange of delegations since 1956 had undoubtedly brought Indonesia closer to these countries.

Further, in recent times Indonesia has leaned heavily on East European countries and the Soviet Union for equipping her army with modern weapons. She turned to these countries only after she was convinced that neither the UK nor the USA would help her to equip her army with modern weapons. While the Indonesian government argued that these arms were required for strengthening her forces in the fight against the guerilla activities of Darul Islam and Tentara Islam Indonesia,<sup>9</sup> American and British governments expressed a fear that it might be used to suppress the opposition to the government in Indonesia<sup>10</sup> and against the Dutch. The negotiations with the Soviet Union for the supply of arms in 1961 were started only after the repeated declarations by the Dutch of their intention

9. The activities of Darul Islam and Tentara Islam Indonesia began even before the transfer of sovereignty. They demanded the establishment of an Islamic Republic of Indonesia. It was frequently stated that they tried to secure assistance from abroad for their struggle against the government.

10. The Press Officer of the United States State Department said on 7 April 1958 that the State Department was aware that Indonesia had placed orders to the East European countries for aircraft and other equipments none of which had been supplied by the western countries. He continued, 'Indonesia turns to communist bloc countries for possible use in killing Indonesians who openly oppose the growing influence of communism in Indonesia.'

to strengthen their forces in West Irian.<sup>11</sup> These negotiations did not go unchallenged in Indonesia. The press was critical of these dealings and repeated assurances that these deals did not mean a deviation from her policy of nonalignment were given by the government. One important reason for the closer relations with Soviet Union and other East European countries is that 'it is in Moscow that they justify Indonesia's claim for West Irian. It is there that the Asian-African Conference was accorded full support. It is there that our independent policy has been justified. . . .'<sup>12</sup> Thus Indonesia's relations with the communist bloc countries have been strengthening steadily.

At the same time, western policy towards Indonesia was coming in for increasing criticism. The western nations considered that President Soekarno's policies would only help the Communists. They felt that his ideas were considerably influenced by his frequent visits to the communist countries. In 1957 the regional commanders defied the central government and finally, early in 1958, they announced the formation of a Revolutionary Republic of Indonesia in Sumatra. The central government was hard pressed but they proceeded to take firm action against the rebels. The reactions in the west were extremely critical of the central government. Statements made by several civil and military authorities in the United States were construed by the rebels as expressing support for their cause. John Foster Dulles remarked at a press conference:

I think there has been growing feeling among the Muslims, particularly in the islands other than Java, a feeling of concern at growing communist influence in the Government in Java. . . .<sup>13</sup>

11. In January 1961 Defence Minister General Nasution led a military mission to Moscow to negotiate the supply of arms. At a press conference he stated that the mission to Moscow was 'provoked' by the recent Dutch move in West Irian. See *The Guardian* (Rangoon), 19 January 1961.

12. Soekarno, Address Before the Students of Padjadjaran University in Bandung on 2 May 1958.

13. Department of State Bulletin, 38 (3 March 1958), p. 334.

The Indonesian Government objected to these remarks and the rebels interpreted them as support to their cause. The Central Government claimed that the rebels were receiving aid from abroad and the capture of an American pilot and American-made arms in the course of the military operations against the rebels caused a near crisis in American-Indonesian relations in 1958. Dulles remarked that the American government could not prevent the sale and purchase of arms in free markets.<sup>14</sup> However, the Indonesian government was convinced that the American government could exercise considerable influence and prevent American adventurers from helping the rebels.<sup>15</sup> It is only after repeated insistence that the United States Government publicly denounce the rebels that Dulles stated that the revolt in Indonesia should be dealt with by the Indonesians 'without intrusion from without.'<sup>16</sup>

Anti-colonialism has been the dominant theme of Indonesian foreign policy since her independence. Former Vice-President Mohammad Hatta once stated that the 'final abolishment of all colonies from the world' is an important ideal which keeps the 'national spirit of Indonesia burning.'<sup>17</sup> Apart from its own colonial past this anti-imperialist fervour has been derived from an immediate source. Indonesia has always regarded the

14. *New York Times*, 2 May 1958.

15. Indonesia is not the only country in Southeast Asia which considered that the American government could exercise her influence in order to end the activities of foreign adventurers in their countries. In the northern parts of Burma a strong contingent of KMT troops entrenched itself after they were forced to retreat from China. Their plundering activities were a source of constant worry to the Burmese government. In 1951 the Burmese government contemplated military action against them. Apparently they were persuaded by the then American Ambassador to Burma David Mck Key to refrain from any hasty step. He also assured that he would use his good offices with the foreign office to persuade the Nationalist Chinese Government at Taiwan to deal with the problem. Neither he nor his successor succeeded. The problem remained unsolved and the Burmese were rather disappointed that the American government did not help them in solving this problem. See Frank N. Traegar and others, *Burma's Role in the United Nations, 1948-55* (New York, 1956), p. 10.

16. *New York Times*, 21 May 1958.

17. Mohammad Hatta, 'Facing the Future,' *Report on Indonesia*, 10 (November-January 1957-1958), p. 32.

refusal of the Dutch to negotiate the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia as continuance of imperialist rule on Indonesian soil. The Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty clearly stated that the future of West Irian would be discussed a year after the transfer of sovereignty over other parts of the country. But the Dutch were not keen to open negotiations with the Indonesians and finally, in 1954, the matter was taken to the United Nations. Indonesian attempts to seek a solution to the dispute through the United Nations were also unsuccessful.<sup>18</sup> In December 1957 the Indonesian government announced the nationalisation of Dutch holdings as a step towards the recovery of West Irian. Further drastic steps as the breaking off of diplomatic relations were taken in recent times. Indonesia's relations with other countries were often influenced by their reactions to Indonesia's efforts towards the recovery of West Irian.

Indonesia has strongly condemned the continuance of colonial domination in any part of the world. Soekarno has laid special emphasis on this aspect of Indonesia's foreign policy. In the course of his visits to other countries he had raised this point in his discussions and the joint-statements issued usually referred to the need to abolish colonialism.<sup>19</sup> Indonesia never hesitated to support the African nations fighting for their freedom. Both during his address before the General Assembly in September 1960, and during his address before the confer-

18. The United Nations Plenary Session approved the inclusion of West Irian in its Agenda on 25 September 1954. Between 1954 and 1957 the Dutch rejected the UN discussion of the dispute four times and refused three mild UN Political Committee resolutions.

19. See for example the Joint Soviet-Indonesian Statement signed by Khrushchov and Soekarno on 28 February 1960. It stated: 'Both Governments reaffirmed once again that all manifestations of colonialism must be liquidated and that their liquidation accords with the interests of world peace.' The Joint Communiqué signed by Kennedy and Soekarno in April 1961 stated: 'The two Presidents discussed the recent emergence of the new nations in Asia and Africa. Both Presidents welcomed the newly found freedom of these countries.... Both Presidents recognise that these new countries must be alert to any attempts to subvert their cherished freedom by means of imperialism in all its manifestations.' Text in *New York Times*, 26 April 1961.



ence of nonaligned countries at Belgrade, Soekarno elaborated Indonesia's view that 'imperialism and colonialism and continued forcible division of nations is the root of almost all international tension.'<sup>20</sup> Soekarno again and again reiterated his view that 'there can be no coexistence between independence and justice' on one side and imperialism-colonialism on the other.'<sup>21</sup>

In recent times Indonesia has been urging that the non-aligned countries should come closer together. It considers that the uncommitted nations should exercise their influence for the preservation of peace in the world. In February 1960 at a mass meeting in Surabaya, Soekarno expressed the view that the uncommitted nations should also be represented at the Paris Summit meeting of major powers. This suggestion was supported by Khrushchov who while addressing the Indonesian Parliament later the same month, stated that Russia believed it 'necessary to be attended both by representatives of the two opposing alignments and by those from neutral nations, such as India and others.'<sup>22</sup> In March 1961 President Soekarno again suggested that a conference of the nonaligned countries be arranged in order to discuss the world situation. He argued that since colonialism had not been completely liquidated yet such a conference has become necessary. His suggestion was welcomed by Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of Peoples Republic of China. Indonesia apparently was disappointed that the idea did not catch on with some other nations. But it pursued the idea and was one of the powers which took the initiative in calling for the convening of the Conference of nonaligned nations at Belgrade. President Soekarno stated at the conference that

20. President Soekarno, 'To Build the World Anew,' Address before the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations on 30 September 1960. Text published by the Department of Information (Djakarta).

21. See the text of President Soekarno's address before the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries on 1 September 1961.

22. Khrushchov's address to the Indonesian Parliament. Full text published in Supplement to *Soviet Land*, 6 (20 March 1960), pp. 6-11.

... nonalignment has become a growing force in the world, a force standing for friendship among nations, for peace, for social justice, and that the time has now come to gather this force together, to turn it into a co-ordinated accumulated moral force.<sup>23</sup>

Indonesia is convinced that the nonaligned nations could make a 'collective contribution towards easing international tensions. ...'<sup>24</sup>

While thus it supports greater collaboration among non-aligned countries, Indonesia has firmly rejected the development of a power bloc. It considers that the creation of such blocs would only intensify the tensions in the world. It was not enthusiastic when Prime Minister of Malaya and President Garcia of Philippines suggested the formation of an Association of Southeast Asian States. It considered that as long as 'bilateral relations between the countries of the proposed association are still unfulfilled such an association would be "unreal".'<sup>25</sup> When ultimately the association was formed in August 1961 Indonesia was not a party to it. It had earlier expressed its fear that such an association was likely to be used as a forum to discuss the political course of a state and was not likely to confine itself to economic and cultural relations.

One of the most difficult aspects of Indonesia's foreign policy was its relations with China. There are nearly two million six hundred thousand Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. The Chinese were allowed and even encouraged to immigrate to Indonesia by the Dutch and many Chinese families had been staying in Indonesia for generations. The Chinese by their industry and hard work soon acquired strong control over the Indonesian economy. It is estimated that through big and small enterprises the Chinese earn nearly 40 per cent of the

23. President Soekarno's address before the Belgrade Conference, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

25. Subandrio's statement at a press conference. See *Antara* (Djakarta), 14 February 1961.

national income. Naturally, they have for long been looked upon with suspicion.

Among the Overseas Chinese a strong group identified itself with Indonesia soon after independence. Another group looked up to communist China. Still another, smaller than the other two, looked up to nationalist China. Finally, there was still another group which did not take any side. Officially Indonesia's relations with communist China were very cordial. It had always looked upon communist China with admiration. Like many other Asian-African States Indonesia also felt that communist China should be represented in the United Nations.

Since the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, the Indonesian government had introduced a number of restrictive measures against the Chinese, mainly to prevent them from gaining further dominance over the Indonesians. In 1955, during the Bandung Conference, Chou En-lai and the Indonesian Foreign Minister negotiated an agreement whereby the Chinese government renounced its principle of dual citizenship for Overseas Chinese. The Government of Indonesia offered to give Indonesian citizenship to the Chinese willing to opt for it. This treaty, however, was not ratified till 1958. In 1958 the Indonesian government took a series of steps affecting the Chinese. It is generally claimed that the Chinese who were affected were mostly Kuomintang supporters. But before the end of the year it was apparent that the Indonesian government was determined to take firm action against all Chinese irrespective of their loyalties. A new decree was proclaimed in May 1959 banning aliens from engaging in any business enterprise outside the provincial or regional capitals. A rough estimate showed that nearly 100,000 commercial enterprises in the rural areas would be affected. While implementation of this measure would have harmed the rural economy somewhat, it would have harmed the Chinese even more. The decision to implement the measure towards the end of the year was taken amidst protest notes from local Chinese as well as from the Chinese government.

Even before December 1959 a critical situation had developed. Many Chinese felt that since the dual nationality treaty had not been ratified, their option for Indonesian citizenship might not be valid and felt that the regulations would affect them. When the Indonesian government announced that the businesses run by the Chinese in the rural areas should be transferred to the Indonesian cooperatives, the Chinese felt that their position was seriously threatened.

In the light of these developments it is not surprising that relations between China and Indonesia rapidly deteriorated. Radio Peking launched a violent attack on Indonesia. The Indonesian government, however, remained adamant and proceeded to implement the regulations. It is only after prolonged negotiations between China and Indonesia that a settlement was at last arrived at. By the middle of 1960 both China and Indonesia declared that the problem would be settled in the true 'Bandung Spirit' and the friendly relations between the two countries would never be allowed to deteriorate. The Chinese government agreed that the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia should cooperate in the orderly implementation of the regulation.

#### IV

How far has Indonesia been successful in following an 'independent and active' foreign policy? Indonesia like many other Asian-African nations is convinced that world peace cannot be preserved by individual or collective defence agreements. This conviction has largely been responsible for her preference to remain nonaligned. At the same time her geographical position has favoured the adoption of such a policy. Former Vice-President Hatta once said:

This island archipelago is in a very different position from that in which the Netherlands and Belgium found themselves at the beginning of World War II. It does not share



a common boundary with any of the possible belligerent. . . .<sup>26</sup>

Hatta claimed that Indonesia's independent policy 'preserves her from the damage that would follow from taking sides.' While in the initial stages her policy was rather ambiguous, after Bandung, its support of the struggles for independence and its efforts for greater collaboration among the nonaligned nations gave the policy a clear character.

Indonesia's policies had not always been appreciated in the neighbouring states. Philippines and Australia are suspicious of Indonesia. Australia in recent times has opposed the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia. During 1958-59 Indonesian rebels used Philippines as a base of operation against the central government. The smuggling activities in the eastern parts of Indonesia have been a perennial source friction between Indonesia and the Philippines. Their foreign policies are basically different. Indonesia's relations even with her nearest neighbours—Malaya and Singapore—have not always been smooth. The attitudes of these countries towards Indonesia was largely influenced by the internal developments in Indonesia.

Indonesia's actions were often considered as rash by her immediate neighbours. Thus her decision to nationalise Dutch holdings in 1957 and her actions against the Chinese traders in 1959 were considered as steps which should not have been taken at a time when the country was facing an economic crisis. Her decision to secure loans from the Soviet Union and the reported rumours that Soviet Union might build an atomic base in Indonesia were received with strong criticism.

Indonesian public opinion has strongly been in favour of the nonalignment policy. During the major part of the period after the transfer of sovereignty her foreign policy had enjoyed the support of the masses. It has succeeded in drawing atten-

26. Mohammad Hatta, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy,' *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1953), p. 445.

tion of other nations to itself and has exercised her influence effectively over recent developments. Perhaps a fuller assessment of Indonesia's foreign policy is only possible after several years have passed.

## Positive Neutrality

K. R. Singh

ONE OF THE MAJOR TASKS FACING THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT Afro-Asian countries is to evolve a foreign policy which would enable them to steer clear off the cold war. No country can isolate itself entirely from the rivalries of the power blocs, yet, a total commitment to either bloc has to be avoided if political and economic independence is to be preserved. In response to these circumstances a new policy began to take shape—the policy of nonalignment, or 'positive neutrality' as the Arabs term it.

Before we proceed to study this policy a rapid look at the recent past would not be amiss, rather, it would help in evolving a pattern which would facilitate our efforts in projecting the contemporary trend in its proper perspective. The Arab World came in direct contact with modern Europe in 1798 A.D. when Napoleon attacked and conquered Egypt. Although his further conquests in the region were blocked by the continued Ottoman-British alliance, yet the brief sojourn of the French in Egypt had deep repercussions. It opened the region not only to western civilization but also to western imperialism and gave rise to a great scramble for power which was then known as the 'Eastern Question'. The European powers gradually nibbled away parts of the Arab World which was at that time a part of the Ottoman Empire. France took

\* Arab African countries, except Egypt, have been excluded from the purview of this article.

away Algeria and Tunisia; Great Britain controlled Cyprus, Egypt and the Sudan, and Italy, Libya. Czarist Russia, too, made some advances at the cost of the Ottoman Empire, but the Arab World did not come into direct contact with her till after the end of the Second World War.

During the First World War the Arab World became a scene of frenzied diplomatic double-dealings. Several conflicting and contradictory agreements were signed and support pledged—almost all of them secret. They were the Constantinople Agreement of March-April 1915 which divided the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence of Great Britain, France and Russia, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 16 May 1916 which divided the Arab World between Great Britain and France, and the Sherif Hussein-McMahon correspondence of 14 July 1915—January 1916 which promised an independent Arab State in exchange for Arab support against the Ottoman Empire. Besides, a letter from the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, to Lord Rothschild, dated 2 November 1917, granted the Jews a homeland in Palestine, an area till then under Ottoman control and promised to be included in the Arab State as stated in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. All these agreements created considerable chaos after the end of the war.

The promises given to the Arabs were, however, forgotten and the Arab World was divided and apportioned by France and Great Britain as Mandates. This division was sanctified by law through Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. France obtained Syria and the Lebanon, and Great Britain acquired Iraq, Egypt, Transjordan and Palestine. In response to national feelings, Great Britain nominally declared Iraq, Egypt and Trans-Jordan as independent states but which were linked with Great Britain by preferential treaties. Palestine continued to be governed directly by Britain. France, too, continued to press through her 'civilizing mission' in Syria and the Lebanon. Thus, the non-fulfilment of promise of complete independence which was given to the Arabs during the First World War conditioned their attitude towards the western



powers in the subsequent decades. Two factors—the unequal treaties and the Palestine problem—exerted a profound influence in shaping Arab policy *vis-a-vis* these powers.

## I

## ROOTS OF NEUTRALISM

It is not possible here to analyse in detail the effect of these factors, yet, one can hardly afford to ignore their impact upon Arab psychology which has conditioned the formulation of their foreign policy. An endeavour, therefore, would be made to project the Arab mind *vis-a-vis* these two factors. Because, questions of right and wrong apart, what a nation feels it acts and to understand why it acts so one must know why it feels so.

The Palestine question about which an Arab is so emotional that he is not prepared to acknowledge even the existence of Israel has deep roots. For him Palestine is a part of the Arab nation which was, contrary to the British promise during the First World War, given to the Jews. An Arab looks at Israel as a state carved out of the Arab land, an outpost of western imperialism,<sup>1</sup> because according to him Israel was created not only by the Jews but also by Great Britain and above all by the US which, after the Second World War, took active steps in this direction within the UN as well as outside it. American dollars financed the Palestine War of 1948 and the same source continues to finance the state of Israel even today. US aid to Israel till 1957 amounted to \$388 million<sup>2</sup> and it totalled \$720

1. Khaled el-Azem, the Syrian Foreign Minister, while speaking at the Bandung Conference described Israel as

... pocket left behind by the line of imperialism in its desperate retreat. Placed at one of the main gates of Asia, at once the crossroads of the three continents, Israel is an advanced bulwark of imperialism, exposing to danger the peoples of Asia and Africa. League of Arab States, *The First Asian-African Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia*, (18-24 April 1955), p. 64.

2. *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services*. United States Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session on S. I. Res. 19 and H. J. Res. 117, Joint Resolution, United States (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1957) II, p. 684 (henceforth referred as *Hearings II*).

million in 1960,<sup>3</sup> a phenomenal amount if one considers the size of Israel's population (2 million). It is natural that these factors created disillusionment rather than pro-western feelings among the Arabs. Even sober minded Arabs like the well-known writer Fayze Sayegh said:

If the west traditionally stood for liberty and justice in its dealings with the Arabs it had betrayed these very ideals. The east-west conflict appeared to be more of a dual between power-blocs and national interests than a contest between good and evil.<sup>4</sup>

The Palestine issue generated a passive attitude among the Arabs. The attitude of big powers towards the Palestine problem in the UN and also towards the Palestine War of 1948 hurt the Arabs. The Arabs had great faith in the UN and expected that their point of view would be sympathetically considered in that world forum. But they were disillusioned.<sup>5</sup> Only great expectations can be great disappointments and there is a very thin borderline between disillusionment and bitterness. We find a trace of this bitterness in the speech of Mahmoud Fawzi, the Egyptian representative in the Security Council. While speaking on the Korean problem on 30 June 1950 he said:

... there have been several cases of aggression against peoples and violations of the sovereignty and unity of the territories of Member States of United Nations. Such aggressions and

3. *Jerusalem Post Weekly* (Israel), 14 October 1960, p. 3.

4. Fayez A. Sayegh, 'Arab Nationalism Today', *Current History* (Philadelphia), 33 (November 1957), p. 285.

5. The 29 November 1947 voting on the partition of Palestine was of great importance. All the Arabs and also the Asian states voted against it. The two-third majority was attained mostly by the joint voting of the US bloc including the Latin American countries and the Soviet bloc and the Eastern European countries. Commenting upon this resolution the Egyptian Study Group said:

No Arab was convinced of the justice of the resolution; on the contrary, every one in Egypt and throughout the Arab world was convinced that this resolution was unjust and adopted for the purpose of flattering the Zionist movement. (*Egypt and the United Nations*, Report of a Study Group set up by the Egyptian Society of International Law, prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1957, p. 55).

violations have been submitted to the United Nations, which did not take any action to put an end to them...<sup>6</sup>

Fawzi was referring to the issues which were brought to the notice of the UN by the Arab states and which were not so promptly dealt with as the Korean question. The two important Arab questions which were brought before the UN were the Syrian-Lebanese complaint of 4 February 1946 urging the withdrawal of the British and French troops, and the Egyptian complaint of 8 July 1947, urging for the evacuation of British troops from Egypt and the termination of the 1899 Condominium Agreement regarding the Sudan. The UN failed to respond to the Arab complaints. It had great impact throughout the Arab world.<sup>7</sup> The Arabs believed that the big powers were interested in taking actions only on those issues in which their interests were involved. This was one of the major reasons for the Egyptian abstention on the Korean question before the Security Council in 1950.<sup>8</sup>

The Arabs felt detached from the cold war but were not allowed to remain so. The constant refusal of the western powers to recognise this basic Arab urge and the persistent pressure which was brought to bear upon them to side with the west were the reasons for the militant attitude of the Arabs towards the west.

One of the methods through which the west brought

6. SCOR. 475th Meeting. 30 June 1950, p. 2.

7. Moussa G. Dibb, explaining this psychological setback, says: The indignation which swept over Egypt measured the bitterness against Great Britain and the United Nations which had failed to respond favourably to its national demand. The failure of its case in the Security Council gave a certain colour and direction to Egypt's foreign policy and not only to Egypt's foreign policy, but also to the other Arab States in as much as Egypt could exercise its influence over them. The influence could sometimes be considerable on account of the fact that Egypt occupied a leading position in the Arab world. (Moussa G. Dibb, *The Arab Bloc in the United Nations*. Amsterdam, 1956, p. 76).

8. All the Arab countries, except Iraq, abstained on the 8-Power Resolution of October 1950 on Korea. Iraq voted for the Resolution. So did Iran, Pakistan and Turkey: future members of the Baghdad Pact. India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia abstained. GAOR 5th Session, 294th Plen. Mtg., p. 232.

pressure upon the Arabs to join them in the cold war was the continuation of treaties which existed between Great Britain on the one hand and the Arab states on the other.<sup>9</sup> These treaties allowed Great Britain the use of economic and military potentials as well as military bases and other facilities in these countries. Great Britain endeavoured to perpetuate this state of advantageous position and use it in cold war rivalries. Arab nationalism, however, demanded their termination. The tug of war between these two forces became the testing ground for Arab neutralism.

One example of this conflict was the draft treaty of 1948, also known as the Portsmouth Treaty, which was signed by the representatives of Great Britain and Iraq in Portsmouth. According to this treaty, British forces were to withdraw from their bases in Iraq but Great Britain retained the right to reoccupy them in case of war or threat of war. When the news of this treaty reached Iraq there were violent riots in Baghdad in which several people were killed. Popular opposition was so strong that the Iraqi Government did not dare to ratify it.

Another example of this strategy of apparently renouncing the rights to use the bases on one hand and to retain control over them on the other was manifest in the Middle East Command Proposals of 1951. On 13 October 1951 France, Great Britain, Turkey and the US invited Egypt to participate in the Middle East Command. Article 3(a) of the Technical Annex of this proposal which carried the gist of the whole scheme, said:

9. Great Britain had treaty relations with Iraq, Jordan and Egypt (besides the small Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf). These relations were governed by following treaties: The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 30 June 1930, Treaty of Preferential Alliance, Great Britain and Egypt, 26 August 1936, and Treaty of Alliance, Britain and Transjordan, 15 March 1943. All these treaties restricted the rights of these countries in matters of defence and foreign relations and, therefore, infringed upon their sovereignty. For the text of these treaties, please refer to J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1914-1956*. (New York, 1956), pp. 178-81, 203-11 and 296-99.



...it would be understood

- (a) that the present British base in Egypt would be formally handed over to the Egyptians on the understanding that it would simultaneously become an Allied base within the Middle East Command...<sup>10</sup>

Did the western powers imagine the Egyptians or for that matter the Asians lacking in common sense so as not to understand this glaring deception? This proposal was even worse than the provisions of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and sought to impose in place of British an international domination. No wonder the Egyptians rejected the proposal. None of the other Arab states openly supported it.<sup>11</sup>

The failure of western powers to enlist the support of the Arabs in their military alliance compelled them to seek new avenues. The whole strategy of the defence of the Middle East was reorganised. The previous strategy which was centred around the Suez base was abandoned in favour of the 'Northern Tier' concept. The US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, toured the area in 1953 and submitted his report on 1 June the same year. In his report he said:

Many of the Arabs League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism.<sup>12</sup>

10. Department of State Bulletin (Washington), 25 (22 October 1951), p. 648. (Henceforth referred as DSB.) (Italics added.)

11. There seems no reason to believe that the displeasure of the Soviet Union was the reason for the Arab rejection of this proposal. Yet, the Soviet note to these countries is of great significance since it underlined the future Soviet policies regarding the military blocs in the area. The Soviet note sent to Egypt on 21 November 1951 welcomed the Egyptian stand but at the same time issued a note of warning. It said:

[The Soviet government] deems it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of Egypt to the fact that the participation of countries of the Near and the Middle East in the so-called Middle East Command would cause serious damage to the relations existing between the USSR and these countries, as well as to the cause of maintaining peace and security in the area of the Near and Middle East. (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs 1951, London, 1954, p. 431).

12. DSB, TB (15 June 1953), p. 835.

In this report Dulles refused to recognise Arab neutralism as he refused to recognise similar policies in other countries. But his insistence on the Northern Tier Plan for the defence of the region which bypassed most of the Arab states gave an indirect recognition to Arab neutralism.

The Northern Tier Plan was favourably received only in one Arab state—Iraq. But, the Iraqi Government could not openly side with the west without crushing all the nationalist forces which were against this policy. By 1954 the leaders of the National Democratic Party, the Istiqlal Party, and the Communist Party who had opposed pro-western policy were either in prison or in exile or were powerless to do anything because of the strict police rule of Nuri-es-Said and Abdul Ilah. By 1955 Iraq joined other like-minded countries of the region, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, to form the Baghdad Pact.<sup>13</sup>

Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact was severely criticised by Arab politicians. Their main criticism was that Iraq, by joining the western camp, had attempted to disrupt the Arab solidarity. The communique issued on 12 January 1953 after the Turko-Iraqi talks said that Iraq had decided to enter into a defence pact with Turkey. The pact was signed on 24 February 1955. But in between these two dates there was a big commotion in the Arab World about this proposed pact. Major Salah Salem, the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, bitterly criticised this move at a press conference on 16 January. He accused Iraq of breaking Arab solidarity and said that the defence of the Arab World should come from its own ranks so as to serve the Arabs and their interests alone. Fadhil Jamali, the then Iraqi Foreign Minister, replied to this charge on 6 February 1955 and said that the Arab League was a 'national' and not a 'regional' organisation and argued that if it was to be considered as a regional organisation then

13. The Baghdad Pact was the result of the 'Northern Tier Plan' of Dulles. The first manifestation of this new regional defence planning was the Agreement of Friendly Cooperation Between Pakistan and Turkey, 2 April, 1954. Others joined it subsequently; Iraq on 22 February 1955, Great Britain, 4 April, Pakistan, 1 July and Iran, 11 October 1955.

Turkey, Iran and Pakistan should also be included in it. Jamali also questioned the very fundamentals of Arab policy of positive neutrality and expressed his support for the western bloc. The Arab League also held a meeting in Cairo in February 1955 in which this question was discussed. Faris al-Khouri, the Syrian Prime Minister, while commenting upon this meeting said that the delegates approved the following paragraph:

The foreign policy of the Arab State is based on the Arab League Charter, the treaty of joint defence and economic cooperation between the Arab States, and the Charter (of the UN). This policy does not approve of concluding other alliances.<sup>14</sup>

He also said that Syria, the Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen approved the paragraph. Iraq accepted this paragraph, 'but with a reservation that while confirming her obligations under the Arab League Charter and the treaty of joint defence between the member states of the Arab League, Iraq reserves the right to take any additional measures to guarantee her own safety.'<sup>15</sup>

It would be wrong to presume that the Arabs were not security conscious but what they wanted was that in their attempt to maintain their security they should rely more on themselves rather than on either of the power blocs. It was in this spirit that the Arab States signed the Arab League Pact of 1945 and the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation on 17 June 1950. Both these treaties aimed at Arab solidarity.<sup>16</sup> After the signing of the Baghdad Pact and

14. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs 1955* (London, 1958), p. 325.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

16. Art. 10 of the 1950 Treaty specifically said: The Contracting States undertake to conclude no international agreement which may be contradictory to the provisions of this Treaty, nor to act, in their international relations, in a way which may be contrary to the aims of the treaty. (J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1914-1956*, New York, 1956, p. 313). Military Annex of the same treaty deals with the military cooperation of these Arab countries, *ibid.*, pp. 313-4.

as a reaction to it the Arab states signed bilateral defence agreements among themselves. Egypt and Syria signed the mutual defence pact on 20 October 1955 and Saudi Arabia and Egypt signed it on 27 October the same year. Yemen joined it on 21 April 1956.<sup>17</sup>

## II

### SUEZ—A TURNING POINT

The signing of the Baghdad Pact marked the end of one phase of Arab neutralism. Until then the Arabs had only opposed the schemes of western powers to rope them in their defence system. This was the period of a negative attitude towards system of the western defence alliance. But the period which followed was one of defiance—defiance of the west—and of an urge to challenge it. This was the period of the Bandung Conference, the Czech Arms Deal, the dispute regarding the Aswan Dam aid and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.

By 1955 Nasser had emerged as the champion of Arab neutralism. Also, by this time the Cairo-Delhi-Djakarta axis was nearly complete. Close cooperation between Nehru and Nasser and identity of their views regarding the cold war and military alliances were clear from the joint communiques signed by them on 16 February and 12 July 1955.<sup>18</sup> The Bandung Conference which brought Nasser into closer contact with other neutralist leaders had great impact upon him. His active role in the Bandung Conference exercised a profound impact even in Egypt. Political observers noticed a sudden rise in his prestige. He emerged as a 'hero' and was widely cheered immediately after his return from Bandung. This also

17. Text of these pacts see: *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1955, pp. 158-62.

18. Joint communique issued on 12 July 1955 in Cairo said: ...it is their conviction that involvement in military pacts or alignment with Great Powers does not serve the cause of peace and, indeed, often has the opposite effect. (Lok Sabha Secretariat, *Foreign Policy of India, Text of Documents, 1947-59*. New Delhi, 1959, p. 201).



reflected the popular mood which was definitely in favour of neutralism. But both Nasser and the Egyptians had to pay heavy price for following this policy as will be seen presently.

In spite of the neutralist policy the Arab World was still solely dependent, economically and militarily, upon the western bloc. The Czech arms deal was the first major attempt to break this stranglehold. Reasons for the Czech arms deal have to be searched in the Tripartite Declaration of 25 May 1950.<sup>19</sup> According to this Declaration, France, Great Britain and the US had arbitrarily decided that an equilibrium should be maintained between the military potentials of the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs did not approve of this policy and the Arab League Council issued a statement on 21 June 1950 which said that the level of armed forces maintained by every state was a matter that could be estimated by that state only. They asserted that they did not approve of action that would harm their sovereignty and their independence.<sup>20</sup>

Like any other people the Arabs, too, wanted to modernise their armed forces and increase their strength. The persons at the helm of affairs in Syria as well as in Egypt were mainly army officers who knew that the old and defective arms which they possessed were useless junk as had been proved in the Palestine War of 1948. They had to be replenished and modernised. It is a wrong notion that at that time Arabs were more powerful than Israel and were any threat to her existence.<sup>21</sup>

The immediate cause which forced the hands of the Arab politicians to secure better arms was the Gaza raid of 28 February 1955. The Arabs attributed it to the change of government in Israel. Ben Gurion became the Defence Minister of Israel on 17 February and hardly ten days after Israel

19. DSB, 22 (5 June 1950), p. 386.

20. Hurewitz, n. 16, p. 311.

21. Jordan and Iraq had been able to obtain some modern arms through various treaties, like the Military Assistance Agreement between the US and Iraq, 21 April 1954, but they were of no asset to the Arabs as a whole because of the differences of opinion amongst the Arab countries, especially among Iraq and Egypt.

launched a heavy attack upon Egyptian territory. According to the former US Ambassador to Egypt, Byroade, Israel was responsible for this attack.<sup>22</sup> Also, according to him, at that time Egypt was not half as strong as Israel.<sup>23</sup> The aggressive policy of Ben Gurion and the heavy Israeli raid on Gaza which was even condemned by the UN Mixed Armistice Commission on 6 March 1955, as a 'brutal aggression,'<sup>24</sup> compelled the governments of Egypt and Syria to seek new arms as quickly as possible.

Arabs, however, did not immediately contact the eastern bloc for arms but tried to obtain them from countries of the western bloc. These countries agreed to supply only small arms and on terms which were disadvantageous to the Arabs.<sup>25</sup> At the same time feelers were sent out from the eastern bloc countries that they would be willing to sell heavy arms to the Arabs on barter basis. The proposition was very attractive and contracts were signed in September 1955.<sup>26</sup> For the west, Egypt and Syria had gone communist. The Czech arms deal and the mood it generated in the west had deep repercussions in the subsequent year and led to the Suez Crisis of 1956.

The Czech arms deal had also an immediate impact upon the Aswan Dam aid programme. Before we can understand the importance of the Aswan Dam we must bear in mind that the Egyptian economy is based mainly upon agriculture and has reached a saturation point. The population has been increasing but not the land under cultivation. Undoubtedly the Egyptian fallah is a good farmer but there is a limit to

22. Hearings II, n. 1, p. 746.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 755; Also see *The Times* (London), 3 October 1955.

24. SCOR 10th Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1955, 60. (S/3373 Annex III.)

25. Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, (30 September 1955), p. 17.

26. Premier Nasser in an interview to *The Times* correspondent on 2 October 1955, explained the Arab point of view and said that the deal was an illustration of Egypt's true and vivid independence of all Power Blocs. *The Times* (London), 3 October 1955, p. 8. President Shukry al-Quwatly also voiced similar view in his interview when he said, 'We would go to the devil, if necessary to defend ourselves.' *U.S. News and World Report*, 42 (18 January 1957), p. 34.

which the land can yield crops. The basic question before Egypt is to increase her cultivable area and since nearly all the arable land has been brought under cultivation the need for a big dam which would provide more water to reclaim the desert had become imperative. Therefore, the Egyptian Government approached the World Bank for loan to build the dam. The question was discussed and it was announced in Washington on 17 December 1955 that the US and Great Britain would give Egypt financial support for the construction of the Aswan Dam.<sup>27</sup> The World Bank also agreed to loan the necessary sum. But, suddenly on 19 July 1956, the US Government withdrew her offer.<sup>28</sup> Great Britain announced the same the next day. The World Bank offer which was conditional on the US and British participation was also withdrawn. The fact that the offer was withdrawn was not so important. What was more important was the way in which it was done. The snub was supposed to be a 'master-stroke' of the strong-handed policy of Dulles. It was a surprise not only to the Arabs but also to the US Ambassador in Cairo who came to know about it only through newspapers.<sup>29</sup> The real reason for this withdrawal was to humiliate Nasser, 'to seize him up,' and tell him that he would not get any western help by following the policy of positive neutrality. But this calculated snub failed.

27. The Egyptian Finance Minister, Kaissouni, had a meeting in Washington with the US Acting Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr., British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins and the President of the World Bank, Eugene Black in which the US, British and World Bank's participation in financing the High Dam at Aswan was discussed. In the communique issued on 17 December 1955, 'The United States and British Government assured the Egyptian Government through Mr. Kaissouni of their support in this project, which would be of inestimable importance in the development of the Egyptian economy and in the improvement of the welfare of the Egyptian people.' Text of the communique see: DSB (26 December 1955). pp. 1050-1.

28. The US Government gave two main reasons for the withdrawal of the proposed aid; the lack of agreement among the riparian powers, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda, and the change of events in Egypt, chiefly the arms deal, which according to them prevented Egypt from devoting all her economic resources towards financing the High Dam. For the text of the US statement see DSB (30 July 1956), p. 188.

29. *Hearings II*, n. 1, p. 717.

Nasser seized this opportunity to nationalise the Suez Canal Company.<sup>30</sup>

The announcement of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company took the breath away from western diplomats. In their desperate attempt to maintain control over the Suez Canal they committed themselves into an uncompromising position by attempting to equate the Suez Canal with the Suez Canal Company. They agreed that Egypt had the right to nationalise the Suez Canal Company but in the same breath they argued that she had nationalised the Suez Canal. And, when they could not argue on legal grounds they descended to the level of abuse and started accusing Nasser as a 'dictator attempting to choke the life-line of the western economy.' They sought to gain complete control over the Suez Canal through the London Conference of August 1956 and the Canal Users' Association of the same year. The Egyptian argument of convening an international conference to reaffirm the principle of free navigation through the Canal, in other words, the reiteration of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, was ignored.

However, suffice it to say that discussions aimed at solving the issue led to deadlocks and the attempts of the western powers towards the *status quo anté* nationalisation failed. In desperation, and in order to cover their humiliation Great Britain and France used Israel to perpetrate an international crime which would always remain a blot upon their history. The west had thought that they would be able to overthrow Nasser and entrench somebody who would be more amenable to their will. In this attempt they failed miserably. They attacked Nasser and made him a hero. The Suez War was an important test-case of Arab neutralism and it emerged triumphant.

30. President Nasser, in his speech on 26 July 1956, explaining the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company said that the revenues of the Canal would be used to finance the High Dam. Explaining the western refusal to finance the High Dam he said that they were 'punishing Egypt because it refused to side with military blocs.' Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs* 1956, p. 107.



## III

## ARABS AND THE VACUUM-FILLERS

Even after the Suez War the Arab desire of not being involved in the cold war was not heeded. They had to fight one more battle against the western attempt to dominate the Arab world. On 5 January 1957 President Eisenhower, in his Message to the Congress referred to the so-called 'vacuum' which was created in West Asia because of the loss of British and French prestige and said that the US must fill it before the Soviet Union did. He also referred to the communist danger in the area. He said that the US Government should

... authorise such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.<sup>31</sup>

Only two Arab governments, the Iraqi and the Lebanese, accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. Iraq was a member of the Baghdad Pact and her acceptance was taken, more or less, for granted. But the Lebanese acceptance, because of the pro-western Chamoun Government, had far-reaching consequences<sup>32</sup> and was one of the reasons for the 1958 crisis. In other Arab countries the 'doctrine' was widely criticised. The Syrian Government, in its statement of 1 January 1957, neatly summed up the general tone of Arab opposition to it. It said that the economic interests of any state or a group of states did not give them the right to interfere in the affairs of other states. It condemned the so-called 'vacuum theory' and asserted that it was not international communism but 'imperialism and Zionism' that posed danger to the area. It asserted that

31. Paul E. Zinner, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations 1957* (New York, 1958), p. 201.

32. Lebanon's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine was manifest in the joint communique signed after the visit of Richard's Mission to Beirut, 16 March 1957. For text see: DSB (6 May 1957), pp. 725-6.

the task of defending peace and security in the area rested with the inhabitants of the area alone.<sup>33</sup> The question was again brought up at a conference (held at Cairo) of President Nasser, King Saud, King Hussain and Sabri al-Asali. The joint statement issued on 19 January 1957 stated that all the parties had agreed that they would not recognise the 'vacuum theory.'<sup>34</sup> Yemen also expressed adherence to this statement.

The Cairo Conference was convened before King Saud left for the US, ostensibly, to convey the Arab view about the Eisenhower Doctrine. But his subsequent statements in Washington belied this purpose. Probably the fabulous red carpet treatment meted out to him was partly responsible for his deviation from the avowed aim of his visit. The joint communique signed by King Saud and President Eisenhower in Washington on 8 February 1957 said:

President Eisenhower explained the purposes of his proposals to Congress in relation to the Middle East, pointing out that they were designed to supplement the universal non-aggression principles expressed in the Charter of the United Nations and to promote the independence and proper aspirations of the Arab people. King Saud received with satisfaction this exposition...<sup>35</sup>

While King Saud was in the US, the US was granted the permission to use the Dahrn airbase for five more years.<sup>36</sup> After the King's return, President Nasser, President Quwatly, King Hussain and King Saud met again in Cairo. The communique issued on 27 February 1957 reaffirmed the earlier decision of 19 January and proclaimed their desire to adhere to the policy of 'positive neutrality.'<sup>37</sup> But within a month, King Saud

33. Text of the statement see: Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs* 1957, p. 241.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 257. When the Arab Heads were meeting in Cairo the regional Baghdad Pact members were meeting in Ankara and in a joint communique issued on 21 January 1957, welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine.

35. DSB, 36 (25 February 1957), pp. 308-9.

36. Saudi Arabia has announced recently that the US would not be allowed to use the airbase after 1962.

37. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs* 1957, p. 226.

again changed his stand. The communique issued after the visit of President Chamoun to Riyadh on 26 March 1957 (that is, after the visit of the Richard's Mission to Beirut) said that they agreed on

... cooperation in combating communist doctrines and every subversive activity in their countries inconsistent with the ideals and spiritual values of the Arab peoples...<sup>38</sup>

King Saud further reaffirmed his faith in the Eisenhower Doctrine in the joint communique signed after the visit of Richard's Mission to Riyadh on 11 April.<sup>39</sup>

In Jordan the reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine was negative in the initial stage. Sulaiman Nabulsi, the Jordanian Premier, in an interview with the *Ogouyok* magazine (20 January 1957) said that his government was 'in principle against a doctrine of filling the vacuum.' He said that the Arabs alone had the right to defend Arab countries and that 'the United Nations must maintain and protect peace among people.'<sup>40</sup> Nabulsi's government was backed by the National Socialists, the Baathists and the Communists who had formed a common front to protest against the Eisenhower Doctrine. Even King Hussain was towing the popular line as can be seen from his acceptance of the communique issued in Cairo on 27 February 1957. Premier Nabulsi even went to the extent of terminating the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1948 on 13 March 1957, thus severing the last ties with Great Britain. There was also a possibility of exchanging diplomatic missions with the USSR. Indeed, the spirit of 'positive neutrality' was running pretty high in that country. It, however, received a big shock when in April the same year martial law was proclaimed and political parties were banned by King Hussain.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

39. DSB, 36 (6 May 1957), p. 731. Saudi Arabia, however, repudiated the Eisenhower Doctrine on 2 June 1958. *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part IV (4 January 1958), A/1-2.

40. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Joint Committee on Slavic Studies), 9 (27 February 1957), p. 25.

Soon after that the Jordanian foreign policy gradually drifted away from positive neutrality to pro-westernism.

The Syrian crisis of 1957 gives an inkling of the possible effects of the Eisenhower Doctrine. There is no doubt that Syria, despite the restraining influence of President Shukry al-Quwatly, was drifting towards the left. During that period a delegation led by Khaled al-Azem, the Syrian Minister of Defence, had visited the Soviet Union. The joint communique of 6 August 1957<sup>41</sup> promised huge Soviet economic and technical aid to Syria. Immediately after the return of Khaled al-Azam, Col. Bizri, who was pro-Communist, was made the Syrian Commander-in-Chief and there was a purge in the army. The same month diplomatic relations between the US and Syria deteriorated and several diplomatic personnel of both sides were declared *personae non gratae*. It coincided with the visit to the Middle East of the US Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, Loy Henderson, who had discussions with President Bayer of Turkey, King Hussain of Jordan and King Faisal of Iraq. The US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, commenting on Henderson's tour, said in a press conference: '... he found in the Near East deep concern at the apparently growing Soviet communist domination in Syria....' He went on to say about the Syrian crisis and Eisenhower Doctrine as:

The President recalled his Message to Congress of 5 January 1957.... The President reaffirmed his intention to carry out the national policy, expressed in the Congressional Middle East resolution....<sup>42</sup>

When the Syrian crisis was looming large the supply of US arms to Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan were stepped up. It was at this time that Syrian-Turkish border tensions developed. The inevitable result was that Syria was virtually thrown into the arms of the Communists. (A Soviet naval squadron

41. Text see: *News and Views from the Soviet Union* (New Delhi), 16 (10 August 1957), pp.4-5.

42. DSB, 37 (23 September 1957), p. 487.



arrived in Latakia on 21 September 1957). The liberal politicians in Syria became alarmed at the pro-Soviet orientation in Syria and sought closer support from Egypt which was granted. Egyptian troops reached Syria on 13 October 1957. By that time the crisis had simmered down, yet the ill-feelings towards the US which was held responsible for it remained, thereby further discrediting the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Eisenhower Doctrine did not lead to any fruitful result. Immediately after the Suez War the US had emerged as one of the most popular states in West Asia. But by her effort to acquire the place of Great Britain and France by this 'doctrine,' she lost all the good will she had earned by her stand on the Suez. As against the US, by comparison, the Soviet Union emerged with far greater influence than before. Her stand on the Suez, her criticism of the Eisenhower Doctrine<sup>43</sup> and her support to the Arabs helped her a great deal in creating a favourable impression in the Arab World. The Soviets, apparently, did not ask for anything in return for their support and showed their willingness to accept Arab neutralism as a cardinal principle of the Arab foreign policy.

#### IV

#### COLLAPSE OF WESTERN PRESTIGE

Thus in 1958 we find the Arab World struggling for recognition of its neutralist policy yet unable to smash the web of western propaganda which was distorting its point of view. In this context an event occurred which removed the self-made smokescreen from the western vision. The Iraqi Revolution of 14 July 1958 nullified the western propaganda of conflict

43. The USSR proposed a six-point plan, popularly called the Shepilov Plan. It formed a part of the Soviet note of 11 February 1957 to the US which was critical of the Eisenhower Doctrine. It called for liquidation of foreign bases in the area, reciprocal refusal to deliver arms to the West Asian countries and economic aid without strings attached to them. For text see: Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs* 1957, p. 70.

among the Arabs regarding the attitude towards the cold war and brought to the forefront the Arab policy of positive neutrality. Immediately after the Revolution its leaders proclaimed that Iraq would follow the policy of positive neutrality. Iraq as a bastion of the western camp in the Arab World, had crumbled before popular action.

The Iraqi Revolution caused great panic among western powers but even more than that it shattered the confidence of the pro-western governments in West Asia. The Lebanese and the Jordanian governments invited the US and British troops to come and protect them.<sup>44</sup>

The Lebanese crisis of 1958 revealed the deep cleavage between popular aspiration to keep the country away from the power-blocs and the Government's determined efforts to tow the pro-western line. Adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine had generated a deep popular hostility towards President Chamoun and the Foreign Minister Charles Malik. Chamoun's attempt to amend the constitution so as to get re-elected was opposed by the people who saw in it an attempt to continue his pro-western policy. The country was seething with discontent but the spark which ignited it was the murder of Nasib al-Matani, the editor of *al-Telegraph*, a Beirut daily, in early May 1958. The Lebanese National Union Front, a group composed of various cross-sections of the Lebanese political, social and religious institutions blamed the US for the state of affairs in Lebanon. It sent a note to the US Ambassador in Lebanon on 15 May 1958 which said:

44. President Eisenhower explaining the reason for the dispatch of US troops to Lebanon said:

President Chamoun made clear that he considered an immediate United States response imperative if Lebanon's independence, already menaced from without, were to be preserved in the face of the grave development which occurred yesterday in Baghdad....(He was referring to the Iraqi Revolution). DSB, 39 (4 August 1958), p. 181.

The US intervention in Lebanon was not in response to the Eisenhower Doctrine but under Article 51 of the UN Charter. President Chamoun in his letter to President Eisenhower thanking him for the US help said: '...to help us defend our independence and integrity in conformity with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter.' *Ibid.*, 39 (11 August 1958), p. 235.

We presume that you are unaware that our current national movement is not inspired by any ideological currents imported from outside, but that it is of a purely internal character and has inevitably arisen because of the narrow partisan policy, jeopardising Lebanese integrity, which the President of the Republic has personally conjured up through his hirelings in the Government and in the Parliament.

We are duty bound to draw Your Excellency's attention to the fact that your Government's blatant interference in the Lebanon's affairs will only arouse against it all those Lebanese elements which oppose the present regime...<sup>45</sup>

Charges of foreign interference, especially of the UAR, in the internal affairs of Lebanon, were also denied by the opposition.<sup>46</sup> The US intervention after the Iraqi Revolution heightened the severity of conditions which were verging on civil war. A compromise solution, however, ushered in a neutralist cabinet of Rashid Karami which repudiated Chamoun's pro-western policy. Foreign troops which had been stationed in the Lebanon were unable to protect their 'friends' and were withdrawn by October 1958.

After the July 1958 crisis, the western powers apparently abandoned their attempt at coaxing the Arabs to join them and concentrated upon their original Northern Tier Plan. The Baghdad Pact was renamed CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) and its headquarters was shifted to Ankara. The US also indirectly joined it by concluding bilateral military pacts with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey on 5 March 1959. The Arabs were not asked to join it. At last, the Arab policy of positive neutrality seems to have been recognised by the western powers.

45. SWB, Part IV (17 May 1958), p. 10.

46. The Lebanese Foreign Minister in a press conference on 13 May 1957 had accused the UAR of 'interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon'. Ibid. (15 May 1958), pp. 11-12. The opposition repudiated this charge in a statement on 17 May. Ibid. (19 May 1958), pp. 15-6.

## V.

## NEUTRALISM AND THE SOCIALIST BLOC

Till now we have studied the Arab policy *vis-a-vis* the western bloc countries and their attitude towards it. But the study would be incomplete unless we also study the reactions of the eastern bloc towards this policy.

For quite a long time the communist world refused to recognise this policy not only in the Arab World but also elsewhere in Asia. This was especially true in the Stalinist era. During that period the communist world was generally suspicious of the bourgeois governments. Also, the suppression of the communist parties in the Arab countries hampered the evolution of a more lenient Soviet attitude towards them. Moscow's attitude towards the Egyptian Government was hostile even though Egypt was trying hard to follow a policy of positive neutrality and was resisting western pressure to include her in the anti-communist defence bloc. Even the change in Egypt after the 1952 Revolution failed to evoke any immediate favourable response. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of July 1954 for the evacuation of the Suez Canal base was interpreted as a concession to the west. The Soviet radio and press bitterly criticised the Egyptian leaders for having jumped on the American bandwagon.<sup>47</sup>

Communist policy, however, underwent a drastic change in 1955.<sup>48</sup> This was the result of a combination of two events: change within the communist world, and closer cooperation between the neutralist bloc countries. Contacts between Nehru and Nasser which had been initiated in 1954 were further strengthened in 1955. Nasser met other neutralist

47. *Izvestia*, 8 August 1954, quoted in Walter Z. Lacqueur, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (London, 1959), p. 196.

48. L. Vatoline, a Soviet expert on West Asia praised the 1954 treaty in an article. It read '... the liberation of Egyptian territory from foreign forces is a factor of great political and international importance. ... It marks a most important victory for the Egyptian people in their long national-liberation struggle.' *International Affairs* (Moscow), 6 (June 1956), pp. 66-74. This article was written on the eve of Shepilov's visit to the West Asia. Also see: 'Free Egypt', *New Times* (Moscow) (1956), pp. 3-5.



leaders also at the Bandung Conference in 1955. His stand on the cold war problems, which were discussed at that conference, contrasted sharply with that of the western-oriented representatives of Iraq, Ceylon, the Philippines and Pakistan. Further, the Czech arms deal announced on 27 September 1955 proved Nasser's willingness to deal with the eastern bloc countries. All these factors influenced and were in turn influenced by the ideological shift in the communist bloc.

In 1955 the communist strategy was oriented to a pro-neutralist stand and this change was manifested in the tour of Khrushchov and Bulganin to the neutralist countries like India, Burma, Indonesia and Afghanistan in November-December 1955.<sup>49</sup> The Communists stopped calling Nasser 'American fascist Gamal, a torturer and traitor' and he became the brave defender of the nation's peace and independence.<sup>50</sup> In 1955, Vatoline, a Soviet expert on the Middle East, wrote an article (in *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*) praising internal as well as the external policies of Nasser's government, saying that they were 'objectively progressive actions.'<sup>51</sup> It must be remembered that even at this time the Communists were as severely suppressed in Egypt as before, yet, expediency had replaced ideology. The Suez War and the support of the communist bloc to Egypt brought the two closer than before.

This period of honeymoon ended in 1958. After the union between Syria and Egypt in February 1958, the Syrian Communist Party which was the then strongest Communist Party in the Arab World, was suppressed. Khaled Bagdash, the

49. The editorial of *International Affairs* (Moscow) (December 1955), pp. 5-17, entitled 'The Soviet Union—The True Friend of the Peoples of the East', commented upon the Asian-Soviet friendship and portrayed the Soviet Union as the champion of the Asian countries. It criticised the Baghdad Pact and the CENTO and eulogised the nonaligned countries including those of the Arab World.

50. Jean and Simone Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition* (London, 1958), p. 266.

51. Quoted in Walter Z. Lacqueur, ed., *Middle East in Transition* (London, 1958), p. 492. Similar views were also expressed in other publications. See: L. Vatoline, 'The Egyptian Republic takes the new road to independence,' *International Affairs* (Moscow) (June 1956), pp. 66-74; F. Mulyukov, 'The Soviet Union and Egypt,' *Ibid.* (August 1956), pp. 41-9.

Syrian communist leader, went into exile and started attacking the UAR Government in general and Nasser in particular.<sup>52</sup> That in itself would not have mattered much and the cordial relations between the UAR and the eastern bloc would have continued for some more time.<sup>53</sup> But the Iraqi Revolution of 14 July 1958 and its repercussion created conditions which had far-reaching implications and severely tested the Arab policy of positive neutrality *vis-a-vis* the eastern bloc.

The Iraqi Revolution unleashed the pent-up political energies and all the political parties which had been suppressed under the previous regime re-emerged into active political life. Of them the Communist Party was the strongest and the most influential and was able to have a dominating influence in Iraq. Naturally it became the rallying point not only of Arab Communists but also of the communist bloc as a whole. The eastern bloc thus became involved in the controversy between the Iraqi Communists and the UAR Government.

The UAR-Iraq controversy started after the dismissal in October 1958 of Col. Abdul Salam Aref of Iraq who was spearheading the movement for union with the UAR. The UAR press and radio accused the Iraqi as well as the Arab Communists of working against Arab unity. In his Port Said speech of 23 December 1958, Nasser criticised the Syrian Communists of trying to separate Syria from the UAR.<sup>54</sup> It

52. Khaled Bagdash in an article, 'The Crisis and the Problems of the Middle East,' criticised the suppression of the communist parties in the region. He said: '...chief form of revisionism in those countries is that of denying the leading role of the Communist Party in building socialism.' *World Marxist Review*, 1 (September 1958), p. 69.

53. An example of the close cooperation between the UAR and the USSR was Nasser's visit to the Soviet Union. Khrushchov while speaking on 30 April 1958 in a gathering where Nasser was present said, 'We are sincerely happy that there are no storm clouds on the horizon of relations between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic.' President Nasser reciprocated and stressed the UAR's policy of positive neutrality which he said was respected by the USSR. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 10 (11 June 1958), pp. 18-9.

54. UAR, Information Department, *President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews 1958* (Cairo), p. 355. (Hereafter cited as *Nasser's Speeches*). President Nasser had enough reasons to criticise the Syrian Communist Party. This party in its Central Committee meeting

seems that these attacks did not have any apparent impact upon relations between the UAR and the USSR because only four days after the Port Said speech these two countries signed the Aswan Dam loan agreement.

First major criticism against Nasser's attitude towards the Arab Communists was voiced by Khrushchov at the 21st Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. In his speech Khrushchov criticised Nasser's struggle against the Communists and the 'progressive parties' as a reactionary step. But at the same time he said: 'Differences of ideological views must not interfere with the development of friendly relations between our countries and the business of a joint struggle against imperialism.'<sup>55</sup>

There were strong protests against the first remark of Khrushchov but the points of conflict were smoothed out in the subsequent correspondence between the two leaders and Nasser in his speech on 21 February 1959 mentioned that the differences between them were patched up.<sup>56</sup>

Subsequent events, however, showed that they were only superficially resolved. They flared up again in March the same year. On 11 March 1959, while speaking in Damascus, President Nasser criticised the Arab Communists in general for being foreign agents, and the Iraqi Communists in particular, for working against the unity of the UAR.<sup>57</sup> His criticisms must be read in context with the infructuous anti-

passed a Thirteen Point Programme. The first point demanded regional autonomy of different parts of the UAR and freedom to have political parties. (In the UAR political parties were banned.) For the text see 'Platform of the Syrian Communist Party,' *World Marxist Review*, 2 (19 February 1959), pp. 61-3. Incidentally it should be noted that the reactions in the Soviet Union towards the formation of the UAR were favourable to the Union. The Soviet publications did not voice the feelings of the Syrian Communists. See *New Times* (9) (1958), pp. 21-2 and *International Affairs* (Moscow) (March 1958), pp. 52-8.

55. *Mizan News Letters* (February 1959), Appendix A; also *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 11 (4 March 1959), p. 21.

56. *Nasser's Speeches*, 1959, pp. 35-6. For Khrushchov's reconciliatory attitude, see his speech of 24 February 1959 at Moscow. See: *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 11 (4 March 1959), p. 21.

57. *Nasser's Speeches*, 1959, p. 123.

communist Mosul revolt of March 1959. Also, at that time there was a strong rumour of a communist plan for the 'Fertile Crescent' — union of Syria, Jordan and Iraq. The inclusion of Syria in this plan went against the unity of the UAR.

Khrushchov, while speaking on the occasion of the signing of the Iraqi-Soviet Economic Agreement on 16 March 1959, severely criticised Nasser's attack against the Arab Communists and the Iraqi government. He said that he was 'grieved' at Nasser's attacks but at the same time he said that relations between the Soviet Union and the UAR would remain unchanged.<sup>58</sup> An uneasy truce was maintained in spite of several bitter exchanges between the two countries. By 8 September 1959 they were again back to normal because an important contract in connection with the Aswan Dam aid was signed on that date.

Relations between the People's Republic of China and the Arab world were very cautious in the initial stage, but developed very quickly after the Bandung Conference. Soon after that Egypt signed a trade agreement with China on 14 October 1955 and on 16 May 1956 granted recognition to the communist regime and withdrew it from the Nationalist Government. China's relations with Syria were also friendly. Syria had announced her recognition of China on 31 July 1956 and had already concluded the trade agreement with her in April 1956. Sino-Egyptian Friendship Association and Sino-Syrian Friendship Associations were also formed. Articles were written in the Chinese periodicals bringing out the historical basis of Sino-Arab friendship.<sup>59</sup> Relations between the UAR

<sup>58</sup> In the same speech Khrushchov, replying to the anti-communist propaganda of Nasser, commented, 'When he speaks of communism and Communists in these speeches he arms himself with the tongue of the imperialists.' Regarding future relations between the UAR and the USSR he said: 'I think that they will be the same as before. For when we formed friendly relations with the UAR we knew about the anti-communist views of President Nasser.' *The Mizan News Letter* (April 1959), Appendix, pp. 3-4.

<sup>59</sup> Muhammad Makien, 'Sino-Arab Friendship, Yesterday and Today,' *Peking Review* (1 December 1957), pp. 16-20.



and China, however, deteriorated following the Nasser-Khrushchov controversy and the Mosul Revolt of March 1959. The shift in the Chinese (as well as the Soviet) policy can be explained in the light of the emergence of the Iraqi Communist Party as a strong political force in Iraq, a force with great potentials, thus, meriting support even at the cost of estrangement with Nasser. A leading article was published in *Renmin Ribao* (20 March 1959), entitled 'What are the True National Interests of the Arab People', which criticised the UAR's attitude towards the Mosul Revolt and towards the Arab Communists.<sup>60</sup> Another article was published in *Hongqi* on 1 April 1959 entitled 'Imperialism is the Sworn Enemy of Arab National Movement.'<sup>61</sup> Criticising President Nasser it said:

The reason why President Nasser of the United Arab Republic was respected by the people was because he led the Egyptian people to wage resolute struggle against the imperialist aggression, sympathised with and supported the liberation of other Arab states and, together with the socialist and nationalist countries, safeguarded the five principles of peaceful coexistence. But, President Nasser who *once* won the people's respect, has recently made vicious attacks on Iraq, the Communist Parties and the Soviet Union. This has made people worried. *Where will he eventually go?*<sup>62</sup>

Chinese antagonism against the UAR government and particularly against President Nasser reached its climax when she allowed Khaled Bagdash, the Syrian communist leader in exile, to address the international forum in Peking during the celebrations of the Tenth Anniversary of the Chinese Revolution. Bagdash bitterly attacked Nasser, which made the UAR Chargé d'Affaires walk out in protest from the gathering. The UAR Director-General of Information, Saad Afra, sent a note to the

60. English translation of the text see: *Ibid.*, (24 March 1959), pp. 6-9.

61. Abridged translation see: *Ibid.* (7 April 1959), pp. 10-14.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 12. Italics added. For the Egyptian criticism of the Chinese attitude see: *Egyptian Economic and Political Review* (Cairo), 5 (April/May 1959), pp. 20-1.

Chinese Government protesting against their permission to allow Khaled Bagdash to attack the UAR government in the anniversary celebrations.<sup>63</sup> Egyptian newspapers, *al-Ahram* and *al-Gomhouria* also came out strongly against China. The Chinese leaders were even accused of suffering from 'schizophrenia.'<sup>64</sup>

Why did China allow Bagdash to speak at Peking before this international gathering? No doubt China was trying to show her disapproval of the anti-communist policies of the UAR. It was also a move to gain popularity among the Arab Communists and the Iraqi government. It is very unfortunate that that year (1959) China was antagonising nearly all her Asian friends. But the incident blew off soon and by 1960 relations between the UAR and China became more or less normal and correct.

Controversy between the UAR and the communist bloc countries and especially the Nasser-Khrushchov exchanges highlights two main factors. The first is that the Arab neutralist leaders would not allow themselves to be pushed into compromising their policy, either internal or external, irrespective of the political or economic ties with any particular bloc. And, secondly, the communist bloc and especially the Soviet Union is prepared to accept the Arab neutrality and is prepared to support these countries even at the cost of the Arab Communists. In this policy a certain amount of pragmatism separates national interests and ideological affiliations.<sup>65</sup>

63. *Egyptian Gazette* (Cairo), 30 September 1959, p. 3.

64. 'Marxist Mandarins', *Egyptian Economic and Political Review*, 5 (September 1959), p. 4. During this Sino-UAR debate the Egyptian newspapers and periodicals criticised the Chinese policy in Tibet and their border dispute with India, not because of their sympathy for India, but because they came in handy in their dispute with China.

65. Soviet reactions to the recent anti-communist policies of the Iraqi Government also prove this point. In February 1961 Moscow Radio attacked Premier Qassem for suppressing the Iraqi Communists. Yet, in spite of these attacks, the economic relations between the USSR and Iraq have remained unaffected.

## VI

## ARAB NEUTRALISM—AN ASSESSMENT

It is very encouraging that both the eastern and the western blocs have started appreciating the Arab policy of positive neutrality. But the hard battle which the Arabs had fought to attain this recognition has lent a certain amount of dynamism, even aggressiveness, to their policy. This factor becomes apparent when we compare the Arab policy with that of other like-minded countries.

Reasons for this attitude of dynamism and aggressiveness are obvious. Countries like India, Burma or Ceylon had started with a much cleaner slate in their foreign policy in that their foreign policies were not simultaneously burdened with the struggle against unequal treaties with big powers or with fight to remove foreign forces and bases from their territories. Arab politicians on the other hand had to fight for the elimination of these limitations to the sovereignty of their countries and naturally their policy seemed much more aggressively anti-western than that of other neutralist countries.<sup>66</sup>

Also, the points of irritations in their relations with the western bloc were numerous. The neutralist policies of India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon were accepted, though often criticised, and no serious attempt was made to change them. It was not the case with the Arab World. Examples of foreign interferences which aimed at giving a pro-western or pro-eastern orientation to their policies were numerous. Naturally these led to bitter struggle between the Arabs and others. These tests have given a certain amount of recognition to the Arab policy of positive neutrality.

Though the Arab policy is criticised for its aggressiveness, yet, a certain balance is discernible in this aggressiveness. An

66. No doubt India had a few foreign enclaves. But they belonged to a small power, Portugal, and consequently, anti-colonial movement in India had much less impact upon her attitude towards cold war than the anti-British (and subsequently anti-us) movement in the Arab world.

analysis of the role of the Arab states in the Belgrade Conference (nine Arab states attended it) would reveal that they had acted, more or less, as a balancing force between the extreme anti-westernism of Ghana and Indonesia on the one hand and the more sober attitude of India on the other. President Nasser, as a co-sponsor of the conference and an important neutralist Arab leader, played an active part in this conference and a large measure of credit is due to him (and to Emperor Haile Selassie) for his role as a peace-maker among the nonaligned leaders. Whereas Prime Minister Nehru emphasised the Berlin issue and the threat of nuclear devastation, and President Nkrumah and President Soekarno thought colonialism as the greatest evil, it fell upon Nasser to re-emphasise both the points of view — an attempt which contributed in a large measure to the success of the conference.

There is no doubt that the Arabs today are firmly committed to the policy of positive neutrality. The aggressiveness in the application of this policy denotes the degree of conviction and commitment. The day Arab policy of positive neutrality loses this quality and assumes an attitude of complacency, it would also be the day of its decay.



## Uneasy Alignment

B. C. Rastogi

### I

NONALIGNMENT, AS A POLICY, CAME INTO VOGUE IN THE POST-world war era. Most of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa have been inclined to accept it, firstly, because of the anti-colonial and anti-feudal heritage of their freedom movements; secondly, because of their ultra-sensitiveness about their sovereignty and independence; and thirdly, because of a belief that between the two warring factions in the cold war, neither all virtue is on one side nor all evil on the other. This policy has three main facets: non-commitment to the political ideologies, whether of the western bloc or the Soviet bloc, in their operation at the international level; non-involvement in the world-wide system of military alliances of the rival power blocs; and the exercise of free judgement and initiative on international issues:

Pakistan started its independent career 'without any narrow and special commitments and without any prejudices in the international sphere.'<sup>1</sup> During the early years, she tried to pursue, like India, an independent foreign policy.<sup>2</sup> But

1. Liaquat Ali, quoted by K. Sarwar Hasan, 'Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,' *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), 4 (December 1951), p. 134.

2. 'Sometimes we agreed with the western bloc and sometimes with the communist bloc as the situation and the matter under discussion demanded. Pakistan could pursue such an independent course because it was not under the obligation to any foreign country.' Liaquat Ali Khan, *Dawn* (Karachi), 9 March 1951.

towards the middle of the 'fifties she became aligned to the western bloc.<sup>3</sup> Recently, however, a slight shift in favour of nonalignment has been noted in her outlook.<sup>4</sup> The attempt here is to examine these shifts in her foreign policy with a view to understanding their causes, nature and scope.

The major determinants of a country's foreign policy can be broadly classified under two heads: the national interests in terms of defence and economic requirements, and the dynamics of the socio-political set-up, leadership and national traditions.

India has been the principal preoccupation of Pakistan's defence and foreign policies. Pakistan seems to suffer from a fear complex. Her overall weakness<sup>5</sup> and strategic vulnerability<sup>6</sup> vis-à-vis India, the continuance of several disputes in which she accused India of having changed the rules of the game according to her convenience,<sup>7</sup> and the lingering memories of partition riots and communal hysteria, have combined to present India as the most imminent threat to her

3. Pakistan signed a Military Pact with the United States on 19 May 1954, signed the South East Asia Treaty on 8 September 1954, and joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955.

4. *Times* (London), 14 February 1911; *Guardian* (Manchester), 14 February 1961.

5. India's population is four times and its territory three times larger than Pakistan's. Industrially also India is several times stronger since she inherited all the major industries and most of the important mineral wealth of undivided India. She received about 2/3 of the military stores and equipment of British India and retained all the ordnance factories. Andrew Mellor, *India Since Partition* (London, 1951), pp. 38-9. Pakistan was short of armed personnel on the technical side, she received no ordnance factories or ammunition depots and only two training institutions, Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates*, I (1948), p. 34.

6. The Separation of the two wings of Pakistan by over one thousand miles of Indian territory renders her eastern part 'notoriously unmilitary.' W. G. East and O. H. K. Spate, *The Changing Map of Asia* (London, 1958), p. 166. India can easily cut all the communications between the two wings and can very effectively blockade her sea-coasts. All the big cities and industrial centres in Pakistan are 150 miles—an easy air striking distance—from the Indian border. Keith Callard, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy—An Interpretation* (New York, 1957), p. 9. The land frontiers between the two countries are long, open and indefensible. 'Neighbours in Asia: India and Pakistan,' *Round Table* (London), 185 (December 1956), p. 18.

7. Keith Callard, *Pakistan, A Political Study* (London, 1957), p. 313.

existence and security. This has often loomed large over the political horizon of Pakistan<sup>8</sup> and impelled her to seek allies and military aid.<sup>9</sup>

Another aspect of Pakistan's defence relates to her territorial contiguity with the areas of control and influence of the two power blocs which gives her a significant location with reference to their global strategy.<sup>10</sup> The stretch of her territory in Southeast Asia as well as in the Middle East lends her some interest in these regions also.

Pakistan's economic problems revolve round her economic structure and resources and the need to step up the rate of economic growth. Her economy is dominantly agrarian. Since most of the industrial centres were in Indian territory, she was left with little 'industrial activity.'<sup>11</sup> There was 'much leeway to make up' to create an industrialised Pakistan. She lacked capital<sup>12</sup> and technical know-how and was not adequately endowed with even mineral and power resources.<sup>13</sup> Foreign trade formed the backbone of her economy—a fact which rendered her economy susceptible to the price fluctuations in the world market.<sup>14</sup> These features introduce in her

8. 'Neighbours in Asia: India and Pakistan,' n. 6, p. 18.

9. Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates*, I (1954), p. 1191.

10. The Soviet Union and China lie just a few miles from her borders in the north. Her uneasy relations with Afghanistan and Soviet support to the latter on the Pukhtoonistan issue have made her north-west frontier sensitive. 'Neighbours in Asia: India and Pakistan,' n. 6, p. 22. On the other hand Pakistan's sea coasts are open and her trade flows on the Indian ocean which is an area of Anglo-American dominance.

11. Statement on the Industrial Policy, Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates*, I (1948), p. 624.

12. Firstly, her low per-capita income did not allow much scope for the formation of domestic capital; secondly, she lacked a traditional business class which in the pre-partition India was chiefly Hindu; and thirdly, the absence of a developed investment market, made foreign private capital shy.

13. O. H. K. Spate, *India and Pakistan* (London, 1957), p. 306; see also G. E. Percy and Associates, *World Political Geography* (New York, 1957), p. 534.

14. Her exports, mostly of raw materials, earn the much needed foreign exchange to pay for her import of capital goods, consumers' items and also some of the raw materials like coal. Her imports and exports also furnish, in the form of custom duties, a significant portion of her government's revenues. Hasan Parvez, *Pakistan's International Economic Relations* (New York, 1958), p. 2.

economic development and industrial expansion a considerable degree of dependence on the good will, assistance and cooperation of other developed countries. Her trade and economic structure is heavily oriented to the west, especially to Britain and the United States. These characteristics and requirements of her trade and economy have exercised a decisive influence on her foreign policy.

Moreover, the mould and direction of her foreign policy also bear an unmistakable imprint of internal dynamics. Pakistan was born on the same wave of nationalism which swept over the countries of Asia and Africa and, therefore, Pakistanis also shared with the latter the common sentiments of distrust of erstwhile colonial rulers of the west, enthusiasm for the freedom movements of the colonial peoples, a zeal for quick economic progress, and sensitiveness about their freedom. However, in her case, the sense of national belonging is based more on the idea of a religious identity<sup>15</sup> than anything else, and Islam, therefore, has become not only a strong unifying force but also an important factor in the political scheme of things in Pakistan.<sup>16</sup> Yet her national unity is not very securely based; it is threatened by the existence of divisive forces like lingual and racial groupings, regional contentions, and provincial rivalries.<sup>17</sup>

The 'élite' in Pakistan consists of a small group of men drawn largely from the feudal and middle classes whose training and education in the western tradition have created in them a cultural and philosophical affinity with the west.<sup>18</sup> In

15. Keith Callard, *Political Forces in Pakistan* (New York, 1959), p. 16.

16. Callard, n. 7, chapter on 'Islam and Politics.'

17. Racially, linguistically and culturally East Pakistan and West Pakistan are two separate entities and the grievances of the former against the disproportionate influence which the latter wields, are a source of serious challenge to Pakistani nationalism. Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates*, I (1956), p. 1816. In West Pakistan, although the rivalry between Sindhis, Baluchis, Pathans and Punjabis is not very sharp, the cultural and political dominance of the Punjabis is resented by all. Hindus form about 11 per cent of the total population. This percentage is nearly twice as large in East Bengal. Their one-time opposition to Pakistan's formation has not been forgotten by the Muslims. Callard, n. 7, pp. 78, 267.

18. Callard, n. 7, pp. 200-1.



the absence of a strong and advanced middle class<sup>19</sup> or an informed and effective public opinion,<sup>20</sup> the power and control over public affairs was concentrated in the hands of a few leaders. Their 'unprincipled alliances' and 'manoeuvrings' for power led to quick changes in governments<sup>21</sup> and rendered their life and policies subject to factional pulls and improvised compromises.<sup>22</sup> The successive governments at the centre have ruled without a free and frank mandate from the people. Democracy, as a result, did not have a smooth sailing in Pakistan, although the country inherited the parliamentary system shaped on the British model.

The opposition has been 'irregular, unconstructive and weak,' thus undermining another foundation of democracy. The major political parties belong to the right and a 'systematic socialist approach' being confined to few among the educated sections; leftist influence in politics has been slight.<sup>23</sup> The political parties were formed around personalities rather than socio-economic principles<sup>24</sup> and this fact further weakened the possibility of an eventual crystallisation of leftist forces to counter-balance the preponderant rightist influence of the feudal elements<sup>25</sup>—a hangover of the movement for Pakistan the leadership of which was mostly in the hands of landed

19. Callard, n. 15, pp. 13-5.

20. Callard, n. 7, p. 50.

21. The average life of the governments in Pakistan has been not more than two years. *Ibid.*, Appendix II, pp. 342-6.

22. 'Except the first government all others depended for their existence on political manoeuvrings, unprincipled alliances and acute intrigues,' Sisir Gupta, 'Political Trends in Pakistan,' *Foreign Affairs Reports* (New Delhi), 5 (December 1956), p. 130. '...rigid adherence to a policy or a measure is likely to make a politician less available for office.' Callard, n. 7, pp. 67, 78.

23. Though the Awami League and the Krishak Samaj Party were, in a sense, radical but not leftist, the only leftist parties were the Communist Party (banned in 1954), the Gantatri Dal and the Azad Pakistan Party. Callard, n. 7, pp. 73, 103-4.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 23. The absence of political parties with clear-cut socio-economic programmes or philosophy is not unrelated to the absence of a similar programme in the Muslim League's manifesto on Pakistan.

25. 'There can be little doubt that Jagirdars and Zamindars... retain vast political influence. A glance through the lists of members of legislative assemblies show how many such hereditary leaders or their near relatives are active in political life.' *Ibid.*, p. 50.

interests and big bourgeoisie.

As regards Pakistan's traditions in international affairs she started with none, excepting an active sympathy for the Muslims, general support for the freedom struggle of the subject peoples in Asia and Africa, suspicion of the western powers and, lastly, the historic rivalry between the Muslim League and the Congress, which contributed to some extent to the post-partition rivalry between India and Pakistan. This feeling of rivalry, fomented by mutual suspicion and distrust, has often verged on hostility and has existed in both the countries. But in Pakistan, because of ill-founded national unity and political instability, the leaders have on occasions deliberately tried to play it up, either to unite the whole nation and fight the divisive forces within the country, or to win popular support for a particular government or its policies or to divert the attention of the people from more acute and pressing domestic problems.

## II

Although thirteen years of Pakistan's existence as a nation is in itself a short span as compared with the long temporal sweeps of history, yet for the purpose of this paper and on the basis of certain sign-posts, it is proposed to divide it into three smaller periods.

The first period extends from 1947 to 1952. Pakistan was created in 1947 amidst communal riots and large-scale movement of refugees. She set out without an established administration or well-organised army. Her most pressing internal problems during the initial years were the maintenance of law and order, the rehabilitation of nearly six million refugees, national integration and economic reconstruction—in short the transformation of a 'moth eaten' and 'truncated' Pakistan into a strong and stable nation. In the international field, being a new and little known country,<sup>26</sup> Pakistan started with

<sup>26</sup> Pakistan started with little active sympathy or understanding on the part of the members of the world community for herself. *Ibid.*, pp. 302-3.

almost a clean slate except for certain links with Britain, the Islamic bonds with Muslim countries, and unhappy relations with India. Thus her principal tasks in this period were firstly to ensure her survival and independence, and secondly, to build up her internal strength and international position, as against India—more particularly on the issue of Kashmir.<sup>27</sup>

Such were the objectives which during this period guided her foreign policy towards securing friends, obtaining foreign assistance and avoiding entanglements in bloc-politics. At first she looked to Britain for economic assistance, technical and administrative personnel, supply of military equipments and for political support in her disputes with India and Afghanistan.<sup>28</sup> She continued to be a dominion within the British Commonwealth and loyal to the Crown, even after India had become a sovereign republic. She also tried to invoke the Commonwealth's intervention during the communal riots<sup>29</sup> and on the issue of Kashmir.<sup>30</sup> In 1950, Liaquat Ali is reported to have suggested to Britain the institution of a Commonwealth guarantee for the territorial integrity of both India and Pakistan.<sup>31</sup> But she was not prepared to compro-

27. The validity or otherwise of the 'two-nations' theory, which formed the very basis of Pakistan, is also involved in the Kashmir issue. Therefore, it has been regarded as an issue of life and death for Pakistan, and considered to be 'the continuation of our struggle for freedom.' Governor General's Address, Pakistan, Constituent Assembly (*Legislative Debates*, II (1951), p. 13. Kashmir became the test of Pakistan's foreign relations 'for the first three years or so of Pakistan's existence... each problem as it arose was tested by one simple criterion—whether this policy or that was more likely to help Pakistan get Kashmir.' F. M. Innes, 'Political Outlook in Pakistan,' *Pacific Affairs* (New York), 26 (December 1953), p. 308.

28. The question of Pukhtoonistan is the main cause of bitter relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since it also involved the repudiation by the former of the Durand Line frontier, which was the product of a treaty between British, India and Afghanistan, Pakistan expected Britain to uphold this treaty.

29. Richard Symonds, *Making of Pakistan* (London, 1949), p. 169.

30. Liaquat Ali insisted on the inclusion of Kashmir on the agenda of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in 1951 as the condition of his participation in the conference. \*

31. *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 14 April 1950.

mise her own interests in spite of her membership of the Commonwealth.<sup>32</sup>

Another direction in which Pakistan moved to win friends was towards the Middle East. Ostensibly, relying on the concept of 'Muslim brotherhood,' she attempted to forge close cooperation among the Muslim states in the political, economic and cultural fields.<sup>33</sup> Bilateral treaties of friendship were concluded and State visits exchanged with many of them. With a view to building up, besides a cultural front, the 'collective bargaining strength' of these States, to resist the 'political and economic infiltration of the west'<sup>34</sup> several conferences of Muslim nations were convened in Pakistan.<sup>35</sup> In 1953, an attempt was made to create also a permanent consultative body of these countries.<sup>36</sup> Pakistan's Foreign Minister pleaded very strongly and vigorously the case of Arabs in Palestine,<sup>37</sup> and the successive Pakistani governments have persistently refused to recognise Israel.<sup>38</sup> Through this policy of encouragement of Islam and support for the cause of the Muslim peoples, Pakistan hoped to build up a close group of Muslim States whose support could be mobilised *vis-a-vis* India.

The other feature of her foreign policy in its early phase was non-involvement in the big powers' rivalry, and in effect,

32. For example, in 1949 when the £ sterling was devalued and consequently all other Commonwealth members agreed to devalue their currencies, Pakistan refused to follow suit. However, she devalued the rupee in 1955.

33. See Inaugural Address by Liaquat Ali Khan to the Motamar conference on 9 February 1951. *Dawn*, 10 February 1951.

34. 'Pan Islamism,' editorial, *Times of India* (Bombay), 14 July 1951.

35. The first Muslim International Economic conference was held at Karachi in 1950, and its third conference in 1954. The Motamar conference was held in February 1951. A Muslim People's conference was also convened in 1951.

36. Callard, n. 6, p. 21.

37. Zafrullah Khan himself admitted that 'Pakistan espoused the cause of the Arabs in Palestine with as much vigour and force as it was capable of. On no subsequent problem of the Middle East has Pakistan's advocacy exhibited greater passionate devotion than it did in respect of Palestine.' *Dawn*, 3 June 1952.

38. A press statement of Suhrawardy on 14 November 1956 that Pakistan will not recognise Israel under any conditions, appeared in *Pakistan News* (London), 24 November 1956, quoted by Callard, n. 7, p. 318.



taking an independent stand on international issues. A close alliance with the western bloc did not at first appear attractive because of the people's suspicion of the western powers born of their past experience under western colonialism. Similarly the rigidity of ties implicit in an alliance with the communist bloc and the Soviet indifference to Pakistan during this period, ruled out this possibility too.<sup>39</sup> Pakistan, therefore, sought to maintain correct relations with everybody, standing aloof from power blocs, and judging each issue on its merits.<sup>40</sup> However, because of the economic and intellectual ties with the west her attitude on many world problems reflected an approach often nearer to the west than to the Soviet Union.

Pakistan's record in the United Nations amply bears it out that it was 'neither tied to the apron strings of the Anglo-American bloc nor was it a camp-follower of the communist bloc.'<sup>41</sup> On the question of the Interim Committee, she was the only non-communist country to vote with the Soviet bloc in the Fourth Session of the General Assembly.<sup>42</sup> During the same session, on the Essentials of the Peace Resolution<sup>43</sup> and in the Fifth Session on the Uniting for Peace Resolution<sup>44</sup> she voted with the western bloc. On the Korean crisis, though in the beginning her attitude was one of considered support to

39. A Group Study, 'The Fundamentals of Pakistan's Foreign Policy,' *Pakistan Horizon*, 9 (March 1956), p. 46. It was only in 1950 that the ambassadors were actually exchanged between Karachi and Moscow. Although, an alliance with the Soviet Union does not seem to have been seriously considered by Pakistan, yet at times the leaders and the public flirted with this idea, particularly when they felt irritated at the alleged partiality of Britain and the United States for India. It was such a reaction which was manifested in the popular welcome to the Soviet invitation to Liaquat Ali. Sometimes it was motivated also by a desire to play the East versus the West. See Robert Trumbull's report from Karachi in *Times of India* (Bombay), 17 September 1951.

40. Friendliness towards all states; but with regard to each individual question or problem that might arise, standing on the side of fairness and subject to that to help and succour the weak. I hope, Sir, that is a positive enough policy.' Zafrullah Khan, *Pakistan, Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates*, I (1948), p. 821.

41. Liaquat Ali's statement, *Dawn*, 9 March 1951.

42. Mushtaq Ahmad, *United Nations and Pakistan* (Karachi, 1955), p. 56.

43. Avra M. Warren, 'Pakistan in the World Today,' *Dawn*, 29 June 1952.

44. Ahmad, n. 42, p. 60.

the United Nations' operations in Korea and though she concurred with the Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June<sup>45</sup> respectively, she declined to lend any armed assistance to the UN forces.<sup>46</sup> Again, she co-sponsored the eight-power resolution (A/C. 1/558) which endorsed the measures taken by the United Nations and recommended the holding of elections and the establishment of an independent united Korea under UN auspices.<sup>47</sup> But after the Chinese intervention in the war, Pakistan adopted a cautious attitude. Whereas, earlier, Zafrullah Khan had remarked that there was no 38th parallel for the UN forces, later he urged the cessation of hostilities on the 38th parallel and a negotiated settlement.<sup>48</sup> Pakistan also became a co-sponsor of the twelve-power resolution which appealed for a peaceful solution of the conflict.<sup>49</sup> She abstained on the US draft-resolution seeking to brand China as an aggressor.<sup>50</sup> She was opposed to the proposal to institute a blockade against China.<sup>51</sup> She also supported the admission of China to the United Nations.<sup>52</sup> These were some of the cold-war issues, besides the colonial and racial questions, on which Pakistan exercised independent judgement.

Another important plank of her foreign policy has been a keen advocacy of the cause of self government for the colonial peoples.<sup>53</sup> The leading part she took, inside and outside the

45. Pakistan's reply to the Security Council resolution of 27 June is contained in the U.N. Document No. S/1539, indicating her full support to it. *United Nations Year Book* (1950), p. 225.

46. For a report of Pakistan's reply in the negative to the UN request for sending armed units to Korea, see *Hindu* (Madras), 17 June 1961.

47. *United Nations Year Book*, (1950), p. 258.

48. See Iftikharuddin's speech quoting Zafrullah's remarks, Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates*, I (1951), p. 439.

49. *United Nations Year Book* (1951), p. 216.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 224. 51. *Ibid.*, p. 228; also see Khawaja Nazimuddin's statement in an interview in the USA. *Hindu*, 12 February 1953.

52. *United Nations Year Book* (1950), p. 439, also see Pakistan's delegate Izzat Hussain's statement to the Special Political Committee of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, reported in *Pakistan Times*, 17 December 1952.

53. '... whenever there is a question of liberty and independence from imperialism or opposing colonialism or pushing forward a people's march towards freedom, Pakistan is always to the fore and second to none whether

United Nations on the questions of Indonesia; the Italian colonies of Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland; Morocco and Tunisia; and her support to Egypt and Iran in their disputes with Britain;<sup>54</sup> bear testimony to her desire to accelerate the march of colonial peoples towards freedom. Goa is one notable exception on which Pakistan, by supporting Portugal's claims, has abandoned her anti-colonial role and principles. But this is mainly because of hostility towards India.

Nearer home, Pakistan's relations with her two neighbours, India and Afghanistan caused concern and suspicion, particularly those with the former. The opposition of the Congress to the Pakistan Scheme,<sup>55</sup> the indignation expressed repeatedly by certain Hindu elements over the fact of partition,<sup>56</sup> the numerous communal disturbances in the two countries in the years following partition and the emergence of several disputes with India, in which she always felt she was wronged by the stronger neighbour, created in her an impression that India was not yet reconciled to her existence.<sup>57</sup> This anxiety was further deepened by their early engagement in an undeclared war in Kashmir, the stoppage of canal waters by India in 1948<sup>58</sup> [which in her view pointed to a sinister possibility], the virtual suspension by India of all trade with Pakistan when the latter refused to devalue the currency in

it is the case of a Muslim country or it is the case of a non-Muslim country. So long as it is the case of a people awaiting its independence, we have always supported it....' Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates*, 3 (1952), p. 621.

54. Egypt's dispute was over the withdrawal of British bases near Suez, and Iran's dispute was over the nationalisation of British oil companies.

55. This fact, a part of history, assumed an added significance by the assumption of power in India by the same Congress leaders. And though these leaders had accepted the partition of India, they had not accepted the two-nation theory which Pakistan claimed to be the basis of her existence and of her claim to Kashmir. Callard, n. 7, pp. 15-6.

56. For statements of Hindu leaders on this theme, see V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power In India* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 382-5.

57. Callard, n. 6, p. 12.

58. India had stopped the water supply to Pakistani canals for a few days in April 1948, at the expiry of the Stand-Still Agreement of 1947. Satya Mehta, *Partition of the Punjab* (Ph.D. thesis submitted to the Delhi University, 1959), pp. 588-9.

1949,<sup>59</sup> and the reported massing of Indian troops on Pakistan borders in March 1950 and again in July 1951.<sup>60</sup> Under such conditions, the Nehru-Liaquat Pact (1950) could provide but little respite; the general mode of their mutual relations kept deteriorating. The Kashmir dispute, after the cease-fire agreement of 1 January 1949, had entered into a stalemate; the evacuee property and canal waters disputes were no nearer solution; the minority problem in East Bengal worsened between 1950-51 and the barrage of mutual recrimination poisoned the atmosphere.

The period 1953-8 represents a new phase in Pakistan's foreign policy. The installation of Mohammad Ali in 1953 as the Prime Minister marked a definite signal for this shift towards alignment with the United States and the western bloc.<sup>61</sup> The ground for this had already been prepared during the preceding year and a half.

The Commonwealth had disappointed Pakistan and her bonds with the former were 'looser' in 1952 than in 1947.<sup>62</sup> Britain also had disappointed her in her quarrels with India.<sup>63</sup> Her attempts to secure friends among the Islamic States to take her side against India also did not achieve much success, because they attached greater value to friendly relations with India which was bigger and took more active interest in their anti-colonial struggle. Her plans to create a permanent consultative organ of the Muslim countries aroused the suspicion

59. Callard, n. 6, p. 12.

60. The movement of troops is reported to have followed a heavy outflow of refugees from East Bengal. Stephan Ian, *The Horned Moon* (London, 1953), p. 33.

61. Editorial remarks in *Pakistan Times*, 8 October 1959.

62. Gordon Graham in *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), 23 September 1952.

63. 'India became a republic.... Pakistan recognised the crown. And my people watched to see what difference it would make. My people know your queen as our queen but still they ask: what difference does it make?' (Britain still maintains a neutral attitude). Mohammad Ali's statement at London, *Dawn*, 28 May 1953. Pakistan was also disappointed by Britain's attitude of indifference on the division of military stores between India and Pakistan, on Kashmir and on Pukhtoonistan. *Dawn*, 29 May 1953.

64. Editorial remarks in *Dawn*, 4 May 1952; also *Jerusalem Post*, 17 April 1952.



of the Arab League powers, especially of Egypt, which did not like to let the leadership of the Middle East pass on to Pakistan.<sup>64</sup> Another reason which can explain the failure of Pakistan's plan was her inability to give stout support to Egypt and Iran in their disputes with Britain concerning military bases at Suez and the nationalisation of oil, because of her need for Britain's economic and political support. There was poor response to her proposal for holding a conference of the Prime Ministers of the Islamic countries in April 1952 and it had to be shelved.<sup>65</sup>

Thus Pakistan felt isolated and friendless.<sup>66</sup> On the other side her relations with India had suffered a further set-back. The failure of Dixon's and Graham's missions, owing to India's alleged intransigence over the issues of demilitarisation and plebiscite in Kashmir<sup>67</sup> made her more and more desperate. A belief started growing among the leading circles that the United Nations, paralysed by the machinations of the big powers, could not protect the interests of the smaller countries.<sup>68</sup>

At the same time, towards the end of 1952, Pakistan was also faced with a grave economic crisis following a drop in the world prices of raw materials, especially of cotton and jute<sup>69</sup> which constituted Pakistan's chief export items. It affected adversely both her government's revenues and her balance of payments position.<sup>70</sup> Concurrently, her defence expenditure became a crippling drain on her economy.<sup>71</sup>

65. *Jerusalem Post*, 17 April 1952.

66. Gordon Graham in *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 September 1953.

67. Ahmad. n. 42, pp. 99-103.

68. Editorial remarks in *Dawn*, 24 October 1952.

69. The commodities' price index fell from 162 to 123 between June 1951 and December 1952; during the same period fibres fell from 193 to 98. Statement by Mohammad Ali, Pakistan, Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates, I (1953), p. 135.

70. The Balance of Payments' statement for the year ending June 1952 released by the Ministry of Finance on 9 September 1952, showed a deficit of Rs. 47.32 crores. *Pakistan Times*, 10 October 1952.

71. The allocation for defence for 1951-2 was increased from Rs. 62 crores to Rs. 72.11 crores. The demand for the year 1952-3 was placed at Rs. 67.69 crores, i.e. nearly 53 per cent of the total revenue. See editorial remarks in *Dawn*, 16 March 1952.

Successive crop failures reduced her from a surplus food producing area to a deficit one.<sup>72</sup> She had therefore to import large quantities of food from foreign countries.<sup>73</sup> The net result was that her foreign exchange reserves were severely depleted. Internally, the recession produced an unprecedented rise in prices, increased unemployment, and a general dissatisfaction among the people.

Pakistan stood in dire need of the friendship of a big power, which could strengthen her economically and militarily. Britain's reluctance to alienate India and the postwar decline in British power status, ruled her out for this role. The friendship of Muslim countries also could not have made much difference.<sup>74</sup> The United States with her enormous military and economic resources and political influence was seen as the only big power with whom an alliance would enable Pakistan to meet her defence and economic requirements as well as boost up her international status.

On the other hand, US strategists also saw Pakistan as a valuable asset in their global search for allies and bases around the USSR.<sup>75</sup> In their view the communist success in China had already increased the threat of communist expansion in Asia. The events in Egypt, Iran and Jordan in 1951 and 1952, and the disturbing situation in Southeast Asia created by the Indo-Chinese war, called for a readjustment and a reinforcement of the western position in Asia. India had refused to line up with the United States' anti-communist front, and remained unshaken in her nonaligned attitude. Pakistan appeared as an alternative, commendable more for her willingness to join military pacts and her strategic advan-

72. Dawn, 4 September 1952.

73. Pakistan's wheat purchases from abroad in 1952, excluding the US Wheat Loan, amounted to 3,55,000 tons. Dawn, 18 September 1952.

74. '...Pakistan is not adding to its prestige in the international field by running after certain other countries which are economically and otherwise in far less stable position than Pakistan itself and which can be of little help to us.' Dawn, 4 May 1952.

75. The Americans felt it would be a wise investment to build up the Pakistan army and construct American airfields there, because of their strategic utility against the Soviet Union. Dawn, 13 November 1952.

tages than for her resources or stability. The idea of the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) had already been mooted; that of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was in the air.

Towards the end of 1952, rumours were current that both the United States and Pakistan were preparing to enter into a military pact.<sup>76</sup> In 1953, the Republicans, with their programme of military and economic aid to like-minded countries, took over the US administration.<sup>77</sup> In Pakistan, the same year, Mohammad Ali, who had many friends in the government circles in the United States, was appointed Prime Minister. The moment was propitious and thereafter commenced a period of closer US-Pakistan cooperation which eventually led to Pakistan's alliance with the western bloc.

Towards the end of 1953 Pakistan had negotiated a pact with the United States for military aid under the US Mutual Security Act. Soon afterwards she concluded a bilateral pact with Turkey which subsequently became the nucleus of the Baghdad Pact, that was devised as a substitute for the abortive MEDO. The same year Pakistan joined the SEATO also<sup>78</sup> and formed thereby an important part of the western bulwark against communist expansion in Asia.

Pakistan's alignment with the west was reflected in her voting-record at the United Nations. Though on some colonial and racial questions, she still continued to vote independently,<sup>79</sup> on the cold-war issues, where vital interests of

76. *Dawn*, 11 November 1952.

77. Republican victory in the US Presidential elections in 1952 had aroused in Pakistan high hopes for substantial economic and military aid from the United States. See *Dawn*, 12 November 1952.

78. The Pact with the United States was signed on 19 May 1954; the Pact with Turkey was signed on 2 April 1954; and the South East Asia Treaty was signed on 8 September 1954.

79. For example, on the questions of Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, the apartheid policy of South Africa, on the issue of the extension of the term of the Committee on Information of Non-Self-Governing Territories in 1952, 1955 and 1958, and on the resolution listing the criteria to determine the constitutional change in the status of the Non-Self-Governing Territories in the 8th Session of the General Assembly, she voted differently from the western powers.

the United States were involved, she fell in line with the latter. On the Korean question for example, whereas earlier, her support to the west-sponsored resolutions was cautious, in 1953 she voted for the US resolution [711-A(VII)] on the membership of the Political Conference on Korea, which sought in effect to exclude India from it. It may be recalled that before Pakistan's vote on this resolution, her name also was suggested by North Korea and the People's Republic of China along with three other neutral Asian countries for the membership of the same conference. But afterwards she was excluded.<sup>80</sup> Again, whereas in the past, she used to advocate the representation of communist China in the United Nations, since 1954 she has been voting constantly with the United States (except in 1957 when she abstained on the Indian amendment to the United States resolution) for the postponement of the consideration of this issue by the General Assembly. During the Suez crisis, although she voted always with the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations, the tone of her delegate's speech was milder than that of many others in the group. Even outside the United Nations, her government's reaction was not in conformity with the popular feelings which rose to a high pitch of sympathy for the Egyptians and of condemnation of the aggressors.<sup>81</sup> On the Hungarian question, Pakistan has voted constantly and consistently with the United States. She was one of the few Asian countries who had welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East.<sup>82</sup> She also lent support to the United States and Britain on the issue of complaints by Lebanon and Jordan against the alleged intervention by the United Arab Republic which had led to the landing of American marines in Lebanon and British

80. Ahmad, n. 42, p. 95.

81. The Government's attitude was typified in her offer of mediation between Egypt and Britain which the former turned down. See 'Pakistan, Rebuffs from Egypt,' *Round Table*, 186 (March 1957). The people's reaction was typified in the editorial remarks of *Dawn*, 1 November 1956.

82. Other countries who had accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine were Iraq, Iran and Lebanon.



forces in Jordan.<sup>83</sup>

Besides Pakistan's voting-record at the UN, several public statements by her leaders in the government declaring her firm friendship, faithfulness and sincerity, for her allies,<sup>84</sup> her unflinching support for the 'free world' with herself acting as the 'citadel' of anti-communism in this region,<sup>85</sup> can also be adduced to prove that on the questions involving the west versus the east, and even on some of those affecting the United States and Arab-Asian countries, Pakistan had ceased to a large extent to take an independent stand or to exercise her free judgement.

In 1958, there was a dramatic change in Pakistan. On 7 October, by an order of President Iskandar Mirza, the Constitution of Pakistan (which had been in force only for two and a half years) was abrogated, Parliament was dissolved, and Martial Law was proclaimed throughout the country. General Ayub Khan was appointed the Chief Martial Law Administrator.<sup>86</sup> Soon after, on 27 October 1958, Ayub Khan himself took over the office of President.

In the field of foreign affairs, the new military regime reaffirmed the desire to honour all the past commitments of Pakistan and to remain faithful to her allies.<sup>87</sup> She continued to be a member of the SEATO and CENTO. The military pact with the United States was intact and operative. She remained a member of the Commonwealth. Her voting behaviour in the United Nations also conformed to the old pattern. To take only a few instances, she voted in favour of the resolution on Tibet (1959) which was supported by the western bloc but

83. United Nations, *General Assembly Official Records*, Third Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly (21 August 1958), pp. 8-10.

84. 'Of Our Foreign Policy the Watchword is Sincerity.' Budget speech of Pir Ali Muhammad Rashidi, Government of Pakistan, *Foreign Relations* (Karachi, 1956), p. 60.

85. Zafrullah Khan's statement, *Amrit Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), 12 December 1953.

86. Text of the President's Proclamation issued on 7 October 1958. Callard, n. 15, Appendix I, p. 39.

87. *President Speaks* (Lahore, 1959), p. 39.

on which most of the Afro-Asian group abstained.<sup>88</sup> Again at both the 14th and 15th sessions she voted against the consideration of the representation of People's China in the United Nations by the General Assembly. At the 15th Session she voted for the Argentinian amendment to the five-power resolution which was supported by the Afro-Asian group but against which the western bloc had tried to marshall all its voting strength.<sup>89</sup> The latest instance has been the Pakistan government's silence over the invasion of Cuba by rebel groups from US soil aided by the US government, when most of the Afro-Asian countries were critical of the United States' conduct.

Since 1959 relations with India have improved relatively. The atmosphere had been considerably toned up by the successful conclusion of the Indus Waters Treaty<sup>90</sup> and the agreements on the borders between the two countries. The flow of trade also improved. On Kashmir, though Pakistan's basic stand remained unchanged President Ayub Khan expressed willingness to consider even an alternative method other than the plebiscite, to test the wishes of the people of Kashmir.<sup>91</sup> He also threw up a proposal for some kind of a defence arrangement between India and Pakistan which would relieve both the countries of the cost of maintaining large armies in Kashmir.<sup>92</sup> Agreements have been reached on refugee-rehabilitation and the minority problem and steady progress

88. Resolution No. 1353 (XIV), United Nations, General Assembly Official Records, 834th Meeting (21 October 1959).

89. The Five-Power Resolution had requested the Heads of the US and Soviet governments to meet and discuss the problems of world peace. U.N. Document No. A/4522; Argentina had requested for a division on the words referring to US President and Soviet Prime Minister. See Roll Calls, G.A./XV/2; G.A./XV/3. United Nations, *The Chronicle of United Nations Activities* (New York, 1960), p. 2638.

90. The Indus Waters Treaty was signed on 19 September 1960. *Pakistan Times*, 20 September 1960.

91. President Ayub's statement at Dacca on 22 March 1961. *Dawn*, 23 March 1961.

92. President Ayub's statement at Dacca on 21 January 1960. *Dawn*, 22 January 1960.

was reported on the question of Evacuee Property.<sup>93</sup> The Indo-Pakistan Information Consultative Committee which met in New Delhi on 28 April 1960 urged upon the Press in both countries not to indulge in mutual recriminations.<sup>94</sup> However, the relations between the two countries still continue to be bedevilled by mutual distrust, and recently, they have again become strained. President Ayub's overtures on Kashmir had already caused some anxiety among the Azad Kashmir leaders and a section of the people in West Pakistan, but India's studied coolness, towards these has incensed the Pakistan government as well. To allay the fears of these people that Pakistan's position on Kashmir might be compromised and also to divert their attention from its failure to ameliorate substantially the socio-economic conditions of the masses, the government has been led to making some strong statements on Kashmir and on the alleged sense of insecurity among the Muslims in India.<sup>95</sup> Secondly, the occurrence of communal riots in India and their repercussions in Pakistan between February and May 1961 have further aggravated the tension. On the Indian side the government as well as the people have been 'irritated' by Pakistan's proposal to China on the border demarcation of northern Kashmir and by the threatening tone of the Pakistani leaders' recent speeches on Kashmir.<sup>96</sup> Consequently, strong sentiments have been expressed in the press

93. See the statement issued from New Delhi on the agreement reached between the two countries on the Evacuee Movable Property. *Statesman* (New Delhi), 22 April 1958.

94. See Joint Communiqué issued by the Committee on 29 April, *Statesman*, 30 April 1960.

95. The columns of *Dawn* and *Pakistan Times* between March and May 1961 carried several speeches by Ayub Khan, Qadir, Bhutto, Azam and the Azad Kashmir leaders—Khurshid and Abbas—strongly reiterating their position and resolve on Kashmir. Statements on the minority situation in India appeared in the Pakistan press after the communal riots in Jabalpur in February 1961. Later two more communal riots broke out in Moradabad and Lucknow.

96. These provoked Prime Minister Nehru to issue a rejoinder that no talks could be held with Pakistan on Kashmir until the aggression was vacated. *Statesman*, 1 July 1961.

on both sides, thus charging the air with some uneasiness.

Thus, it is clear that the Revolution of 1958 in Pakistan has not produced any marked change in her foreign policy. Nevertheless, there have been, recently, certain indications of the possibility of a slow movement away from her committed position to a more independent position. The ruffled reaction of the government and the people over the U-2 incident, in which a Pakistani airfield was reported to have been used;<sup>97</sup> the new oil deal with the Soviet Union, her attitude on the Congo crisis, President Ayub's recent remarks in London on the need for China's representation at both the disarmament conference and the United Nations<sup>98</sup> and his attempt to reach an understanding with China over the northern frontiers of Azad Kashmir,<sup>99</sup> are some of the pointers to the new shift. Probably it is being realised in Pakistan that her close adherence to the western bloc has, on the one hand, alienated her from several of the Afro-Asian countries, including the Arab World, and on the other it has not brought to her any special benefits.<sup>100</sup> The rise of Soviet power with its inevitable repercussions on the international situation, and the recent open threats of Khrushchov that US military bases will be blown off as the first retaliatory measure, in the event of a serious provocation,<sup>101</sup> have caused some rethinking in Rawalpindi regarding its ties with the United States. Further, the change-over to the new Kennedy administration with its greater emphasis on economic offensive than on military aid to fight communism in Asia and Africa and its benevolent and friendly attitude towards India,<sup>102</sup> aroused some doubts among the

97. *Dawn*, 14 May 1960.

98. *Dawn*, 18 March 1961.

99. *Dawn*, 16 January 1961.

100. 'Is it worthwhile to glory in alliances that have hardly brought us any more benefit, in terms of either economic or military aid or of support for our causes than what the neutralist denouncers of pacts and alliances have been given by the same sources?' *Dawn*, 1 January 1961.

101. *Statesman*, 10 May 1960.

102. Averell Hariman's speech at the Bureau of Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi, reported in *Statesman*, 23 March 1961.



Pakistanis about their foreign policy.<sup>103</sup> She may not give up military alliances since in President Ayub's view, they need not, necessarily, either hinder the improvement of relations with neutral or communist countries or curb greater assertiveness and the pursuit of a relatively more independent policy on the international plane.<sup>104</sup> Probably, starting with the same premise he had thought that a defence understanding between India and Pakistan and the establishment of good relations with China were not impracticable. Therefore, it may be envisaged that in future her relations with Asian countries might improve.<sup>105</sup>

Thus, a certain amount of political stability at home and the realisation that Pakistan's trade and economy have to be more diversified and broadbased,<sup>106</sup> as well as the conclusion of agreements on several issues with India, the change in world strategy and balance of power and the emergence of the non-aligned Afro-Asian group into new prominence, might be suggested as some of the plausible explanations for the new trend in Pakistan's foreign policy.

### III

Though Pakistan claims to adhere to the ideology of 'Islamic socialism' it considers it as an 'alternative' to both capitalism and communism.<sup>107</sup> Her foreign policy has so far

103. 'In short, should not our aim be to look for ways and means for gradual and unobtrusive disengagement from the now no longer profitable or even esteemed role of a committed nation?' *Dawn*, 1 January 1961; also the editorial in *Dawn*, 22 March 1961.

104. *Pakistan Times*, 19 March 1961.

105. Solution of the Kashmir dispute is the primary condition of any improvement in the relations with India. Here it is difficult to see how else it can be solved peacefully, unless the two parties agree to transforming the existing armistice line into an international boundary with minor adjustments.

106. Editorial remarks in *Pakistan Times*, 22 March 1961.

107. '...and show the world both by precept and example that the remedy for its ills lies neither in communism nor in capitalism but in Islamic socialism with its emphasis on democracy, social justice and universal brotherhood.' Speech by Fazlur Rahman at Motamar conference. *Dawn*, 10 February 1951.

been based more on empiricism than on any ideology. Her alliance with the western bloc was more a product of the forces working inside the country and of a practical calculation based on her requirements than a result of an ideological identification with the west.

It was the realisation of her isolation<sup>108</sup> and the inadequacy of her own resources to guarantee her security<sup>109</sup> in the context of her relations with India; the economic crisis which had created a serious distress among the people; and the political instability owing to the lack of any broad-based political party or strong leadership after Liaquat Ali's death (that could give a bold direction to the nation) which impelled the new government in 1953 to seek the support of an outside power. By a process of elimination it was concluded that an alliance with the United States alone could provide the government with the necessary prestige and the country with sufficient economic, military and political support.<sup>110</sup> The growing influence of the civil servants in the politics of the country, who, along with the political leaders (because of their western education and training) felt an intellectual affinity with the west, and the preponderance of the feudal elements in the government, facilitated the ties with the United States. Externally, among the factors which proved conducive to this alliance were: the sharp Indian reaction to press-rumours about a possible US-Pakistan military pact which, in turn, aroused the opposite reaction in Pakistan owing to suspicion

108. 'Indeed, widespread feeling of frustration, here, has been due, among other reasons, to increasing realisation during the past years that Pakistan was gradually becoming friendless and isolated.' *Dawn*, 9 December 1953.

109. 'Even with 70 per cent of the revenue budget allocated to defence, Pakistan's frontiers were not secure against violation by her neighbours.' Ahmad, n. 42, 140.

110. '...it (the alliance with us) will underwrite our existence and we shall have an ally to depend upon in times of stress and storm...' *Times of Karachi*, 7 December 1953. 'I venture to think that it is perhaps the most effective step ever taken to ensure security and progress of the country since the establishment of Pakistan.' Mohammad Ali, *Pakistan, Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates*, I (1954), p. 283.

of Indian motives;<sup>111</sup> the popular belief that the United States, though a western power was not colonial in the traditional sense;<sup>112</sup> and the 610,000 ton wheat gift from the United States at a time of acute shortage in Pakistan.<sup>113</sup>

But, still, this pact and the subsequent military alliances like the Baghdad Pact and the SEATO did not escape strong criticism and stern warnings from quite a sizable and important section of the press and informed public opinion such as *Pakistan Times*,<sup>114</sup> the Azad Pakistan Party,<sup>115</sup> the Awami Muslim League<sup>116</sup> and the National Awami Party.<sup>117</sup> They cautioned the government against mortgaging Pakistan's freedom—a reaction natural to a people who, only few years ago, had won it from a leading western power. Sensitive and zealous of their independence Pakistanis also, like most other peoples in Asia and Africa, want to steer clear of the power-blocs or embroilment in the cold war.<sup>118</sup> However, the nature of leadership, the alienation between the government and the people, the absence of a strong socio-economic base,<sup>119</sup> the ineffectiveness of progressive socialist forces in the country, and the people's extreme obsession with their little cold war with India pushed them in a different direction. Nevertheless,

111. M. A. Choudhary, 'Military Pacts, Pakistan and Kashmir,' *Pakistan Review* (Lahore), 5 (February 1957), p. 11.

112. M. M. Daultana's speech in *Dawn*, 11 December 1956, quoted by Callard, n. 6, p. 2.

113. G. W. Choudhary, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan* (New York, 1958), p. 7.

114. See for example editorial remarks in *Pakistan Times*, 31 January 1953.

115. *Dawn*, 27 November 1953.

116. So long as the Awami League was in opposition, it remained opposed to the alignment policy. But when Suhrawardy was summoned to form the government in September 1956, he defended this policy. The Suez crisis caused a split in the party and the more radical elements led by Maulana Bhasani formed a new party called the National Awami Party. Callard, n. 6, pp. 24-5.

117. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

118. 'As a new born country we are perhaps more cautious in this respect, the more as the history of political relationship between the erstwhile imperialist power and nations of Asia justifies our being extra-cautious in this matter.' An article by Ghulam Mohammad, the Governor General of Pakistan, *Dawn*, 8 August 1951.

119. Sisir Gupta, *India's Relations with Pakistan* (New Delhi, 1958), p. 52.

since the very beginning of the negotiation for the pact with the United States, the successive Pakistan governments were hard put to declare, time and again, that they would not accept any aid with strings, that no military bases were to be given to the United States,<sup>120</sup> that she did not belong to the 'American system of alliances'<sup>121</sup> and that the defence commitments did not cover the area beyond the boundaries of Pakistan.<sup>122</sup> In spite of these utterances, however, Pakistan found it difficult to resist the politico-economic pressure to follow a pro-west policy on important world issues, though in respect of several other problems she acted like a nonaligned country. This latter fact was true particularly in respect of colonial questions, and apartheid, on which her delegates even attacked US policies bitterly.<sup>123</sup> On some minor issues as well, for example, on the resolutions in which China was condemned for violation of the Korean truce agreement,<sup>124</sup> and on the Soviet package-proposal for the admission of new States to the United Nations, Pakistan voted<sup>125</sup> independently.

Moreover, her alignment was not based on a genuine anti-communism. The occasional flurry of anti-communist statements and the pledge to defend freedom, democracy and individual liberty were more in the nature of lip-service to

120. Mohammad Ali at a Press Conference, *Dawn*, 18 December 1953.

121. At London, Mohammad Ali remarked that Pakistan had signed the pact with Turkey and SEATO because 'we believe in arrangements for security' and not because 'we are part and parcel of the American system of alliances.' *Dawn*, 3 October 1954.

122. Mohammad Ali at a Press Conference, *Dawn*, 18 December 1953. The South East Asia Treaty, however, involves commitments for Pakistan, contrary to the above assurance.

123. 'We mourn and lament the attitude of the USA displayed by them recently towards humanitarian problems in general and towards the liberty and freedom of mankind in particular. It is a pity that the statue of liberty should crumble to pieces. How have the mighty fallen...' quoted from the Pakistani delegate's speech at the UN by Marcelle Hitschmann in *Pakistan Times*, 14 August 1954. Also see Zafrullah's speech in the Security Council, reported in *Dawn*, 19 April 1954.

124. *United Nations Year Book* (1953), p. 152.

125. *Dawn*, 4 November 1954.



their allies.<sup>126</sup> The intelligentsia in Pakistan has been fairly appreciative of Soviet support for the freedom of colonies<sup>127</sup> and racial equality. They were also impressed by the quick economic progress of the Soviet Union.<sup>128</sup> Nor do they entertain any genuine fear of a communist attack from the Soviet Union and China.<sup>129</sup> The only occasions when their concern for their northern borders was seriously aroused were when the Soviet Union supported India on Kashmir<sup>130</sup> and Afghanistan on Pukhtoonistan.<sup>131</sup> But both these followed rather than preceded the US-Pakistan military agreement. Thus in Pakistan's view her alignment was limited in purpose;<sup>132</sup> it was more military in character than political since it did not necessarily entail an automatic and total support for the western stand on all issues.

From the above analysis of the motivations and the nature of Pakistan's military alliances two principal conclusions can be drawn.

Firstly, her alignment is pragmatic and therefore limited in its nature and purpose. Pakistan is more aligned with the United States than with the western bloc as such. Also, in

126. The real motive, more often, was to obtain greater economic and military aid from the western powers on the pretext of the need to strengthen Pakistan against communist threat. For example, see Mohammad Ali's speech at St. Louis, Missouri, United States, Dawn, 10 October 1954.

127. 'The Troubled Belt,' editorial in Dawn, 14 February 1952.

128. See statement by G. M. Syed, member of the Pakistan delegation to the International Economic Conference at Moscow. Dawn, 14 February 1952.

129. At a press conference at Houston, Texas, United States when asked if he anticipated any trouble from Russia, Liaquat Ali replied in the negative. Hindu, 23 May 1950; '...when I have nothing against them (Russia and China) why should they be against us.' Pakistan Prime Minister's statement in the Parliament on 25 February 1957, quoted by Sisir Gupta, n. 119, p. 54.

130. Khrushchov's speech at Srinagar, Dawn, 11 December 1955.

131. Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin's speech at Kabul: 'We have sympathy for Afghanistan's attitude to the Pukhtoonistan problem and think that Pushtos should be consulted on the solution of the problem.' Pakistan Times, 11 May 1955.

132. 'Such pacts and alliances have only limited purposes...and economic collaboration with the Soviet bloc, shows that the earlier rigidity of our western commitments was mistaken as well as unwise and against national interest.' Dawn, 7 March 1961.

her mind, membership of the military alliances was intended more to build up her own economic, military and political power *vis-a-vis* her close neighbours than to contribute to the defence of the 'free world' or the containment of international communism.<sup>133</sup> Thus, her status in the western camp is different not only from that of its American and European members, but also from Turkey, the Philippines and Thailand.

Secondly, her alignment is more a commitment of the government than of the people. Her people are averse to involvement in the east-west tension. They do desire to be prosperous and strong enough to defend themselves and to secure justice from India,<sup>134</sup> and, for these limited aims, they may readily accept foreign assistance. But they are also suspicious of the west and abhor any alliance implying ulterior political or military commitments. Since the common man has not been given the opportunity to participate freely in a national election, he has been able to exercise neither judgement nor influence on the government's policies. With the solution of the Kashmir dispute, the easing of tension between India and Pakistan, the creation of a stronger socio-economic base and the institution of a government truly representative of and more responsive to the people, it may be expected that the trend towards nonalignment will grow.

133. This is the clear implication of Sir Zafrullah's statement that if it were possible Pakistan would be neutral. 'Neutrality is not a matter which can be secured by a country alone. Every state would like to be neutral but neighbours do not let it be free.' *Dawn*, 27 February 1953. The following statement of Mohammad Ali also brings out the real purpose of the alliance with the west. 'Sir, the question of our obtaining US assistance is that we find that our own resources have been continually strained to the utmost extent for the purpose of ensuring our sovereignty, the integrity and independence of our country [possibly against violation by India] and we feel that our independence is more valuable to us than anything else including our lives.' Pakistan, Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates, I (1954), p. 620, also see Mohammad Ali's press conference, *Dawn*, 18 December 1953.

134. See A. E. H. Jaffer's statement, Pakistan, Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates, I (1954), p. 556.

Belgrade

## New Phase

D. N. Mallik

### I

#### BACKGROUND TO BELGRADE

THE CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF nonaligned countries held in Belgrade from 1-6 September 1961 can be regarded as a landmark in the evolution of the policy of nonalignment. This conference, the 'first concerted action of the nonaligned countries',<sup>1</sup> was initiated under 'the conviction that nonalignment has become a growing force in the world... and that time has now come to gather this force together, to turn it into a coordinated accumulated moral force.'<sup>2</sup> The first suggestion for such a conference is reported to have emanated from Marshal Tito in the year 1959.<sup>3</sup>

The experiences in the Congo and Algeria led Nkrumah of Ghana to sound the idea of a conference of all noncommitted countries, particularly of Asia and Africa on 4 July 1960. The fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly added especially to the conviction that a get-together of the nonaligned nations would contribute to the cause of peace. The meeting of the Casablanca Powers in January, 1961, further strengthened this feeling. In March, 1961, President

1. President Tito's statement at the opening of the Belgrade Conference, *vide*, *Belgrade Conference* (Belgrade, 1961), p. 17.

2. President Soekarno's speech, *Ibid.*, p. 25.

3. K. P. Karunakaran, 'Background to the Neutral Nations' Summit,' *U.S.I. Journal* (Delhi) LXXXX (384), p. 175.

Soekarno sent letters to heads of other governments suggesting a Bandung type get-together to which might be added those governments in other continents which could 'support the liquidation of colonialism and imperialism in the shortest possible time.' Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of People's Republic of China, during his visit to Indonesia in April, 1961, welcomed the idea. But the Indian Prime Minister was less enthusiastic, for, according to him, such a conference at the moment was 'likely to result more in the show of disunity than unity.'<sup>4</sup> Nehru's rejection of the idea, however, left the scope for thinking that while a territorial conference might not be desirable, a conference on the basis of nonaligned foreign policies was, nevertheless, desirable and possible. When President Tito met President Nasser in April, 1961, during the former's visit to the UAR, they finally took the decision to sound other nonaligned governments on the idea of a conference of nonaligned nations. The UAR and Yugoslavia jointly sponsored a proposal that a conference of the heads of states and chiefs of governments of the uncommitted nations be held before the opening of the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 16 September 1961. The joint-communique issued at the end of this meeting between the two leaders said, *inter alia*:

The two Presidents expressed their deep concern over the unfavourable development of international relations and over the dangerous aggravation of the situation caused by recent developments.

In this connection, the two Presidents held the view that consultations among the nonaligned countries are indispensable for consolidating world peace, safeguarding the independence of all nations and eliminating the danger of intervention in their affairs.

These consultations should also aim at fostering economic, cultural and technical cooperation for the benefit of their peoples and the world community.<sup>5</sup>

4. 'Invitations to Cairo', *Guardian* (Manchester), 10 May 1961.

5. Quoted in the *Arab Observer* (Cairo), II (20), 14 May 1961, pp. 14-15.



The communique also clearly reflected concern of the two leaders over American aggression in Cuba, disarmament, Algerian independence, Palestine, Laotian neutrality, the Congo and the urgent necessity to liquidate colonialism in all its forms.<sup>6</sup> The communique further suggested 'consultations among the nonaligned countries' on the following problems: (i) world peace; (ii) liquidation of colonialism and imperialism; and (iii) economic and technical cooperation. Shortly after, the two Presidents issued a joint-letter to the leaders of non-aligned nations proposing the conference and suggesting therein that it had to be so organised as to have 'a salutary effect' on the UN General Assembly meeting in its sixteenth session.<sup>7</sup>

While a large number of the nonaligned nations were enthusiastic of the proposal, some did appear cautious and reserved. The Foreign Ministers of Guinea, Mali and Ghana, who were attending the Conference of the African Charter Nations at Cairo, gave enthusiastic, ready response to the proposal. Indonesia was so keen on the idea that it sent Mrs. Supenei as Ambassador-at-Large to Cambodia, Burma, Ceylon and the UAR to canvass support for the conference.<sup>8</sup> A meeting of the Presidents of Indonesia, Guinea and UAR on 16 May 1961 revealed much the same thing but countries like India and Burma, while welcoming the idea of the conference, did not appear to favour the formation of a third bloc, of using the conference as a forum to ventilate the grievances of individual nations. They also did not want to antagonize the west through excessive vilification on grounds of colonialism. India wanted the conference to be primarily concerned with problems of international relations relating to war and peace. India and Afghanistan, however, joined the UAR, Yugoslavia and Indonesia in sponsoring the conference.

Originally 22 nations were to attend the preparatory meet-

6. *Hindu* (Madras), 24 April 1961.

7. *Arab Observer* (Cairo), 14 May 1961, pp. 14-15.

8. K. C. Khanna in the *Times of India* (Delhi), 6 May 1961.

ing. But only 20 of them actually attended it. They were Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan, the UAR, Yemen and Yugoslavia. Brazil sent an observer and Mexico, though welcoming the idea of a nonaligned nations' conference, declined to attend the preparatory meeting. Differences of opinion appeared on a number of issues that came up for deliberation and decision at the meeting. Of the 8 items on the agenda for the meeting, the composition of the conference, seating of the Algerian Provisional Government and the Stanleyville Government of Congo at the preparatory conference and the drafting of the conference agenda were the most important. Ghana's proposal for inviting the Algerian Provisional Government and the Stanleyville Government of Antoine Gizenga brought the differences to the surface. For some of the participating countries who had been previously assured that countries which they had not recognised would not be invited to the conference, this discussion seemed to cause considerable embarrassment. But despite their firm stand it seemed difficult for the effervescent Afro-Arab nationalism to exclude Algeria, for Algerian participation would, according to it, strengthen the Algerian struggle for independence. Algeria was admitted to the meeting on the third day. But the majority at the meeting agreed on the non-participation of the Congo and decided to wait for the final nature of the Congolese delegation to the conference.

The preparatory meeting could not finalise the composition of the conference, though broad principles were agreed upon. A five-point definition of nonalignment was drawn up on the basis of which the list of participants was to be decided upon. The actual task of choosing the invitees was left to the Committee of Ambassadors of the 20 nations.

The criteria contained in the five-point definition were the following:<sup>9</sup> (i) the country should be following an indepen-

9. *Statesman* (New Delhi), 12 June 1961.

dent policy based on nonalignment and peaceful coexistence; (ii) it should support anti-colonial liberation movements; (iii) it should not be a member of military pacts in the context of the east-west struggle; (iv) it should not be a member of a bilateral military pact with a big power in the context of the east-west struggle; and (v) it should grant no military bases to foreign powers. This five-point definition was a compromise between the 'moderates' and the 'militants'. In order to have a proper understanding of this compromise, a brief account of the divergent attitudes towards the question of defining a non-aligned country will not be out of place.

The formula put forward by Indonesia—'having no foreign military bases on their territories and joining no military bloc'—enjoyed considerable popularity. To this, however, Guinea had added two other conditions: that a country should issue an official statement declaring that it is nonaligned and that it should apply this policy in the internal and in the international fields. These two conditions obviously made the definition more rigid and implied that neo-colonial trends in countries like those of the Monrovia group or the clearly anti-communist stand as in case of Malaya would disqualify them. Mali's insistence, shared by the majority, that a nonaligned country must needs be committed to help the struggle for political independence and economic development would have certainly excluded European countries like Sweden, Finland and Ireland.

The attitudes of India, Nepal, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Burma were more flexible. India stood for a flexible definition, capable of maximum accommodation. India was persuaded to adopt the stand on the following grounds: (1) it would be more profitable to keep the definition very broad-based at this stage of the growth of nonalignment; (2) such a definition would mean positive encouragement to the countries on the border-line of nonalignment; (3) certain countries that had involuntarily become party to military pacts with their previous colonial masters are potentially nonaligned; (4) some of the newly independent countries had to continue with the

old economic ties they had with the colonial powers and they had therefore to cooperate with them necessarily; (5) some of these countries were having foreign military bases as a condition to the attainment of their independence; and (6) quite a considerable number of Latin American and European neutralist countries could contribute to the expansion of the area of nonalignment. The logic contained in these arguments could hardly be ignored, for some of the countries at the preparatory meeting itself were having foreign military bases,<sup>10</sup> some like Ceylon had foreign bases in no remote past and had gradually got rid of them as Tunisia was trying at the moment; countries like India, Ceylon and Ghana had continued cooperating with the UK and that Ireland had played a helpful role in solving the Congolese crisis. To cite yet another example, Finland's neutrality means 'a policy of maintaining the security of the country by keeping it outside the conflicts of interests of the big powers, rather than aligning it with one big power or a group of powers against another.... Finland refuses to take sides in the controversies of the cold war.... This does not, however, mean a sterile withdrawal from international life.'<sup>11</sup>

The 'five-point definition' was thus a compromise between differing points of view in several ways. While it laid down that a country should be following an independent policy based on nonalignment and peaceful coexistence, it did not uphold the Guinean view that a country should issue an official statement declaring that it is nonaligned. While it provided that a country to be considered as nonaligned should not be a member of any military pact, multilateral or bilateral, this provision held good not in a general way but only in reference to 'the east-west struggle.' Lastly, in respect of foreign military bases, the term 'grant' was employed to exclude the hard cases of involuntary acceptance of them in the

10. Martin Moore, *Daily Telegraph* (London), 1 September 1961. [Saudi Arabia and Morocco are still affording bases to the United States.]

11. Ralf Törnqner, 'Neutrality of Finland,' *Foreign Affairs* (New York), 39(4), July 1961, pp. 601-609.



process of colonial emancipation. These compromises themselves indicated an over-all flexibility and moderation. Besides, there was a general understanding that these criteria were to be applied liberally.

The general discussion at the preparatory meeting revealed the mind of the participating nations as to the purpose of the conference. They were clear on the point that no third 'bloc' or 'force' was being aimed at since nonalignment stood for 'depolarization,' as an Indonesian official put it. In the words of the communique issued by the preparatory meeting, 'With the holding of such a conference, positive results could be achieved in the interests of world peace, effective international cooperation, and the realisation of the aspirations of millions of people for independence and a better and happier future.'<sup>12</sup> The Indian view had been for discussion of global rather than local issues, and the draft agenda, which was later adopted almost *verbatim* by the conference, reflected the primary concern of the conference with problems of war and peace. The agenda gave key importance to the question of the 'consolidation and strengthening of international peace and security.'<sup>13</sup> Imperialism was regarded as the pristine factor contributing to the outbreak of wars. The final communique contained expressions like 'respect of the right of peoples and nations to self-determination,' support to the 'struggle against imperialism' and the 'liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism.' There were also references about 'non-interference and non-intervention,' reflecting concern over US role in Cûba, France's excesses in Bizerta and Belgium's activities in the Congo. References to racial discrimination, disarmament—'general and complete'—peaceful coexistence and the United Nations appeared only in the context of these expressions of concern for the maintenance of world peace. These were the common problems of concern of the nonaligned nations and, therefore, they constituted the common ground among them. 'Problems of unequal economic development'

12. *Belgrade Conference, op. cit.*, p. 15.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

and 'improvement of international economic and technical co-operation' indicated another major common ground among the nonaligned nations.

It is interesting to note that nonalignment derived some meaning also from the decisions on the venue and the time of the conference. As reported in the press there came up several choices for the venue—Havana, New Delhi, Belgrade and even New York and Stockholm. Cuba's suggestion that the conference be held at Havana as it was the centre of struggle against the US imperialism was practically ignored by all, revealing the unwillingness of the nonaligned countries to take extreme positions. India herself did not favour New Delhi as the venue of the conference. The choice of Belgrade may be regarded as a tribute to the genuinely nonaligned character of the Yugoslav government. The choice of the date—1 September 1961—signified the common desire of all nonaligned nations to make the weight of their deliberations felt by the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly which was scheduled to meet on 16 September 1961.

The 20-nation Ambassadors' Committee, entrusted with the task of finalising the list of invitees, started work on 21 June 1961 at Cairo. The main question with which this committee was faced was how to interpret and apply the five-point definition. It was at this stage alone the degree of flexibility and accommodativeness imparted by the preparatory meeting could be ascertained. While the Ambassadors were generally agreed upon seeking a further expansion of the nonaligned area, there continued to be divergence of opinions between countries like India and on the one hand Burma (the 'liberals'), and Cuba, Ceylon and the UAR on the other, which were not willing to permit any major dilution of principles on which nonalignment is based. India advocated the inclusion of Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico and Brazil from Latin America; Lebanon, Jordan and Malaya from Asia; Tunisia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Upper Volta and Togo from Africa; Sweden, Ireland and Finland from Europe and also Cyprus. As the deliberations at the Ambassadors'

level continued, it became clear that within the genus 'neutralism' there were several species, e.g., positive neutralism, progressive neutralism, nonalignment, the uncommitted and the disengaged.<sup>14</sup> While the 'orthodox' and 'liberal' currents were facing each other in respect of the application of the five-point definition, it was reported that Prime Minister Nehru of India addressed personal messages to Tito and Nasser wherein he is reported to have stated that it was not enough for the so-called neutralist nations to be nonaligned to power-blocs but that they should be nonaligned among themselves.<sup>15</sup> Tito, in his reply to Nehru, agreed that the conference should be broad-based.<sup>16</sup> At the early stage, eight more countries were selected to be invited. They were Lebanon, Bolivia, Ecuador, Togoland, Upper Volta, Nigeria, Mexico and Brazil. Togoland, Nigeria and Mexico did not, however, accept the invitation.<sup>17</sup> Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador agreed to send observers. After a lot of haggling, invitations were issued also to Tunisia and Cyprus. Thus 28 countries in all agreed to participate in the Belgrade Conference. Among them, 25 were full-fledged participants and 3 preferred to remain as observers. Compared to the participation at the preparatory meeting, there was now the addition of the Congo, Cyprus, the Lebanon, Tunisia, Yemen, Bolivia and Ecuador. This meant an addition of one-third more to the number. Apart from Togoland, Nigeria and Mexico, who while associating themselves with the spirit of nonalignment, expressed their inability to attend, the countries whose case had been put forward but were excluded were Malaya, Jordan, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Ireland, Finland, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica. Among these Malaya and Sweden chose to keep themselves out while deliberations on them were continuing. On the whole, the Ambassadors' Committee did commendable work in as much as it indicated the inherent tendency of nonalignment to expand.

14. *Statesman* (New Delhi), 24 June 1961.

15. *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 28 July 1961.

16. K. Rangaswami in the *Hindu* (Madras), 3 August 1961.

17. *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 8 July 1961.

## II

## ORGANISATION OF CONFERENCE

The composition of the Belgrade Conference may be looked at from several angles in so far as its bearings on nonalignment are concerned. It represented about one-third of mankind and thus clearly demonstrated the weight of nonalignment as a force in world politics. It reflected three varying shades of nonalignment: nonalignment of the Left, of the Right and of the Centre. Guinea, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Algeria and Indonesia belonged to the Left; the UAR, Ceylon, Morocco, Mali, Saudi Arabia, Congo, Yemen and Ghana belonged to the Centre; and India, Burma, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Somalia, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Iraq and Nepal belonged to the Right. These categories ought not to indicate any rigid classification because they reflect at best their degree of inclination towards the east, away from the east towards the west, and between the two. Such a classification, however, would be hazardous since most of those belonging to the Left and Centre did so mainly on account of their abhorrence of western imperialism and not on account of any affiliations with the communist bloc. In the actual conduct of the conference, however, India, the UAR, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Ghana constituted the 'international oligarchy,' to borrow Schwarzenberger's expression.<sup>18</sup> They were the big five at the conference.

It was very significant that the conference had the character of a summit—the fact that most of the participating countries were represented by their chief executives. Most of the delegations included some of the ablest men with considerable experience in international affairs. Where the chief executives were not personally in a position to attend, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, Cuba, Iraq and Yemen, they sent their personal representatives. Absence of the Iraqi Premier was of some significance. It was reported that Iraq's Premier was

18. George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger (ed.), *Power Politics* (London, 1951), pp. 122-24.



from the very beginning unwilling to face Nasser.<sup>19</sup> The fact that Cuba was represented by President Torrado and not by Premier Castro diminished the influence of Cuba's delegation. The chief executives represented several types: Prime Ministers, elected Presidents, and hereditary Emperors and Kings.

Like any other major international conference, the Belgrade Conference bore the impact of its leading personalities and, therefore, an examination of the role that each played is important in understanding the real nature and significance of the conference. Nehru, Tito, Nasser, Soekarno and Nkrumah were the dominating figures at the conference. It was only natural that their perception of things, their ways of thinking, their statesmanship varied and, accordingly, influenced the conference in different directions. And this in turn was determined not only by the personality of each of them, but also by their understanding of the problems their respective countries faced. The political importance which each of the countries enjoyed in international relations was also a further factor determining the role of their leaders at the conference. For example, Nehru derived considerable strength from the fact that in terms of population, India is nearly equal to all the other Belgrade nations taken together.<sup>20</sup> As the most important leader in the Arab world Nasser was a significant figure at the conference.

### III

#### AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS

A careful scrutiny of the speeches delivered at the conference once again revealed the differences in views given expression to at Cairo. Nehru wanted top priority to be given to the question of the threat to world peace and security arising from the conflict between the two power blocs on the Berlin question. This view was shared by Yugoslavia, the

19. West Asia Correspondent, *Statesman* (New Delhi), 25 May 1961.

20. *National Herald* (Lucknow), 27 August 1961.

UAR, Afghanistan, Burma, Ghana, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nepal, Ceylon, Cyprus, Somalia and the Congo. The anxiety was best reflected in the following words of Prime Minister Nehru:

... Imperialism, colonialism, racialism and the rest — things which are vitally important... are somewhat overshadowed by this crisis. For if war comes all else for the moment goes. Therefore it becomes inevitable for us... to make sure that the dominant note of our thinking and action and what we say and put down is this crisis that confronts humanity.<sup>21</sup>

The priority Indonesia gave to imperialism appealed to the Sudan, Cuba, Tunisia, Cambodia, Morocco, Mali, Guinea and Algeria. The line of this argument was best indicated in the following words of the Indonesian President:

Many problems demand immediate solution, and as long as we fail to get to the source of the tension and strife we shall be working like amateur plumbers, plugging up a leak here only to find a bigger one spurting up behind our very backs, and another, and yet another.

Prevailing world opinion would have us believe that the real source of international tension and strife is ideological conflict between the great powers. I think that is not true. There is the conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination...<sup>22</sup>

Obviously the conference was greatly influenced by the Indian stand. All powers paid attention to the question of economic development of the underdeveloped countries, but Yugoslavia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Guinea and Cuba laid greater emphasis on it. The net result of the deliberations was an elevation of the principle of nonalignment by linking it to the question of international peace and security.

It is extremely significant that with the exceptions of Cuba's attack on the USA, Afro-Arab attacks on France and certain

21. *Belgrade Conference*, op. cit., pp. 107-108.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

conspicuous drifts of Indonesia and Yugoslavia towards the Soviet position, the conference, on the whole, kept itself remarkably balanced by avoiding condemnation of either blocs. Thus it was a clear proof of the fact that even on the collective plane nonalignment is capable of maintaining its poise and judicious balance in assessing the delicate issues of a critical international situation. It may be pointed out in this respect that even the Soviet decision to resume nuclear tests, announced just on the eve of the conference, did not materially change the situation. The west viewed the Soviet decision as 'diplomacy of terror' or 'atomic blackmail,' meant both for the nonaligned countries and the west. Therefore, the poise maintained by the nonaligned countries, in spite of the Soviet announcement on the resumption of tests, appeared to the west as timidity.<sup>23</sup> But the fact is that the nonaligned nations, even though they were alerted and some of them, such as Ceylon, tended to review their earlier attitudes, showed an extraordinary sense of objectivity in viewing this event in its correct perspective<sup>24</sup>—an episode in a sequence or chain of events in the story.

The meaning of nonalignment, as understood by the non-aligned countries themselves, became more clear at the Belgrade Conference than at the preparatory meeting. There was hardly a speech which did not touch on it, and most of the speeches were specifically devoted to explaining it. This reflected the respective national outlooks of the various countries and showed points of uniformity as well as of diversity. They also indicated the major international implications of nonalignment, e.g., its growth as a movement, its crystallisation as a force in international politics, the degree of cohesion in it, the meaning of peaceful coexistence as its medium and an increasing tendency to work in a concerted manner in the United Nations.

23. Robert Bendiner, *New Statesman* (London) LXII (1952), 15 September 1961, pp. 330-31.

24. President Keita's speech on 15 September 1961 — Reported in *National Herald* (Lucknow), 17 September 1961.

The Indonesian stand on nonalignment was rather comprehensive as reflected in Soekarno's words: 'Nonalignment is active devotion to the lofty cause of independence, abiding peace, social justice and the freedom to be free.'<sup>25</sup> Soekarno put the positive meaning of nonalignment in these words and categorically rejected the idea that being nonaligned means becoming a 'buffer state between the two giant blocs.'<sup>26</sup> While all of them denied the mere passivity of nonalignment, Cambodia struck a marked note of divergence from Soekarno's stand when Prince Sihanouk said:

Certain nonaligned friends perhaps consider that the fact of concerting to be a 'buffer'....between the two blocs is indicative of passive neutrality....To be a buffer state is to be in the best position to bring about a reconciliation between our friends in the two blocs by eliminating the causes of friction as much as possible.<sup>27</sup>

While all of them agreed on the contents of nonalignment as 'abiding peace' and 'freedom to be free', i.e. independent judgment of international issues, each on its own merit, Prime Minister Nehru gave expression to a significant section of opinion when he said:

. . The word nonaligned may be differently interpreted but basically it was used, and coined almost, with the meaning nonaligned with the great power blocs of the world. Non-aligned has a negative meaning, but if you give it a positive connotation it means nations which object to this lining-up for war purposes — military blocs, military alliances and the like. Therefore we keep away from this and we want to throw our weight, such as it is, in favour of peace.<sup>28</sup>

There were others like Burma, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and Cambodia who emphasised the balance of impartiality in non-alignment. As the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister put it,

25. *Belgrade Conference, op. cit.*, p. 27.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*, p. 188.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 108.



'Nonalignment means that our souls must be innocent of any bias towards any bloc in a dispute.'<sup>29</sup> Referring to the growth of nonalignment, Nehru said:

Some few years ago — six, seven or eight, if you like — this business of nonalignment was a rare phenomenon . . . the whole course of history of the last few years has shown the growing opinion, the spread of this conception of nonalignment. Why is that so? Because it was in tune with the course of events; it was in tune with the thinking of the vast numbers of people, whether the country concerned was nonaligned or not . . .<sup>30</sup>

Soekarno explained his perception of nonalignment:

We each arrived at this policy inspired by common ideals, prompted by similar circumstances, spurred on by like experiences. There was no attempt at compromise among us, no attempt to round off disagreements to make our policies identical. But not one of us, I think, will deny that we did inspire each other. The experiences of one country in discovering that a policy of nonalignment is the best guarantee for safeguarding our national and international position have undoubtedly helped others to come to a similar conclusion.<sup>31</sup>

He concluded with the remark:

And now we have this present conference . . . to draw the nonaligned countries into a coordinated accumulated moral force in order to help preserve world peace and bring about a new stable equilibrium based on a world order of social justice and prosperity.<sup>32</sup>

As to the degree of cohesion, they were all unanimous that as the underlying urge of nonalignment is 'depolarization,' they stood for common efforts short of forming a 'third bloc' or a 'third force.' The speeches made at the conference also revealed a common awareness that nonalignment should be

29. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

worked out through peaceful coexistence. They were all agreed on the meaning of peaceful coexistence as cooperation between powers irrespective of differences, ideological or otherwise, between their social, political and economic systems. Some laid greater emphasis on opposing colonial imperialist intervention while some others laid greater stress on the need for opposing subversive activities by outside powers. A phenomenon of extraordinary significance, however, was the common awareness that as nonaligned nations their duty was not just to themselves separately or as a group, but towards the whole world which could be served only by maintaining international peace. A trend in the same direction was manifest in a general plea at the conference for the nonaligned nations to work together in the United Nations in a concerted way. But leading participants at the conference like India were anxious that this should in no way be an attempt at forming a third bloc. The desire for peace as a prerequisite of any progress was, however, manifest in the thinking of all. As Prime Minister U Nu said:

The first prerequisite for a sane and sober conduct of negotiations is the restoration of a calm atmosphere, free from frenzy or hysteria. Here the unaligned countries can play a significant role... part of our deliberations be directed towards ways and means of bringing about this cooling-off process.<sup>33</sup>

'Establishment and strengthening of international peace and security' received top consideration at the conference and resulted in the 'Statement on the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace.' Quite a large number of countries at the conference, however, emphasised the existence of imperialism as a cause of world conflict. Generally, the German and the Berlin questions were considered the most urgent. Indonesia and Yugoslavia stood for the recognition of the sovereignty of the two German States, free access to West Berlin and neutralisation of Germany. They were supported by Ghana and some

others. The general opinion, however, was not in favour of going that far.

In respect of disarmament, while the urgent need for immediate negotiations between the two powers was stressed, a new proposal that the nonaligned nations must be entrusted with the powers of international inspection and control was also advocated.

The problem of imperialism was considered in considerable detail. The conference accepted the view that 'neo-colonialism' was a new manifestation of imperialism. In President Soekarno's words:

... The old colonial powers, in having to leave their colonial territories, want to preserve as much as possible of their economic — and sometimes also their political ways: by creating strife among all layers of the local people; by provoking the secession of one part of the old colonial territory from the rest under the pretext of self-determination; creating chaos through military provocation or — and this is also common — by fortifying their economic interests at the last moment, using even the most unscrupulous means.<sup>34</sup>

Thus a large number of the delegates were not prepared to accept the view that colonialism was dead. There was demand for the implementation of the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' passed by the UN General Assembly in 1960 as a legal and political basis for the elimination of colonialism. Equally significant was the stand of the conference on 'non-intervention' and 'non-interference.' The unanimous opposition of the conference to all practices of racial discrimination was but natural.

The conference expressed the commonly shared faith of the nonaligned nations in the United Nations. The participants showed 'the utmost universal concern' for 'the strengthening and extension of the United Nations' influence in the world.<sup>35</sup>

34. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

35. *World Today* (London), 17(10), October 1961, pp. 411-13.

In this connection the participants emphasised the importance of the recognition of the People's Republic of China and demanded the revision of the structure of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in favour of greater representation of Asian and African countries. Ghana proposed the reorganisation of the office of the Secretary General but in general the participating nations preferred not to commit themselves to a final view on the matter. Other suggestions like the setting up of a new body for supervision of effective implementation of the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Security Council were voiced by certain nations.

The conference ended with the adoption of two documents as the summing up of its work: (1) 'Statement on the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace,' and (2) 'Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries.'<sup>36</sup> The first of these was adopted mainly due to Indian insistence. It may be noted that Nehru had stated in his address to the conference:

When this matter comes up and some kind of resolution or declaration or statement is being issued attention will be paid to this question of world peace being put not only foremost but so that it catches every person's attention and so that it does not get lost in a morass of detail and thus lose all significance and importance.<sup>37</sup>

As a matter of fact, as Mr. Krishna Menon told reporters on 3 September 1961, there was a sharp clash in the committee entrusted with drafting the communique over the question of separating the war threat from colonialism, and in giving greater urgency to the former.<sup>38</sup> But ultimately the Indian stand prevailed.

The 'Statement and Appeal' expressed the 'deep concern of one-third of humanity' represented at the conference about

36. For text see Appendix at the end.

37. Belgrade Conference, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

38. V. R. Bhatt, *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 5 September 1961.



'the imminent and ominous prospect of conflict' which, in the opinion of the conference, 'would inevitably lead to devastation on a scale hitherto unknown, if not to world annihilation.'<sup>39</sup>

The conference demanded as 'urgent and imperative,' that the parties concerned, more particularly the United States of America and the USSR, should immediately suspend their war preparations and take no steps which would further aggravate the situation, and should resume negotiations.

It is significant that even the 'Declaration' started by stating the purpose of the conference as 'contributing more effectively to world peace and security and peaceful cooperation among peoples.'<sup>40</sup> It, however, also took note of the 'transition' from 'an old order,' i.e. imperialism and colonialism to 'a new order,' i.e. freedom, equality and social justice. It described colonialism as the source of conflict and wanted its earliest eradication. It saw the crisis as fraught with the 'gravest threat of war' in history. The conference described war as an anachronism and explained coexistence as a policy aimed at the eradication of ideological conflicts between powers and interference in each other's affairs, making active effort towards the elimination of 'historical injustices' and guaranteeing every people their independent development. Furthermore, it was made clear that the conference did not seek to make 'concrete proposals for the solution of international disputes,' particularly those between the two blocs or to form a new bloc and urged the great powers to take to negotiations. The conference desired active participation of the nonaligned countries in solving outstanding international issues related to peace and security, the further extension of the noncommitted area of the world as an alternative to the present bipolarisation of countries into rival blocs. It expressed support to all peoples fighting for 'their independence and equality.' In short, the Declaration expressed the view of the nonaligned nations in respect of imperialism, racialism, disarmament, economic

39. Belgrade Conference, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 253.

development, the United Nations and the threat to world peace arising from the Berlin problem.

The conference reaffirmed support to the 1960 General Assembly 'Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,' and recommended the 'immediate unconditional, total and final abolition of colonialism and resolved to make a concerted effort to put an end to all types of new colonialism and imperialist domination in all its forms and manifestations.' It demanded an end to the repression of the dependent peoples and expressed concern at the developments in Algeria, Angola, Tunisia, Congo, Palestine, Cuba, etc. It condemned the South African policy of apartheid and supported the rights of ethnic and religious minorities while generally acclaiming the right of self-determination of peoples.

On the question of disarmament the nonaligned nations felt that a radical solution of the problem is possible 'only by means of a general, complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.' The conference urged the great powers to sign 'without further delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament.' It specifically suggested representation of nonaligned nations in disarmament conferences and in the machinery of inspection and control while stressing that all discussions on disarmament should be held under the auspices of the United Nations.

As regards economic development, it called for removal of 'economic imbalance inherited from colonialism and imperialism' and proposed 'the immediate establishment and operation' of a United Nations Capital Development Fund. It invited all to cooperate effectively in the economic and commercial fields and declared that countries receiving technical and economic aid must be free to use it according to their own perception of needs.

In respect of the United Nations, the Declaration expressed the necessity of expanding the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, of evolving 'a more appropriate structure for the Secretariat to reflect equitable regional representation' and of 'the acceptance of the

People's Republic of China by the General Assembly in its following session.

Finally, describing the German and Berlin problem as of global importance, it called upon all parties concerned to refrain from the use of force or the threats of force for its solution.

The Declaration, it was made clear, was to be brought to the attention of all states within and without the United Nations. The Declaration must be considered complementary but secondary in importance, to the 'Statement and Appeal.'

Still another significant work of the conference was the identical letter addressed to the President of the USA and the Soviet Premier requesting them for 'direct negotiations' between their countries as 'the two most powerful nations today and in whose hands lies the key to peace or war.'<sup>41</sup>

The general mood of the conference was certainly one of accommodation and cooperation. Differences were there, but they were natural in view of the varying emotional complexes of the several nonaligned nations belonging to different regions of the world and conditioned by varying stages of development. But no impartial observer would deny that the conference, on the whole, reflected a dominant spirit of mutual accommodation. The King of Morocco was not exaggerating when he said in his concluding speech: 'The conference may be proud of the fact that it has not fulfilled the expectations of the bad prophets.'<sup>42</sup>

Nonalignment, as manifest at this conference, presented 'a spark of fresh hope which may restore confidence... in this troublesome period.'<sup>43</sup> The aim of the conference was not to win approval from one side or the other but to examine the facts of the situation dispassionately and indicate unequivocally the direction in which solutions for the outstanding international problems ought to be sought. In this task the Confer-

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 264-65.

42. *Belgrade Conference*, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

43. *Ibid.*

ence largely succeeded.<sup>44</sup> The *Times* derived some satisfaction from the fact that the countries which met at Belgrade have remained largely unaligned, even among themselves, and that they were unable to form a bloc.<sup>45</sup> But this was what the nonaligned nations had desired. They remained 'unaligned' in as much as they did not form a new power bloc. But they certainly evolved a common outlook. In the words of the *Times*, 'A good deal of ground has been covered since the Bandung Conference' of 1955. Nonalignment has become more self-conscious and more confident.<sup>46</sup>

Three distinct shades of outlook were, however, evident at the conference: the conservative with a distaste for positive concerted action by the nonaligned nations; the centralist, contemplating some measure of active pursuit of nonalignment, but not prepared for any long-term planning and coordination of policies among the uncommitted nations; and the militarist inclined, increasingly, to give a radical and dynamic orientation to nonalignment.<sup>47</sup> But these were shades of outlook, not the grouping at the conference and, as such, they underlined only certain diversities above an underlying unity. Nevertheless, it remains to be pointed out that, notwithstanding their insignificance in terms of military strength, nonalignment may profitably be turned into something more than a moral force. For this a greater cohesion, greater mobilisation, would be needed and this depends on the frequency of their meetings both inside and outside the United Nations and not necessarily always at the summit level. While emphasising the need for increasing cohesion of nonalignment, the following words of Georg Schwarzenberger may well be borne in mind:

By fostering habits of cooperation, however limited, they may assist the Super Powers of our age in ridding themselves of some of their mutual fear and distrust. They may even

44. Iqbal Singh, 'Belgrade Conference, III,' *National Herald* (Lucknow), 24 September 1961.

45. *Times* (London), 7 September 1961.

46. *Ibid.*

47. Iqbal Singh, *op. cit.*



tempt the giant powers to try their hands at breaking the vicious circle of their present eristic politics.<sup>48</sup>

#### IV

##### VIEWS ON THE CONFERENCE

At various stages of the conference there came up several occasions to reflect the attitude to and responses and reactions of the two blocs of powers towards nonalignment. While the ground for the conference was being prepared, the communist bloc, particularly China, seemed to disfavour the idea whereas the west generally showed greater understanding. Press reports indicated that People's Republic of China made certain moves to prevent the holding of the conference by diplomatically dissuading several nonaligned nations.<sup>49</sup> President Kennedy sent a cable describing the conference as 'encouraging'.<sup>50</sup> The UK welcomed it.<sup>51</sup> The west, however, feared that the conference might adopt rigid attitudes on international problems and as a result cause them considerable embarrassment.<sup>52</sup> The communist bloc did not break their silence until the conference met. But China chose the occasion to attack Yugoslavia and India, and continued to remain hostile to the neutral summit.<sup>53</sup>

But no sooner did the conference met than its impact on the aligned powers became evident. Khrushchov made direct approach to Yugoslavia and addressed letters to Nehru and Nasser<sup>54</sup> just on the eve of the conference. West Germany sent a memoranda to the governments participating in the con-

48. Georg Schwarzenberger, 'The Scope for Neutralism,' *The Yearbook of World Affairs* (London), 1961, pp. 233-244.

49. Sudhakar Bhatt in the *Times of India* (Delhi), 17 May 1961.

50. *Arab Observer* (Cairo), 3(10), 3 September 1961, pp. 7-8.

51. Monitor in *Times* (London), 1 September 1960.

52. Surveyor, 'The International Scene' in the *Times of India* (Delhi), 14 August 1961.

53. *Times of India* (Delhi), 14 August 1961.

54. *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 9 September 1961.

ference.<sup>55</sup> West Berlin's Mayor sent a representative to Belgrade.<sup>56</sup>

The reactions of these powers at the conclusion of the conference proved that the shape which nonalignment took at the conference was quite becoming of it. Even China derived satisfaction from the thought that anti-colonialism and anti-racialism were the main achievements of Belgrade.<sup>57</sup> France appreciated the line of self-restraint shown by India. West Berlin expressed gratitude. Both President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchov responded well to the emissaries, although the former was not as warm as the latter. The fact that former colonies were 'dealing with the two extra-European super-powers on matters involving every country on the globe' was described by the *New York Times* as 'a dramatic illustration of the revolutionary changes in the world's political map'. Khrushchov, in his reply to the Letter of Conference, described the views of his government as 'coinciding in many respects with the considerations set forth in the letter.'<sup>58</sup> While agreeing to respond, he, too, pointed out, 'Talks would be useful only if statesmen go to these talks with a serious desire and readiness and clearly realise that no one can turn the tide of events which reflect the natural development of human society.' President Kennedy also agreed to the principle of negotiations and assured that the USA had 'no intention of resorting to force or threats of force to solve the Berlin and German problems,' but made it clear that the west did not 'intend to enter into negotiations under ultimatums or threats.'<sup>59</sup>

In the light of later moves of the great powers, the impact of nonalignment may be considered as somewhat of a mixed character. While on the one hand the conference was followed by Soviet explosion of the 50-megaton (or more) bomb and the counter-threat of the USA to resume nuclear tests, on the other

55. *Ibid.*

56. *Arab Observer*, *op. cit.*

57. *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 28 August 1961.

58. 'Text of the Reply.' *Times of India* (Delhi), 24 September 1961.

59. *Hindu* (Madras), 17 September 1961.

hand, there has been a relaxation of tension on the Berlin crisis and on the question of disarmament. The fact is that with 'their total economic and armed power' not exceeding 'two per cent of the world's',<sup>60</sup> the nonaligned nations could, at best, put in only the moral force of persuasion. As Kingsley Martin put it,<sup>61</sup> 'Their bid for peace may be too weak or have come too late. But they represent a body of opinion which, as long as the hope of peace lasts, neither Moscow nor Washington can afford wholly to neglect.' Perhaps, it is in partial credit to their concerted move that there had at least been a slight improvement in the international situation afterwards.

## V

### CONCLUSION

In summing up, it will not be out of place to examine the force of nonalignment as unleashed by the Belgrade Conference at work, particularly, in relation to the major post-Belgrade stages: the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Nehru-Nasser-Tito meet at Cairo in the third week of November, 1961.

The 'direct impact' of the Belgrade Conference on the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (16 September 1961) was 'unquestionable.'<sup>62</sup> During the General Debate, 'the influence of nonaligned policy and non-bloc approach to world issues and its possibilities' was strongly felt. It was reflected not only in the actions of the Belgrade powers, but also in the speeches of the representatives of many other countries, and was acknowledged in statements of the delegates of the leading power blocs.<sup>63</sup> The way in which the question of the vacant post of Secretary-General was solved

60. Rammanohar Lohia 'Challenges: Beograd and India,' *Mankind* (Hyderabad), 6(3), October 1961.

61. Kingsley Martin, 'The Necessary Heretics,' *New Statesman* (London), LXII (1592), 15 September 1961, pp. 333-34.

62. Leo Mates, *National Herald* (Lucknow), 31 December 1961.

63. Djura Nincic, *Review of International Affairs* (Yugoslavia), 9(283), 20 January 1962, pp. 1-3.

by the election of U Thant of Burma indicated the direction in which the wind was blowing. In respect of nuclear tests, the proposal for the re-establishment of moratorium on nuclear tests was carried, nearly three quarters of the members of the United Nations voting for it. The nonaligned powers worked in cooperation with other nations on the issue.

Although the joint communique of the three-and-a-half hours' Cairo meeting of Nehru, Nasser and Tito on 19 November 1961 described the purpose of the conference as the exchange of views 'on international problems as well as on the events and trends in the international situation which have evolved, of late, especially since the Conference in Belgrade,'<sup>64</sup> the more specific purposes lay in Yugoslavia's concern over the stiff attitude adopted by the USA towards it on matters of economic assistance and in the Yugoslav proposal for a common market of the nonaligned nations.<sup>65</sup> This meeting was not pre-planned but served a useful purpose of providing an opportunity to the three significant leaders of the nonaligned world to make a 'stock-taking' of the ground that the Belgrade spirit had gained. They showed concern for the persistence of the international tension and reaffirmed their resolve to put in their best efforts for the preservation of peace. They noted with satisfaction the contribution of the Belgrade spirit towards some improvement in the international situation as indicated in the appointment of the acting Secretary-General, the UN resolutions on moratorium on nuclear tests and on Africa as an atom-free zone, immediate termination of the hunger-strike of the Algerian leaders and others and the symptoms of cooling off in the Berlin situation. They also emphasised the urgency of reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

64. *Arab Observer* (Cairo), III(22), 27 November 1961, pp. 8-10.

65. Paul Underwood in *New York Times*, 11 November 1961.



## Appendix I

### STATEMENT ON THE DANGER OF WAR AND AN APPEAL FOR PEACE

THIS CONFERENCE OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT of Nonaligned Countries is deeply concerned that even apart from already existing tension the grave and critical situation which, as never before, threatens the world with the imminent and ominous prospect of conflict would almost certainly later develop into a world war. In this age of nuclear weapons and the accumulation of the power of mass destruction, such conflict and war would inevitably lead to devastation on a scale hitherto unknown, if not to world annihilation.

2. This conference considers that this calamity must be avoided, and it is therefore urgent and imperative that the parties concerned, and more particularly the United States of America and the USSR, should immediately suspend their recent war preparations and approaches, take no steps that would aggravate or contribute to further deteriorations in the situation, and resume negotiation for a peaceful settlement of any outstanding differences between them with due regard to the principles of the United Nations Charter and continue negotiating until both they and the rest of the world achieve total disarmament and enduring peace.

3. While decisions leading to war or peace at present rest with these Great Powers, the consequences affect the entire world. All nations and peoples have, therefore, an abiding concern and interest that the approaches and actions of the Great Powers should be such as to enable mankind to move forward to peace and prosperity and not to the doom of extinction. In the certain knowledge that they seek peace, this conference appeals to the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to make most immediate and direct approaches to each other to avert the imminent conflict and establish peace.

4. This conference expresses the earnest hope that all

nations not represented here, conscious of the extreme gravity of the situation will make a similar appeal to the leaders of the powers concerned, thereby proclaiming and promoting the desire and determination of all mankind to see the achievement of lasting peace and security for all nations.

## Appendix II

### DECLARATION OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF NONALIGNED COUNTRIES

THIS CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF the following nonaligned countries:

- |                |                          |
|----------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Afghanistan | 13. Indonesia            |
| 2. Algeria     | 14. Iraq                 |
| 3. Burma       | 15. Lebanon              |
| 4. Cambodia    | 16. Mali                 |
| 5. Ceylon      | 17. Morocco              |
| 6. Congo       | 18. Nepal                |
| 7. Cuba        | 19. Saudi Arabia         |
| 8. Cyprus      | 20. Somalia              |
| 9. Ethiopia    | 21. Sudan                |
| 10. Ghana      | 22. Tunisia              |
| 11. Guinea     | 23. United Arab Republic |
| 12. India      | 24. Yemen                |
|                | 25. Yugoslavia           |

and of the following countries represented by observers:

- |            |           |            |
|------------|-----------|------------|
| 1. Bolivia | 2. Brazil | 3. Ecuador |
|------------|-----------|------------|

was held in Belgrade from September 1 to 6, 1961, for the purpose of exchanging views on international problems with a view to contributing more effectively to world peace and security and peaceful cooperation among peoples.

The Heads of State or Government of the aforementioned countries have met at a moment when international events have taken a turn for the worst and when world peace is seriously threatened. Deeply concerned for the future of peace,

voicing the aspirations of the vast majority of people of the world, aware that, in our time, no people and no government can or should abandon its responsibilities in regard to the safeguarding of world peace, the participating countries—having examined in detail, in an atmosphere of equality, sincerity and mutual confidence, the current state of international relations and trends prevailing in the present-day world—make the following declaration:

The Heads of State or Government of nonaligned countries, noting that there are crises that lead towards a world conflict in the transition from an old order based on domination to a new order based on cooperation between nations, founded on freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity; considering that the dynamic processes and forms of social change often result in or represent a conflict between the old established and the new emerging nationalist forces; considering that a lasting peace can be achieved only if this confrontation leads to a world where the domination of colonialism-imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations is radically eliminated;

and recognising the fact that acute emergencies threatening world peace now exist in this period of conflict in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America and big power rivalry likely to result in world conflagration cannot be excluded;

that to eradicate basically the source of conflict is to eradicate colonialism in all its manifestations and to accept and practise a policy of peaceful coexistence in the world;

that guided by these principles the period of transition and conflict can lay a firm foundation of cooperation and brotherhood between nations, state the following:

## I

War has never threatened mankind with graver consequences than today. On the other hand, never before has mankind had at its disposal stronger forces for eliminating war as an instrument of policy in international relations.

Imperialism is weakening. Colonial empires and other forms of foreign oppression of peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin

America are gradually disappearing from the state of history. Great successes have been achieved in the struggle of many peoples for national independence and equality. In the same way, the peoples of Latin America are continuing to make an increasingly effective contribution to the improvement of international relations. Great social changes in the world are further promoting such a development. All this not only accelerates the end of the epoch of foreign oppression of peoples, but also makes peaceful cooperation among peoples, based on the principles of independence and equal rights, an essential condition for their freedom and progress.

Tremendous progress has been achieved in the development of science, techniques and in the means of economic development.

Prompted by such developments in the world, the vast majority of people are becoming increasingly conscious of the fact that war between peoples constitutes not only an anachronism but also a crime against humanity. This awareness of peoples is becoming a great moral force, capable of exercising a vital influence on the development of international relations.

Relying on this and on the will of their peoples, the governments of countries participating in the conference resolutely reject the view that war, including the cold war, is inevitable, as this view reflects a sense both of helplessness and hopelessness and is contrary to the progress of the world. They affirm their unwavering faith that the international community is able to organise its life without resorting to means which actually belong to a past epoch of human history.

However, the existing military blocs, which are growing into more and more powerful military, economic and political groupings, which, by the logic and nature of their mutual relations, necessarily provoke periodical aggravations of international relations, the cold war and the constant and acute danger of its being transformed into actual war have become a part of the situation prevailing in international relations.

For all these reasons, the Heads of State or Government of nonaligned countries wish, in this way, to draw the attention of the world community to the existing situation and to the necessity that all peoples should exert efforts to find a sure road towards the stabilisation of peace.



## II

The present-day world is characterised by the existence of different social systems. The participating countries do not consider that these differences constitute an insurmountable obstacle for the stabilisation of peace, provided attempts at domination and interference in the internal development of other peoples and nations are ruled out.

All peoples and nations have to solve the problems of their own political, economic, social and cultural systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and potentialities.

Furthermore, any attempt at imposing upon peoples one social or political system or another by force and from outside is a direct threat to world peace.

The participating countries consider that under such conditions the principles of peaceful coexistence are the only alternative to the cold war and to a possible general nuclear catastrophe. Therefore, by these principles which include the right of peoples to self-determination, to independence and to the free determination of the forms and methods of economic, social and cultural development—must be the only basis of all international relations.

Active international cooperation in the fields of material and cultural exchanges among peoples is an essential means for the strengthening of confidence in the possibility of peaceful coexistence among States with different social systems.

The participants in the conference emphasise, in this connection, that the policy of coexistence amounts to an active effort towards the elimination of historical injustices and the liquidation of national oppression, guaranteeing, at the same time, to every people their independent development.

Aware that ideological differences are necessarily a part of the growth of the human society, the participating countries consider that peoples and Governments shall refrain from any use of ideologies for the purpose of waging cold war, exercising pressure, or imposing their will.

## III

The Heads of State or Government of nonaligned countries participating in the Conference are not making concrete pro-

posals for the solution of all international disputes, and particularly disputes between the two blocs. They wish, above all, to draw attention to those acute problems of our time which must be solved rapidly, so that they should not lead to irreparable consequences.

In this respect, they particularly emphasise the need for a great sense of responsibility and realism when undertaking the solution of various problems resulting from differences in social systems.

The nonaligned countries represented at this conference do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc. They sincerely desire to cooperate with any Government which seeks to contribute to the strengthening of confidence and peace in the world.

The nonaligned countries wish to proceed in this manner all the more so as they are aware that peace and stability in the world depend, to a considerable extent, on the mutual relations of the Great Powers.

The participants in the conference consider that, under present conditions, the existence and the activities of non-aligned countries in the interests of peace are one of the more important factors for safeguarding world peace.

The participants in the conference consider it essential that the nonaligned countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and security in the world as none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues.

They consider that the further extensions of the non-committed area of the world constitutes the only possible and indispensable alternative to the policy of total division of the world into blocs, and intensification of cold war policies. The nonaligned countries provide encouragement and support to all peoples fighting for their independence and equality.

The participants in the conference are convinced that the emergence of newly-liberated countries will further assist in narrowing of the area of bloc antagonisms and thus encourage cooperation among independent and equal nations.

1. The participants in the conference solemnly reaffirm their support to the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples', adopted at the

15th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and recommend the immediate unconditional, total and final abolition of colonialism and resolve to make a concerted effort to put an end to all types of new colonialism and imperialist domination in all its forms and manifestations.

2. The participants in the conference demand that an immediate stop be put to armed action and repressive measures of any kind directed against dependent peoples to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and that the integrity of their national territory should be respected. Any aid given by any country to a colonial power in such suppression is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.

3. The participating countries consider the struggle of the people of Algeria for freedom, self-determination and independence, and for the integrity of its national territory including the Sahara, to be just and necessary and are, therefore, determined to extend to the people of Algeria all the possible support and aid. The Heads of State or Government are particularly gratified that Algeria is represented at this conference by its rightful representative, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Algeria.

4. The participating countries drew attention with great concern to the developments in Angola and to the intolerable measures of repression taken by the Portuguese colonial authorities against the people of Angola and demand that an immediate end should be put to any further shedding of blood of the Angolan people, and the people of Angola should be assisted by all peace-loving countries, particularly member states of the United Nations, to establish their free and independent state without delay.

5. The participants in the conference demand the immediate termination of all colonial occupation and the restoration of the territorial integrity to the rightful people in countries in which it has been violated in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as the withdrawal of foreign forces from their national soil.

6. The participating countries demand the immediate evacuation of French armed forces from the whole of the

Tunisian territory in accordance with the legitimate right of Tunisia to the exercise of its full national sovereignty.

7. The participating countries demand that the tragic events in the Congo must not be repeated and they feel that it is the duty of the world community to continue to do everything in its power in order to erase the consequences and to prevent any further foreign intervention in this young African state, and to enable the Congo to embark freely upon the road of its independent development based on respect for its sovereignty, unity and its territorial integrity.

8. The participants in the conference resolutely condemn the policy of apartheid by the Union of South Africa and demand the immediate abandonment of this policy. They further state that the policy of racial discrimination anywhere in the world constitutes a grave violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

9. The participating countries declare solemnly the absolute respect of the rights of ethnic or religious minorities to be protected in particular against crimes of genocide or any other violation of their fundamental human rights.

10. The participants in the conference condemn the imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East, and declare their support for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations.

11. The participating countries consider the establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries, particularly against their express will, a gross violation of the sovereignty of such States. They declare their full support to countries who are endeavouring to secure the vacation of these bases. They call upon those countries maintaining foreign bases to consider seriously their abolition as a contribution to world peace.

12. They also acknowledge that the North American military base at Guantanamo, Cuba, to the permanence of which the Government and people of Cuba have expressed their opposition, affects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country.



13. The participants in the conference reaffirm their conviction that:

(a) All nations have the rights of unity, self-determination, and independence by virtue of which right they can determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development without intimidation or hindrance.

(b) All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

The participating countries believe that the right of Cuba as that of any other nation to freely choose their political and social systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and possibilities should be respected.

14. The participating countries express their determination that no intimidation, interference or intervention should be brought to bear in the exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples, including their right to pursue constructive and independent policies for the attainment and preservation of their sovereignty.

15. The participants in the conference consider that disarmament is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution of this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of armaments, in the unanimous view of participating countries, can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.

16. The Heads of State or Government point out that general and complete disarmament should include the elimination of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms as well as elimination of institutions and installations for military training, except for purposes of internal security; and the total prohibition of the production, possession and utilisation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms, bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of equipment and installations for the delivery and placement and operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories.

17. The participating countries call upon States in general, and States exploring outer space at present in particular, to undertake to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. They express the hope that the international community will, through the collective action, establish an international agency with a view to promote and coordinate the human actions in the field of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

18. The participants in the conference urge the Great Powers to sign without further delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament in order to save mankind from the scourge of war and to release energy and resources now being spent on armaments to be used for the peaceful economic and social development of all mankind. The participating countries also consider that:

(a) The nonaligned nations should be represented at all further world conferences on disarmament;

(b) All discussions on disarmament should be held under the auspices of the United Nations;

(c) General and complete disarmament should be guaranteed by an effective system of inspection and control, the teams of which should include members of nonaligned nations.

19. The participants in the conference consider it essential that an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests should be urgently concluded. With this aim in view, it is necessary that negotiations be immediately resumed, separately or as part of negotiations on general disarmament. Meanwhile, the moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons could be resumed and observed by all countries.

20. The participants in the conference recommend that the General Assembly of the United Nations should, at its forthcoming session, adopt a decision on the convening either of a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to discussion of disarmament or on the convening of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament.

21. The participants in the conference consider that efforts should be made to remove economic imbalance inherited from colonialism and imperialism. They consider it necessary to



close, through accelerated economic, industrial and agricultural development, the ever-widening gap in the standards of living between the few economically advanced countries and the many economically less-developed countries. The participants in the conference recommend the immediate establishment and operation of a United Nations Capital Development Fund. They further agree to demand a just terms of trade for the economically less-developed countries and, in particular, constructive efforts to eliminate the excessive fluctuations in primary commodity trade and the restrictive measure and practices which adversely affect the trade and revenues of the newly-developing countries. In general, to demand that the fruits of the scientific and technological revolution be applied in all fields of economic development to hasten the achievement of international social justice.

22. The participating countries invite all the countries in the course of development to cooperate effectively in the economic and commercial fields so as to face the policies of pressure in the economic sphere, as well as the harmful results which may be created by the economic blocs of the industrial countries. They invite all the countries concerned to consider to convene, as soon as possible an international conference to discuss their common problems and to reach an agreement on the ways and means of repelling all damage which may hinder their development; and to discuss and agree upon the most effective measures to ensure the realisation of their economic and social development.

23. The countries participating in the conference declare that the recipient countries must be free to determine the use of the economic and technical assistance which they receive, and to draw up their own plans and assign priorities in accordance with their needs.

24. The participating countries consider it essential that the General Assembly of the United Nations should, through the revision of the Charter, find a solution to the question of expanding the membership of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council in order to bring the composition and work of these two most important organs of the General Assembly into harmony with the needs of the Organi-

sation and with the expanded membership of the United Nations.

25. The unity of the world organisation and the assuring of the efficiency of its work make it absolutely necessary to evolve a more appropriate structure for the Secretariat of the United Nations, bearing in mind equitable regional distribution.

26. Those of the countries participating in the conference who recognise the Government of the People's Republic of China recommend that the General Assembly in its forthcoming session should accept the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate representatives of that country in the United Nations.

27. The countries participating in the conference consider that the German problem is not merely a regional problem but liable to exercise a decisive influence on the course of further developments in international relations.

Concerned at the developments which have led to the present acute aggravation of the situation in regard to Germany and Berlin, the participating countries call upon all parties concerned not to resort to or threaten the use of force to solve the German question or the problem of Berlin, in accordance with the appeal made by the Heads of State or Government on 5th September, 1961.

The Heads of State or Government of nonaligned countries resolve that this Declaration should be forwarded to the United Nations and brought to the attention of all the Member States of the world organisation. The present Declaration will be also forwarded to all the other States.